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Title: Understandings of understanding: An inquiry concerning 
experiential conditions for developmental learning 
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ISBN: 91-7346-349-3 
This thesis is about understandings of understanding and has developed from 
previous research on study skill and conceptions of learning among participants in 
various forms of education. The purpose was to investigate understandings of 
understanding as a phenomenon and the significance of understanding of 
understanding for learning. 
The investigation involved 101 persons between 12 and 75 years of age from four 
different forms of education. The data was produced in two steps. In the first, the 
participants wrote a narrative about an occasion when they experienced that they had 
understood something. In the second, 8–10 participants out of each group were 
selected and participated in a subsequent interview about the meaning of 
understanding. The results were constituted through two interpretative turns. Data 
was analysed with reference to forms of understanding, types and conceptions of 
understanding and a selection of the cumulated contribution of four participants was 
also analysed as expressions for differently advanced forms of consciousness of 
understanding and their significance.  
The enquiry resulted in a description of three different ways of understanding 
understanding as a phenomenon. Understanding emerged as: 1) a reception of new 
knowledge either through observation or information; 2) an acquisition of desired 
knowledge through relatively successful completion of deliberate learning activity; 
and: 3) realisation of a new truth on the basis of experience and interpretations of 
experience. This was the first part of the findings. Regarding the second, the 
different understandings expressed by four participants, this indicated that 
performance of learning activity that involves development of more advanced 
systematic understanding as an essential objective, requires relatively sophisticated 
understandings of understanding. It also suggests that the development of 
understanding is guided by the conversations about learning and understanding that 
are developed in different pedagogical practices. 
The conclusion is that relatively comprehensive and formal education, is a necessary 
but not sufficient precondition for the development of experiential prerequisites for 
deliberate developmental learning. In addition, the education must also make 
provisions so the learner may also realise that all human understanding is finite and 
contingent. 
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PREFACE 
About 4 1/2 kilometres north north east of Nyhamnsläge, on the other 
side of the Kullaberg peninsula in the north western part of Skåne, lies a 
remote rocky cove called Hålestenar. Since the north face of Kullaberg, 
which is a ten kilometre long primary rock horst, is very step and the 
beach is covered with large erratic block, it is hard to get there. But at 
this remote place, the artist and art historian Lars Vilks started in the 
summer of 1980 to work on a sculpture of driftwood and forest rests 
(Vilks, 1994). 
According to Vilks’ own account, which is written in the third person, 
“[t]his was his first attempt to construct anything, and it took time 
before he – the long road – learnt a kind of trade. He called the work 
‘Nimis’, a word in Latin that means ‘too much, or a super abundance’. 
The idea… was to create a place that could stimulate the mind, a 
curious suggestion for unification of theory and praxis.” (ibid., p. 17). 
I had my first encounter with Nimis in the summer of 1982. At that 
time I was a young and newly wedded first year student at the uni-
versity. It was my wife, Cecilia, that took me to it. She had heard her 
parents speak about the sculpture, which at that time was subject for 
animated discussion in the local press. Cecilia led me along the trail 
that was gentle to begin with, but that soon got rough. After about a 15 
minutes we reached the beginning of a ravine and started to go down. 
After about 10 more minutes the sculpture all of a sudden appeared to 
us. It was an enormous driftwood construction, about 75 meters long 
and had several towers. The highest was over 10 meters high. And all 
was made out of thousands of driftwood pieces, dead tree limbs, rocks 
and nails. I could hardly believe my eyes, “And this is a one man’s 
work”, I repeated to my self over and over. 
About one and a half years later I started with my own construction, 
the book you have in your hands. I’ve been back to Nimis several times 
since my first encounter. The last time I was there was in 1994. The 
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construction was then about 150 meters long and the highest peak was 
15 meters tall. The construction weighed 70.000 kilos and was held 
together by 150.000 nails. Vilks had by then worked on the sculpture 
on 3.500 occasions. 
At that time, I made also a new acquaintance. Some 200 meters south 
of Nimis, Vilks was working on a new construction, Arx (fortress). I 
walked over to it and noticed that it was made out of rocks, iron bars, 
concrete, and decorated with things like wrist watches and letters. As I 
walked up the narrow ravine that afternoon, the idea struck me that 
the manuscript I was working on was a little like both Nimis and Arx. 
At that time I had serious doubts that I ever would be able to finish the 
project I started as a young doctoral student. The project had grown 
over its proportions. The time for the work on it had also run out. And 
I felt like I carried the weight of the world on my shoulders. I was 
almost down and out, but I’ve continued to go on with my project and 
now I have come this far with it. Being here, I have come to realise 
better than ever that the work of the thesis is equally as little as Nimis 
and Arx are, the work of only one man. It is certainly true that I am the 
author of the book, but behind me are all the good women and men, 
boys and girls, that have helped me on it. 
The book is the latest in a row of writings on the experience of learning 
and understanding among participants in various forms of education. 
It is about unfolding understandings of understanding that involve 
deliberate development of more advanced systematic understanding 
of the object for one’s teaching and studying, as a general prerequisite 
for teaching and learning. This is a teaching and learning that is 
believed to be more educative that teaching and learning that merely 
aims at “understanding”. This is because, whereas the latter form of 
reaching-learning is merely oriented towards establishing what is, the 
former is oriented toward bringing out what can become. 
I have dedicated the book to “all my teachers and their teachers with 
deep gratitude and great expectations”. This might need some words 
of explanation. For me, “teachers” are first of all persons that one has 
learnt of, now learns of and can come to learn of in the future. Teachers 
 Preface iii 
are thus present, past and future servants of one’s education. My 
teachers are the persons that have addressed me, that I have heard and 
that I have learnt of. I also think of them that I learn of now and that I 
can learn of in the future. My teachers’ teachers are the persons that 
they have learnt of, now learn of and can learn of in the future.  
Among my teachers, I think first of all of my mother Kerstin and father 
Lennart, my brothers and sisters (Kenneth, Liselotte, Morgan, Per-
Anders and Lena) and their husbands and wives, for their unfailing 
love for me. I think also of all the persons that have been such a good 
friends, neighbours, classmates, coaches, teachers, church leaders, 
employers, managers, work-mates, collaborators, etc. through out the 
years from birth until now. It takes a whole city and more to educate a 
person. Thank you all! 
At the university and on various conferences, I have met a lot of 
people that mean a great deal to me. Among these, I think for instance 
of Claes Alexandersson, who encouraged me to apply to the researcher 
education and Ference Marton, who has been my supervisor 
throughout the years and without whom this thesis would never have 
come into existence. I would also like to thank Staffan Larsson for 
being such a great “coach” in the Privux-project and for good 
supervision while Ference was on the first Sabbatical and of course for 
the contribution that has been made to this project by the participants 
in the study and their teachers. Thank you for sharing your time, 
thoughts and efforts with me in the quest to make sense of 
understanding. 
In addition to the above, I would here also like to express my gratitude 
to a long list of persons that have been good study comrades and work 
mates over the years. In the work with the manuscript, which to say 
the least has been cumbersome, I have received a lot of good 
comments from a lot of persons. Among these, I would especially like 
to mention Biörn Hasselgren who has supervised me so generously 
with his tough care since Ference went to Hong Kong. I express here 
also my gratitude to Bengt Molander, Janet Burns, Dennis Beach and 
Márta Fülöp for their comments on earlier and in some cases even 
more recent versions of the manuscript. Over the years I have also 
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received financial support from several sources. I thank you for this. It 
takes a whole university and more to educate a researcher. Thank you 
all! 
I would also like to express my gratitude to my wife Cecilia and our 
four children Amelie, Amanda, Aron and Astrid, for their unfailing 
support in my “Nimis-project”. Let’s go and have a picnic at 
Hålestenar as soon as school’s out to celebrate our part of the project! I 
would here also like take the opportunity to thank Cecilia’s parents 
Kalle and Berit, her sister Wanda and her husband Jørn for their 
unfailing support to me and my family through out the years. It takes 
a wife, children, an extended family and more to educate a man, 
father, son and brother in law. Thank you all! 
At last I would also like to acknowledge your role in the project too, 
dear reader(s). For when summarising a Nimis-project “one can use 
the familiar aphorism of Marcel Duchamp, that ‘the observer creates 
the work of art’. This was the case with Nimis. It was created and 
continues to be created in a perpetual friction against social reality. 
Nimis is still in progress. It does not exist officially and lives in a 
sphere of lawlessness. And it scarcely reminds us about anything other 
than itself.” (Vilks, 1994, p. 58) 
So, good luck in your completion of the work as a reader. I hope you 
will find that it was worth the effort! I also hope to learn from you and 
from what you manage to make from the book. 
Nyhamnsläge, April 10, 1999 
Glen Helmstad 
 PART I 
INTRODUCTION OF THE RESEARCH 
PROBLEM 

  
Chapter 1 
 
OVERRIDING PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, 
and not only will you understand the broad lines 
of all there is to be understood, but also you will 
possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, 
opening upon all further developments of 
understanding. (Lonnergan, 1956, p. xxviii) 
This study is from an educational context. In educational activity, as 
well as in all other activity that involves communication, understanding 
is a highly prestigious word. It is a word that is employed to express 
meaning about and to refer to something that is desired; something 
that one would like to do or see come to pass, and is employed 
whenever one hears, reads, thinks, says or writes things like: “[the 
s]tudies shall develop the pupils’ abilities to understand” (Regler för 
målstyrning, 1994, p. 138; my translation) or “[the] evidence is fairly 
compelling that… students often manage to get through courses 
without acquiring a clear understanding of some of the most 
fundamental aspects of the material the courses are intended to cover” 
(Nickerson, 1985, p. 201).  
In this sense, the meaning for “to understand” functions as an or-
ganisational notion which guides one in planing, implementing, 
participating, performing and evaluating cognitive transactions as 
parents, teachers, administrators and students in education 
(Rosenberg, 1981). It is obvious that teachers and others that have an 
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interest in teaching and learning as parents, administrators and 
researchers in education as a rule think that “understanding” means 
something other than “rote-learning”.  
In order to “understand”, it is argued, it is not sufficient that a student 
“can give evidence that he [or she] remembers, either by recalling or 
by recognising, some idea or phenomenon with which he/she has had 
experience of in the educational process” (Bloom, Engelhart, Furst, Hill 
& Krathwohl, 1956, p. 28 f.). In addition the student must also be able 
to present evidence that he/she can also utilise what he/she knows “in 
new situations in a form very different from that in which it was 
originally encountered” (ibid., p. 29). In other words: 
we cannot be said to understand something unless we can employ our 
knowledge wisely, fluently, flexibly, and aptly in particular and diverse 
contexts. (Wiggins, 1993, p. 200) 
In spite of this awareness of what it means “to understand”, it seems as 
if parents, teachers, administrators, and researchers in education, are 
often not consciously aware of what it takes to understand, nor what is 
involved in understanding. Nor do they seem to be consciously aware 
of what they mean understanding as a phenomenon is. 
The assumed difficulty in explaining what understanding is, or what is 
meant with understanding, is something that also seems to be shared 
by philosophers, logicians, linguists, and psychologists, that have in 
one way or another approached and tried to understand un-
derstanding (Parret & Bouveresse, 1981). In a linguist’s treatment of 
the problem of understanding understanding for instance, it is even 
suggested “that to understand understanding is a task to be attempted 
and not to be achieved today or even tomorrow” (Ziff, 1972, p. 20).  
Understanding is obviously difficult to understand. It seems even as if 
it is difficult to understand wherein the difficulties in understanding 
understanding reside and what they consist of. Reflecting upon this, 
Parret and Bouveresse (1981) note that, “[a]n object can be difficult to 
understand because of its particular complexity” (p. 1). This is 
obviously the stance that is taken up in Ziff (1972). An object can, 
according to Parret and Bouveresse (1981) however, also be difficult to 
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understand because of the vagueness or “in distinctness” of the 
character of the thing under consideration, or because of its only too 
great simplicity. Difficulties in trying to understand an object may, 
following these authors, also though stem from approaching the object 
as something other than itself, or from its “exceptional and unheard-of 
aspect, or equally from its excessively ordinary, mundane and familiar 
character.” (ibid., p. 1).  
Lingering on to the latest mentioned reason, Parret and Bouveresse 
draw attention to the phenomenon that was touched upon above, 
namely the experience that something that has always been under-
stood as being selbstverständlisch (self evident) all of a sudden becomes 
strange and incomprehensible, when one tries to give an explanation 
or reach an explicit understanding of it. The attention is also directed 
to a classical example of this phenomenon, which has also been 
discussed by Wittgenstein, namely the difficulties Augustine 
experienced when he asked what time is. These difficulties could 
obviously not stem from that he had no or little experience of time, but 
rather from that he was not consciously aware of what he experienced 
time as.  
Commenting upon this source of difficulty in understanding under-
standing, Parret and Bouveresse (1981) conclude finally by quoting 
Tugendhat that: 
There seems to be here a domain of knowledge where our ignorance does not 
seem to be based on an insufficient experience but on the fact that it concerns 
aspects of our understanding which are too close to us and too evident 
(Selbstverständlich ) for us. We are not looking here for an explanation of an 
ununderstandable object in its factuality but for an elucidation of what is 
already understood. And this elucidation can only be obtained by reflecting on 
our understanding itself, not by experience. (Tugendhat, 1976, p. 19; in Parret 
& Bouveresse, 1981, p. 1) 
The difficulties in understanding understanding appear, thus, not only 
to be many, but also stem from different sources. It seems also 
reasonable to assume that difficulties in understanding understanding 
also vary with a lot of other things, such as, what discipline the 
enquiry is carried out in, at what point in history, by whom, under 
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what circumstances, for what purpose, towards what end, with what 
means, etc. But what is meant semantically with “understanding”?  
A brief check in any of the larger dictionaries reveals that the noun 
“understanding” and the approximate Swedish equivalents, are verbal 
nouns: i.e. nouns that are “directly derived from a verb or verb stem 
and in some uses having the sense and the construction of the verb.” 
(Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1991, p. 1309). In 
Swedish, the nouns (förståelse; förstående) derive from an Old Swedish 
verb, forstanda, that comes from the Old Saxon verb forstandan. This 
corresponds with the Old High German verbs firstantan and firstan, the 
origins to the German verb verstehen which means know [how to], 
grasp, apprehend, mean (Svenska Akademin, 1928, F. 3256). In the 
English case, the noun (understanding) derives from the Old English 
verb understondan, -standan, that corresponds with the Old Frisian verb 
undirstonda, the Mediaeval Danish verb understande, the Mediaeval 
Low German verb unterstan, to understand, to step under, the 
Medieval Dutch onderstaaen, and the Old High German understan, -
sten, which means to take upon oneself, to venture, presume, etc. 
(Oxford English Dictionary, 1970, p. 147). The Oxford English 
Dictionary says also that the same use of stand with a different prefix 
appears in the Old English forstandan, which like the Old Swedish verb 
forstanda is traced back to the origins for the German verb verstehen.  
In each of the two cases, the verbs from which the nouns are derived, 
are thus formed out of a combination of a prefix and word for a mode 
of standing. In the first case, the prefix seems to stem from the 
preposition, före (before, in front of, ahead of). In the second case, the 
prefix seems to stem from the preposition under (below, beneath). In 
spite of this obvious difference, the Swedish and the English verb seem 
to be quite similar to the German verb Verstehen, whose original 
meaning appears to have been “the legal sense of the world, i.e. 
representing a case before the court… mastering it to such an extent 
that one can cope with all the possible moves of the opposing party 
and assert one’s own legal standpoint” (Gadamer, 1960/1993, p. 260). 
In this sense “to understand” means, thus, to know a thing to the 
extent that one also knows how to explain it. It is a sense of “to 
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understand” that reminds of what educators and researchers in 
education appear to sustain. 
Now, “to understand” (förstå) is not only used in a non transitive 
sense. In Svenska akademins ordbok öfver det svenska språket [The Swedish 
academy’s dictionary over the Swedish language)], for instance, the 
word förstå (understand) is also said to have the following usage: 
1) … notice, experience…; learn to know…; 2)… get to know, learn that, hear, 
experience…; 3) find out; realise that, realise (something or that something is 
or what is)…; 4) (with the intellect) penetrate, comprehend the real meaning or 
the significant or the inner coherence in (something) realise (how something is 
possible or why something is in a certain way, etc.); also realise the natural or 
justified in (something); grasp… 6) (with the intellect) apprehend (a through 
speech or writing or sign or otherwise made message), so that one with the 
words or signs etc. associates a certain significance or meaning, grasp…, 
apprehend; … 7) (especially in writing) (ap)prehend or construe (something) in 
a certain way, take or comprehend (something) in a certain significance), (for 
oneself) impute a certain meaning or significance in (something); interpret.… 
8) mean, refer to, intend; put a certain meaning or significance into in 
(something). (Svenska Akademin, 1928, F3256-3262; my translation. See 
Appendix 1 for a transcription of the original text.) 
In the English Oxford English Dictionary (1970), the word to understand is 
said to have the following usage : 
1. To comprehend; to apprehend the meaning or import of; to grasp the idea 
of… c. To apprehend clearly the character or nature of (a person)… 2. To 
comprehend by knowing the meaning of the words employed; to be acquainted 
with (a language) to this extent…b. To grasp the meaning or purport of the 
words (or signs) used by (a person)… 3. To comprehend as a fact; to grasp 
clearly, to realise… 4. a. To grasp as a fixed or established fact or principle; to 
regard as settled or implied without specific mention… b. …to… learn by 
information received… c. To take or accept as a fact without positive 
knowledge or certainty; to get as an impression or idea; to believe… 5. To 
take, interpret, or view in a certain way… 6. a. To give heed to, attend to… b. 
To receive, accept… c. To conceive… 7. To recognise or regard as present in 
thought, though not expressly stated or mentioned; to supply mentally… 
(Oxford English Dictionary, 1970, volume XI, T-U, p. 147 f.). 
In this sense, the Swedish verb förstå and the English verb to understand 
appear to be used in just about the same senses. Both the one and the 
other can function as a word that expresses meaning about and refers 
to what happens when understanding takes place. In this sense 
understanding refers not to a concord nor to an intellect or a 
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signification, meaning, sense or comprehension of something, which 
are some of the things that can be ment with the noun (Svenska 
Akademin, 1928, F. 3264; Oxford English Dictionary, 1970, volume XI, 
T-U, p. 148 f.). It refers rather to something that presents the character 
of a happening or an event, namely what could be said to take place 
whenever one arrives at or whenever a new significance, meaning, 
sense or comprehension, etc. takes place in the world or, in other 
words, comes into existence.  
This use of the noun “understanding” (förstående) suggests that 
understanding is perhaps not so much something that one does or 
achieves, as it is something that one participates in. If understood in 
this sense, understanding can perhaps also be interpreted as the kinds 
of occurrences or happenings where one: 1) experiences that one 
realises something, for instance, that something is or what is; or where 
one: 2) experiences that one penetrates, or comprehends something, for 
instance, the real meaning or the significance or inner coherence in 
something, or the idea of how something is possible or why something 
is in a certain way.  
In this perspective, understanding is, thus, first of all conceived as 
human experience. It is what one goes through whenever one arrives 
at a new comprehension, insight, etc. In this sense, it is not so much 
something that a person does, as it is something that he/she undergoes 
as he/she grows more experienced. It is a conception of understanding 
that first and foremost has been inspired by Gadamer (1960/1993), but 
that has also been inspired by Vygotskij (1934/1987), Whorf (1942), 
Leont’ev (1959/1977), Engeström (1987), Lave and Wenger (1995), 
Lave (1990) and others (Säljö, 1982; Giorgi, 1985, 1992).  
According to this conception, understanding is not so much something 
that one has achieved as it is something that one exercises and 
undergoes as one participates and grows into relatively fully fledged 
practitioners of particular and related practices (Lave, 1990). Leont’ev 
(1959/1977) provides, through an example from the practice of child 
rearing a principle explanation of the character of the circumstances 
wherein one rises to relatively more insightful being: 
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The mother or the child’s nurse feeds the child with a spoon. Shortly thereafter 
she places the cutlery in the child’s hand, and the child attempts now to eat 
with it without assistance. 
At the same time the child lets itself be guided by its natural tendency to put 
everything that it lays hand on, in its mouth. 
The child does not yet, hold the spoon horizontally, so therefore the food slides 
off. The mother does not however merely observe. She helps the child in that 
she intercedes in its actions. In the course of the mutual action that thereby 
arises, the child now forms the skill to use the spoon; it uses it from now on as 
a human tool. (p. 627; my translation)  
This example gives a principal explanation of the circumstances 
wherein one above all rises to better “understanding”, one does so first 
of all in an educational activity and in an activity that involves 
elements of instruction. In an attempt to determine the meaning of 
“education”, Myhre (1992) arrived at the following definition: 
With education we mean the over all attempts of particular adults and the older 
generation to – under mutual influence – bring about the knowledge, skills, 
attitudes and values, forms of life together and beliefs to children and youth 
that represent the social and cultural coherence that the education take place in, 
in such a way that the new generation receive help in realising their abilities 
and possibilities toward human kindness, responsibility and independence, and 
by this become able also to contribute to society and culture in both a 
stabilising and innovating sense. (p. 45; my translation). 
This gives an image of education as a certain form of interpersonal and 
societal activity (Enerstvedt, 1989). As such, education refers to the 
activity where teaching and learning are co-ordinated for the purpose 
of developing socially and personally desired abilities. Education is 
whenever one or several persons (A), which want one or several other 
persons (B) to develop a personally and socially desired ability (X), 
perform an activity (T) with the purpose to engage B in activity (S), 
which A thinks can lead to X, and where B as a response to T also tries 
to do S in order to develop X and thereby at least to some extent also 
succeeds in doing so (Hirst, 1973, p. 171 ff.).  
On the basis of this, one can also say that education is the activity form 
where typically at least two persons – that differ from one another in at 
least some respect with reference to their functional relations relative a 
particular object – interact with one another through communicative 
actions about that object with particular means that lead to mutual 
 Overriding purpose of the study 10 
actions arising whereby the “less knowledgeable” (with the assistance 
of the “more knowledgeable”) takes over and develops a particular 
socially and personally desired functional relation relative that 
particular object. If understood in this sense, one can, to put it shorter, 
say that education essentially consists in teaching and learning in 
productive association. And if teaching is reserved for “the more 
knowledgeable’s” activity, learning can be reserved for “the less 
knowledgeable’s” corresponding activity in that dual activity form 
called education. 
GENERAL DELIMITATION OF THE PURPOSE 
This thesis has been conceived in an educational context. In educa-
tional activities of the kind that are performed in a researcher edu-
cation, the purpose is to develop a better understanding of whatever it 
is that is the subject for study. In this case, the subject for study has 
been “understandings of understanding” among persons engage in 
studies. Assuming that just as what one tends to understand with 
understanding guides, one as educator in planning, conducting, and 
evaluating teaching activity, so does what one understands with 
understanding as a learner, guide one in one’s participation in and 
performance of study activities. Moreover, assuming that what one 
tends to call understanding is determined by one’s previous and 
current experiences of understanding, this experiential ground forms a 
basis for one’s current personal readiness to engage in study activity 
and tends to develop as one grows more experienced in 
understanding. The study has also been intended as an inquiry into 
this, as a prerequisite for engagement in such activity (Marton, 
Dahlgren, Svensson, & Säljö, 1977; Marton, Hounsell, & Entwistle, 
1984, 1997; Svensson, 1984b).  
The research object is, thus, studying persons’ understandings of 
understanding, with the general overriding purpose to study such 
experiential conditions for developmental learning, so one may better 
understand what it takes to understand, what is involved in 
understanding or, in other words, the learning that involves devel-
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opment of better understanding. Hence: Understandings of under-
standing: An inquiry concerning experiential conditions for developmental 
learning.  
OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis consists of four parts. These are: I. Introduction; II. 
Methodology; III. Results; and: IV. Discussion.  
In the first of these parts, Introduction of the research problem; which 
besides this introductory chapter also consists of chapters two, three 
and four; the more precise purpose of the study is introduced against 
the background of some previous studies of conceptions of learning 
and understanding, and against the background of an account of how 
understanding has been understood in the philosophical tradition.  
In the second part, Methodology, which consists of chapters five and six, 
the design and the procedures of the study are, explained against the 
background of an account of the general characteristics of the research 
approach that the work can be considered as an example of.  
In the third part, Results, which consists of chapter seven and eight, the 
results about how understanding of understanding tends to develop, 
and the significance of different ways of understanding un-
derstanding, is presented against the background of a presentation of 
the results concerning how understanding has appeared to be 
understood by the subjects in the empirical study.  
In the fourth part, Discussion, the results of the investigation are 
discussed against the background of previous studies, the foreground 
of the possibility to investigate the development of understandings of 
understanding and the pedagogical significance of such development 
more precisely. In this part the results are also discussed with respect 
to the potential significance for relevant aspects of pedagogical 
practice.  

  
Chapter 2 
 
UNDERSTANDING IN PSYCHOLOGY AND 
EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 
At root understanding is a true paradox…what it 
means to understand is… much more complex 
than might first appear. But recognition of this 
fact may be a step in the direction of better 
understanding… (Nickerson, 1985, p. 235, 236) 
Against the background of the initial characterisation of understand-
ing, it could be expected that there is quite a lot of psychological and 
educational research on understanding. Judging from the indexes of 
contemporary encyclopaedias of psychology and education and 
educational research, however, the interest seems very small. The 
word understanding is, for instance, not included at all in the index of 
The Encyclopaedia of Psychology (Corsini & Ozaki, 1984). It is used in The 
Encyclopaedia of Educational Research (Mitzel, Best & Rabinowitz, 1982) 
and in The International Encyclopaedia of Education – Research and Studies 
(Husén & Postlethwaite, 1985–1990), but only in relation to 
hermeneutics and the debate of the character of human studies as 
opposed to natural science on the one hand, and in relation to research 
on student thinking on the other.  
Attempts to find relevant literature through literature searches in 
databases such, as ERIC, PSYCINFO and PSYCHALERT can at first 
sight appear more promising, since one there actually can find quite a 
few titles that include the key word. At a closer inspection however, it 
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emerges that hardly any of the articles are about understanding as a 
phenomenon. An exception from this rule is Nickerson (1985), who 
under the title of Understanding understanding in the American Journal of 
Education, draws attention to quite a lot of research on students’ 
learning and understanding in teaching and learning in various 
school-, high school and university subjects over the last two or three 
decades.1 This research has, following Nickerson (1985), shed some 
light on the nature of understanding as he also indicates, as he also 
indicates, one has still not, however, yet arrived at a working 
definition of understanding  
Assuming that the achievement of this objective will be very important 
for working out “educational policies and procedures that will ensure 
understanding” (Nickerson, 1985, p. 229), Nickerson also discusses 
some of the results from the above research with reference to what it 
seems to reveal about the nature of understanding, what it means to 
understand something and how to assess understanding:  
Understanding is an active process. It requires the connecting of facts, the 
relating of newly acquired information to what is already known, the weaving 
of bits of knowledge into an integrated and cohesive whole. In short, it requires 
not only having knowledge but also doing something with it. (p. 234) 
Notwithstanding that Nickerson’s article draws attention to the 
phenomenon of understanding and also discusses some obviously 
very relevant aspects of it with respect to education, it does not say so 
much about what characterises understanding, only about what one 
has to be aware of if one tries to make understanding of understanding 
an object for research in its own right. 
Besides Nickerson (1985), the search for psychological and pedagogical 
research literature on understanding in the mentioned data bases has 
also resulted in the observation of a hand full of articles that concern 
students’ understanding of understanding (Burns, Clift, & Duncan, 
1991; Entwistle & Entwistle, 1991, 1992; Tan & Novac, 1992). But apart 
                                          
1 See Pfundt and Duit (1991) for a bibliography on students’ alternative frameworks and 
science education. 
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from these few examples, the research on understanding seems sparse 
in psychology and education.  
There is research literature in psychology and education about un-
derstanding in the sense, for instance of child psychological research on 
ideas and explanations (Hall & Browne, 1903; Piaget, 1929/1982; Oakes, 
1947) and early pedagogical research on study methods (Forsberg, 1928). 
There is also gestalt psychological research on insight (Köhler, 1925) 
and productive thinking (Duncker, 1935/1972; Wertheimer, 1945) and 
the discussion of insight in psychoanalysis (Kris, 1956; Bush, 1978; 
Blum, 1979; Thoma & Kachele, 1986). The historical psychological 
research on concept formation and development of concepts in individual 
and general history, is also about understanding (Vygotskij, 
1934/1987; Leont’ev, 1959/1977) and the same holds for Perry’s (1970) 
study of forms of intellectual and ethical development in the college years.  
Further, there is also some phenomenological research in psychology 
on the experience of being understood and learning that could be said to be 
about understanding (Van Kam, 1959; Colazzi, 1973; Giorgi, 1985, 
1992) and some research on problem solving (Ohlsson, 1984a, 1984b; 
Montgomery, 1988), reading comprehension (Spiro, Bruce & Brewer, 
1980; Waern, 1981), mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983), developmental 
learning activity (Engeström, 1987) and situated learning as legitimate 
peripheral participation (Lave & Wenger, 1995). Not to speak of the 
research on misconceptions and/or alternative frameworks that Nickerson 
(1985) refers to (cf. Pfundt & Duit, 1991; for an overview of this 
research in science education).  
In addition to the mentioned literature, there is also some literature on 
study skill and conceptions of learning, which to the extent that it presents 
accounts of learning activities that involve understanding, is also about 
understanding (Svensson, 1976; Marton et al., 1984, 1997, Säljö, 1979, 
1982; Pramling, 1983; Marton, Dall’Alba & Beaty, 1993; Marton, 
Watkins & Tang, 1997). So instead of a scarcity, one is now rather 
confronted with an abundance of literature about understanding in 
psychology and education and it is rather just the case that the term 
itself is not included in the title or the list of key concepts in the 
abstracts. 
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A closer study of the literature reveals, however, that most of it either 
deals with particular types of understanding understanding, or with 
aspects of understanding, or with understanding as mental meaning. 
The Gestalt psychological research focus, for instance, is on how one 
finds a solution to one or another type of problem. The 
psychoanalytical research focus, for instance, is on the analysand 
becoming conscious of the unconscious during psychoanalysis. The 
historical psychological research focus is on the development of 
concepts or word meanings. The more recent research on problem 
solving focuses on processes that lead to the solution of certain and 
often specific problems, and which often only have one or a limited 
number of – for the researcher already known – solution(s). The 
research on reading comprehension deals with understanding that 
results from reading. The research on mental models, deals, as it 
seems, preferably only with established “understanding” and not so 
much with the event as such. The activity theoretical research on 
learning by expansion and the research on situated learning as le-
gitimate peripheral participation in social praxis, focus more on the 
socio-cultural character of the activities where understanding takes 
place, than on the character of the event as such. The research on study 
skill and conceptions of learning that involve understanding will of 
course also present its own limitations when considered as research on 
understanding in education.  
This means that in spite of the mentioned literature in psychology and 
education being expected to have at least something to say about 
understanding, this is not about understanding as a research object in it 
own right. The nearest is the research on conceptions of learning, as 
this relates to research on experiences of understanding, which have 
been found. This is also why just this research will be discussed in the 
following sections of this chapter, along with historical research on the 
development of thinking and speaking, concept formation and word 
meaning, which have also been found relevant for the present study. 
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RESEARCH ON EXPERIENCES OF LEARNING 
AND UNDERSTANDING IN EDUCATION  
The nearest research context for the present study is the research on 
study skill and conceptions of learning that has been carried out at the 
Department of Education, Göteborg university, and elsewhere, since the 
early seventies (Marton & Svensson, 1970; Svensson, 1976; Marton et 
al., 1977; Marton & Svensson, 1978; Säljö, 1979, 1982; Pramling, 1983; 
Marton & Wenestam, 1984; Marton, Hounsell & Entwistle, 1984, 1997; 
Marton et al., 1993; and Marton, Watkins, et al., 1997). This is research 
that has typically involved interpretations of expressions for different 
understandings as a significant feature (Marton, 1981; Svensson, 1985; 
Marton & Both, 1997). 
Four such studies has been taken as of special interest in this context, 
namely: Säljö (1979, 1982); Pramling (1983); Marton et al. (1993); and 
Marton, Watkins, et al. (1997). The reason for this is that they all 
present accounts of conceptions of learning that involve understanding 
either as an outcome of or as an objective in or as both a prerequisite 
for, an ingredient in and a product of learning. However, in addition to 
these studies there are also some additional studies that concern 
conceptions of understanding among school pupils and other students 
(Burns et al., 1991; Entwistle & Entwistle, 1991, 1992; Tan & Novac, 
1993). And two of these studies will also be discussed, namely Burns et 
al. (1991), and Entwistle and Entwistle (1992). 
FOUR STUDIES OF CONCEPTIONS OF LEARNING 
LEARNING IN THE LEARNER’S PERSPECTIVE 
The first of the four studies on conceptions of learning (Säljö, 1979) 
could be said to form a paradigm for the three subsequent studies, and 
involved 90 young adults and adults in varying ages in an interview 
study about various aspects of their learning activities. It formed a part 
of a more encompassing study that concerned differences in 
constructing meaning from reading a text (Säljö, 1982). After having 
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talked with the participants about various aspects of their learning 
activities for some time in the interview, Säljö asked them to tell what 
they actually meant by learning.1  
In a subsequent analysis of the verbatim transcripts from the inter-
views, which was intended to lead up to a discernment, description, 
exemplification and discussion of different ways participants con-
ceived and explained the meaning of learning from reading, Säljö 
found that the discerned variation could be described in terms of five 
different categories of description. Assuming that these categories 
could be said to represent five different ways of understanding 
learning in the discussed sense, and intending to catch the essence of 
the different meanings in a few words, Säljö (1979) called them: 
1. Learning as the increase of knowledge; 
2. Learning as memorising; 
3. Learning as the acquisition of facts, procedures, etc. which can be retained 
and/or utilised in practice; 
4. Learning as the abstraction of meaning; and: 
5. Learning as an interpretative process aimed at the understanding of reality 
(p. 12 ff.). 
Arguing that these differences seem compatible with the variation in 
approaches or levels of processing described in the previous studies 
(i.e. a surface approach and an atomistic treatment of the written or 
spoken meaning on the one hand, and a deep approach and a holistic 
treatment on the other), Säljö wondered if it might not “be fruitful to 
assume that the fact that people employ either of these strategies has to 
do with their general conception of what knowledge and learning is” 
(Säljö, 1979, p. 21). He also came to the conclusion that “people seem to 
have… different conceptions of what learning is all about” and that it 
“might be fruitful to assume that this affects both how people approach 
a learning task and what they manage to get out of it” (ibid., p. 22). This 
was also something that he tried to gather additional support for later 
on in the same study. 
                                          
1 What do you actually mean by learning? (Säljö, 1979, p. 9). 
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THE CHILD’S CONCEPTION OF LEARNING 
Pramling’s study of The Child’s Conception of Learning (1983) involved 
interviews with nearly 300 children in ages between three and eight 
years. It was conceived to serve the purpose to “trace the development 
whereby children become conscious of the fact that they can learn, and 
to describe the qualitatively different forms that their learning 
subsequently take” (ibid., p. 83).  
The interview-protocols from the research were made subject to a 
qualitative analysis aimed at a description of qualitatively different 
conceptions of learning and the logical relations between these 
meanings for learning. What was arrived at could be described in 
terms of: 1) what learning is brought out as, 2) what learning is said to 
be a learning of, and finally: 3) how learning of that which it is learning 
of is considered to come about. 
The development of the child’s thinking about learning is said to take 
place within an over all conception of learning as becoming (more) able. 
To begin with learning is a taken for granted and undifferentiated 
phenomenon and concept. And at this point in the developmental 
history of the child’s understanding of the meaning of learning, the 
child appears, in other words, not to be aware of learning as something 
other than a mere act.  
The first phase in the child’s, as it were, three parted ascension to-
wards a more advanced consciousness of the meaning of learning and 
what it may mean to learn, begins by learning emerging as a certain 
action, or, in other words, by the child making an implicit distinction 
between doing and learning to do. At this point in the development of 
the child’s thinking about the meaning of learning, learning implies an 
action that aims at learning to do and at learning to do things 
differently.  
The second phase is characterised by the child beginning to become 
aware that learning may not only lead to the ability to perform a 
definite action, but that it may also have become able to know 
something about something. At this phase in the developmental 
history of the child’s understanding of learning about their thinking 
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about learning, learning is also believed to be characterised by the 
child beginning to become aware that knowing something about 
something could be something that the learner acquires through his or 
her own activity in relation to that which is the subject for learning. 
The third phase is characterised by the child beginning to differentiate 
understanding from skills and knowledge, or, in other words, by the 
child beginning to become aware that learning may also have “to 
understand” as an objective. When this begins to be the case, the child 
begins, following Pramling, to also become able to conceive of 
qualitative differences in his/her own and other persons’ thinking 
about what may become the subject for learning. This is conceived as a 
prerequisite for learning of the kind which leads to one becoming able 
to conceive of something in a qualitatively different way than before.  
Pramling gives, thus, a description of the development of the child’s 
thinking about the meaning of learning. It is based on a cross sectional 
study and reconstruction of the ways in which the child seems to 
interpret what is learned in learning, and how learning of this is 
achieved. 
As may follow from a reading of the account, the child lives mainly in 
a world where learning typically means the acquisition of knowing 
how and knowing that by doing, observing, being told, and/or by 
practice. Towards this age, the child begins, however, to also become 
aware of learning as an acquisition of knowledge in, knowledge of, or 
understanding of something by thinking.  
In the first sense it is mainly seen as a transition from one state of 
knowing one kind of knowing to another state of knowing of the same 
kind, which is brought about as a result of one doing, perceiving, or 
learning through goal-oriented action. In the second, however, it 
begins to emerge as a transition from one state of knowing one kind of 
knowing to another, that is brought about through an act of 
understanding. What is meant more precisely with understanding in 
this perspective is, however, never explicitly stated, but merely 
implied as something that could be explored in further research and 
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thinking on what it means to understand for the slightly older child 
and older and more experienced persons.  
CONCEPTIONS OF LEARNING 
The third study of conceptions of learning involved multiple inter-
views 29 adult students at the Open university in England (Marton et 
al., 1993) concerning what they felt it meant for them to be a student at 
the Open university. The first interviews were carried out at the time 
when the participants were about to take up or had just taken up their 
studies in their first course, a social foundations course called Making 
sense of society, which had explicitly been conceived to challenge and 
change the participants’ conceptions of various societal phenomena. 
The interviews, which among other things dealt with the participants 
views on learning, were repeated with students still on registers, at the 
end of each university year between 1980 and 1986; by 1986 the 
interviewees were down to ten persons. At each interview, the opening 
question was, “What exactly do you mean with learning?”. This 
question was repeated, not necessarily in exactly the same words, but 
in a way that appeared appropriate in each interview. The purpose of 
the study was twofold. On the one hand, the researchers wanted to 
obtain material to “give a more precise characterisation of the different 
conceptions of learning” than that given by Säljö (1979, 1982) a decade 
earlier (Marton et al., 1993, p. 278 f.). On the other, they sought “…to 
identify relationships between the conceptions.” (ibid., p. 279). 
The tape-recorded interviews were fully transcribed verbatim, but the 
analyses were limited to those parts that appeared to be the most 
significant with respect to the purpose of the study. This was guided 
by the findings that had emerged from the proceeding decade of 
phenomenographic studies, which had meant an elaboration of the 
phenomenographic key notion, namely, the notion of qualitatively 
different conceptions of the same phenomenon.  
The analysis resulted in a “re-discovery of the five conceptions of 
learning” that Säljö described (Marton et al. 1993, p. 282), plus one 
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more. The authors described, exemplified and elaborated on each of 
the six conceptions of learning, which were called:  
Learning seen as: 
A. Increasing one’s knowledge 
B. Memorising and reproducing 
C. Applying 
D. Understanding 
E. Seeing something in a different way  
F. Changing as a person (Marton et al., 1993, p. 277). 
The list of categories is intended to represent a progression from the 
least advanced to the most advanced conception of learning. However, 
they were also of two distinctly different “types” of categories, or 
families. In the first, learning appears to be viewed in terms of laying 
hold on knowledge about something (A–C). In the second, it appears 
to be viewed in terms of developing an understanding of something 
(D–F). This development is also believed to consist of separate stages 
or “steps”. These are from (D) viewing learning as grasping or laying 
hold on the meaning of something, to (E) viewing learning as a change 
of the meaning of something for someone, to (E) viewing learning 
either as developing a conception of something or as (F) developing 
another understanding of oneself as a person. 
THE EXPERIENCE OF LEARNING  
Marton, Watkins, et al. (1997) interviewed 43 Hong Kong high-school 
students in order to explore “the dimensionality of learning” on the on 
hand, and to investigate “the nature of the relationship between 
memorisation and understanding as experienced by Chinese learners” 
(ibid., p. 21) on the other. The interviews were carried out by 
participants in a part-time Master of education course in qualitative 
research methods at the University of Hong-Kong and the interviewers 
followed a common interview schedule. This was divided into six 
parts: 1) Introduction, 2) Actual task, 3) General questions, 
4) Conceptions and approaches to learning, 5) Language of instruction, 
and 6) Attributions.  
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The interviews were taped and verbatim transcripts were made. These 
were then subjected to a contextual analysis that, as mentioned before, 
aimed at a description of similarities and differences in the ways 
wherein the interviewees could be said to have discerned and 
discussed learning, understanding and memorisation. 
The study resulted in a description of four different ways of experi-
encing learning among the participants. The four different ways of 
experiencing learning are accounted for in terms of: 
• learning as committing to memory (words) 
• learning as committing to memory (meaning) 
• learning as understanding (meaning) 
• learning as understanding (phenomenon) (Marton, Watkins, et al., 1997, p. 
29) 
In addition to the categories, the analysis also resulted in an inter-
pretation of the relationship between memorisation and understanding 
in the experience of learning among Chinese learners and in particular 
the close relationship between memorisation and understanding for 
these learners. It suggests that the Chinese learners experience of the 
relationship between memorisation and understanding is such that 
some “see memorisation and understanding running in parallel, others 
think that the memorisation precedes the understanding and others 
again talk about understanding being a substitute for memorisation” 
(Marton, Watkins et al., 1997, p. 42). However, the research also 
suggests that they tend to link “memorisation to understanding” 
functionally (ibid.). The participants accounts suggest that they “are 
forced by educational context to switch from an emphasis on 
memorisation to an emphasis on understanding” in the studies and 
that the experienced relationship is such that: 
In primary school and in early years in high-school the students can rote 
memorise relatively small chunks of texts. Later on, however, the amount of 
text they have to deal with is simply too extensive for memorisation to be 
possible. They have to look for the meaning of greater wholes in the first place. 
(Marton, Watkins, et al., 1997, p. 42) 
In addition, the results give a certain support for the idea that “the 
experience of understanding may originate, or become differentiated 
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from, the experience of memorisation” (Marton et al., 1997, p. 43). 
There are more precisely two results that have appeared to support 
this hypothesis. The first is that “the categories of description form a 
continuum from committing to memory to understanding and there is 
a significant correlation with age” (ibid., p. 43.). The second is that 
“understanding is not differentiated from memorisation in many of the 
students’ answers, mostly among the youngest students [who] …claim 
that understanding means having memorised or having become able 
to reproduce” (Marton et al., 1997, p. 43). 
TWO STUDIES ON CONCEPTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING  
In the previous part of this chapter four studies of conceptions of 
learning were accounted for. In this part two studies on conceptions of 
understanding that have been found especially interesting will be 
presented. The studies are Burns et al. (1991) Understanding of un-
derstanding and Entwistle and Entwistle’s (1992) Developing, revising, 
and examining conceptual understanding in degree courses.  
STUDENTS’ UNDERSTANDING OF UNDERSTANDING 
Burns et al. (1991) study concerns students’ understanding of un-
derstanding in the context of learning in sixth form chemistry in New 
Zealand at the middle of the eighties and its relationships with their 
teachers’ views of understanding. It reveals that most of the 39 
students from six different schools that participated in the study gave 
evidence of some coherence orientation as opposed to a knowledge 
orientation toward understanding. This means that they appeared to 
be more concerned about the relationships between pieces of 
information and between these and recalled information, than about 
recognition of terms and the memorisation of fact and rules. It also 
means that these students seemed more focused on trying to seek out 
the meaning of terms and why things happened, rather than merely 
trying to seek to learn to know what and how things happen.  
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Burns, Clift and Duncan maintain also that the participants usually 
said they felt they had achieved understanding when they could make 
a whole from the many pieces of new information they were receiving 
together with those they recalled from memory. And, moreover, that 
reaching understanding often meant that having worked first and 
foremost on their own, they suddenly felt that everything fitted into a 
whole. They say also that students often reported that this experience 
was frequently accompanied with a feeling of satisfaction too.  
The assessment of understanding in this study indicated, that only 
students with some coherence orientation achieved levels of under-
standing indicating links had been made between pieces of infor-
mation. It revealed also that these students as a rule were more ori-
ented toward intrinsic assessment than toward extrinsic ditto, usually 
meaning that they said they could recognise their understanding for 
themselves and, moreover, also that they meant they could not only 
visualise what they understood, but also felt high confidence in that 
they could explain it to others.  
The authors of the article assert, finally, that the indicated student 
“attempts to achieve coherence were thwarted (for all but the most 
highly motivated students with strong chemical background) by the 
teachers’ focus on examination skills”, the teachers domination of the 
lessons, their transmission model, their attempts to cover too much on 
too short time, their under evaluation of students efforts to achieve 
understanding and by their focus on “knowledge” rather than higher 
levels of understanding (ibid., p. 285).  
Burns et al. (1991) conclude that if students are to learn with under-
standing they will need: 
1. To be taught about “understanding”. 
2. To be taught about the skills necessary to achieve coherence. 
3. To be provided with conditions that will allow them to pursue coherence. (p. 
286) 
They maintain also that this means that students have to be taught 
about: 1) “the generally accepted view of understanding and the 
spectrum of views held by students”; 2) how “to recognise when there 
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is a problem and… what questions to ask to solve a problem”; and, 
finally: 3) that they are also given “access to resources and time for 
independent study, opportunities for student-student discussion… 
and opportunities for fruitful student-teacher discussion” (Burns et al., 
1991, p. 286).  
With respect to the third and last point, the point most emphasis is put 
on, the authors say that “teachers as assessors rather than as helpers in 
the learning process discourage student confidence”. They refer here 
to Butler [1988] and Nicholls [1983] that are said to have shown that 
“12-year-old students given feedback in the form of grades or grades 
and comments are likely to become ego-involved…, whereas 
comments alone will preserve task involvement” (Burns et al., 1991, p. 
286.). Burns et al. refer also to Rosenholz and Simpson [1984], who 
speak of multidimensional classrooms including more group and 
individual work and less whole-class teaching, and say in connection 
hereto, that a modification of teaching in this direction probably “will 
also reduce the likelihood that students will see their abilities as fixed 
and provide more opportunity for task-involvement” (Burns et al., 
1991, p. 286).  
Beside these changes of teaching in a broad sense, Burns, Clift and 
Duncan (1991) suggest finally also that “the use of assessment tasks 
aimed at developing understanding, particularly oral and written 
explanations, fewer topics, and topics which respond to students 
interests and concerns, [will also contribute to the development of 
more advanced understanding, and this] since the achievement of 
coherence requires active involvement and effort and therefore high 
motivation” (ibid., p. 286). 
This leads over to Entwistle and Entwistle’s study of experiences of 
understanding. 
EXPERIENCES OF UNDERSTANDING  
Entwistle and Entwistle’s (1992) study Developing, revising, and 
examining conceptual understanding, concerns university students’ 
experiences of understanding in the context of learning in degree 
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courses and preparing for final examinations in Great Britain. The 
study involved first and foremost interviews with thirteen students, 
most of whom had just prepared for and had taken their final exam-
ination in psychology at Edinburgh University. It involved, however, 
also an additional group of eleven student in their final year of 
psychology at the same university. These gave a written answer to 
“what understanding is” with reference to their own experience on the 
one hand and with reference to what they thought they had learnt 
about understanding from their studies of literature on psychology on 
the other.  
Entwistle and Entwistle (1992) found that these students basically 
considered understanding as an achievement of “a feeling of satis-
faction that sets of information and ideas have been brought together 
in a coherent whole which can be used with some confidence to 
construct explanations or to use in novel contexts” (p. 35). These 
feelings of relative “satisfaction” over and “confidence” in one’s ability 
to give relatively insightful and coherent explanation, which also 
appears to imply a certain belief in one’s capacity to deal with these 
matters in a successful way within a particular sphere of experience 
and practice, were typically described “achieved after active 
intellectual engagement with course materials, which often involved 
trying to work out a personally satisfying structure which related and 
integrated information, experiences, and ideas” (Entwistle & Entwistle, 
1992, p. 29).  
Students described the experience of understanding in terms like: 
“seeing the interconnectedness of disparate things”, “the jig-saw pieces 
clicking into place”, “following his drift”, “feeling it hangs together”, 
“the mind has locked into a pattern”, which, following the authors, all 
suggest that it “depends on recognising or creating a structure… to 
bring together previously discrepant items of information into a 
recognisable and satisfying pattern” (Entwistle & Entwistle, 1992, p. 29 
ff.).  
Entwistle and Entwistle (1992) also found that the participants seem to 
have been involved in different activities with reference to their 
intended object for understanding, the extent to which they seek to 
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understand this, and the means they use in order to achieve their 
intended end when they studied and revised for examination. They 
maintain also that these differences can be represented by five dif-
ferent categories of description. 
The five different categories of description are worked out with the 
explicit intent to describe essential similarities and differences in 
typical ways in which the participants appear to have carried out their 
studies in preparation for final examinations and make up a system. 
Entwistle and Entwistle (1992) call the categories of description in 
order from the narrowest, shallowest and most reproductive to the 
broadest, deepest and most creative: 
A. Reproducing content from lecture notes without a clear structure 
B. Reproducing content within the logical framework of the lecture notes 
C. Creating own structure for topics, relying mainly on lecture notes alone 
D. Adjusting structures from strategic reading to meet exam requirements 
E. Developing an individual conception of the discipline from wide reading (p. 
20). 
Considering the ways in which the participants talked about revision 
for finals, which was conceived by Entwistle and Entwistle (1992) as a 
particular kind of study activity within the overall activity of studying 
at the university, the researchers described some different kinds of 
activities in revision and purposes for such activities. These were also 
found to vary with the over all study activities that students appeared 
to carry out, to the effect that, for instance, “condensing notes” may 
take on very different meaning dependent on the intended overall 
purpose of the activity within a larger meaningful whole approach to 
learning in the discussed context. 
Entwistle and Entwistle (1992) say that students’ preparations for and 
experiences of answering examination questions, seem to vary with 
the orientation of the students’ study project. They maintain more 
precisely that, whereas students that mainly appeared to have been 
involved in “reproducing”, tended to memorise particular answers to 
expected questions in order to recall and put down such answers, 
students that appeared to have been more concerned with “developing 
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understanding”, tended to try to articulate their understanding to the 
degree that they felt confidence in their ability to respond to just about 
any question about the subject for their studies in a manner that would 
convince the examiner that they had understood.  
Commenting upon this, Entwistle and Entwistle (1992) state that: 
While this set of categories may again seem like a hierarchy, it did not match 
the apparent success of the outcomes as well as might be expected. Memorised 
notes proved perfectly effective for answering questions which could be 
answered from logical structures contained in lectures, and some questions 
were of this form. Narrow, technical questions often did not require any great 
breadth of understanding, whereas more abstract, theoretical questions tested 
personal conceptual understanding more thoroughly. Students who wanted to 
demonstrate their own conceptual understanding might run into difficulties 
created by the time constraints, while the most strategic student seemed to 
present themselves to the examiner in the most effective way. (p. 23) 
By the end of the report, Entwistle and Entwistle (1992) suggest finally 
that: 
1. the answers that students work out to examination questions are constructed 
specifically to satisfy the perceived requirements of the examiner; 
2. the forms of understanding that are developed in academic courses usually 
present the character of “an uneasy compromise between the personal 
understanding towards which a student might aim … and what is possible 
within the constraints of the course and assessment procedures”; 
3. it seems “essential in higher education to be aware of the ways in which the 
forms of understanding developed by students depend, not just on the 
assessment requirements, but on the whole learning environment which they 
experience”; and, finally, that; 
4. the great challenge for educational researchers and practitioners that are 
concerned with teaching and learning at this level is to learn how to design 
courses, provide teaching and assessment that foster development of the kinds 
of understanding that ought to be prefer over other less desirable forms. (p. 35) 
So in spite of a more thorough “personal conceptual understanding” of 
all issues involved in the various courses being the most preferable 
outcome from a general pedagogical perspective, it is not this 
approach, but the more limited approach to develop the kind of 
understanding of particular topics that a particular examiner seems to 
value, that students think is the most effective, when it comes to pass 
examinations with as high degrees as possible.  
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The dilemma of studying at the university, which probably is appli-
cable to studying in most other forms of formal education as well, 
appears then as that of developing the best possible understanding of 
the things that are dealt with in the teaching for one’s own purposes, 
on the one hand, and that of developing the understanding that is 
called for to pass examinations with as good grades as possible on the 
other. It appears as question of profiting from and finding one’s way 
through the “system” that one’s counterpart appears responsible for.1 
CULTURE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THINKING AND SPEAKING 
The historical research on the development of thinking and speaking, 
understanding and explaining proceeds from the belief that human 
behaviour is qualitatively different from animal behaviour, to the same 
extent that the adaptation and development of human beings is 
different from the adaptation and development of animals (Vygotskij, 
1930/1978, p. 60 f.). In this perspective, a person is from birth until 
death in constant interaction with him/herself, other persons, beings 
and things (Vygotskij, 1930/1978, 1934/1987; Lurija, 1978). One’s 
possibilities to relate to oneself, other persons, being and things as 
particular entities in any kind of perception, attention, physical 
movement, activities are to begin with relatively limited, because one 
activity has yet not come to include the instruments and symbols that 
makes this possible (Vygotskij, 1930/1978).  
Through participation in the activities that more experienced others set 
up, one gradually takes over such means and begins also to operate 
with them oneself (Leont’ev, 1959/1977), and may develop an 
orientation to the world and being in it like the ones that the more 
experienced, capable others have developed. It is also through this that 
it becomes possible for one to present these entities to oneself 
(Gadamer, 1960/1993, 443 ff.).  
                                          
1 See Beach (1997) for a critical ethnography perspective on this issue. 
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The appropriation of this knowledge and these concepts is completed 
in the course of one’s activity (Leont’ev, 1959/1977, p. 628 ff.). In this 
one encounters the entities and the forms of appearances in one’s 
surrounding world. Such activity does not take place in itself, but 
corresponds to the practical and linguistic intercourse with the 
persons, that one co-operates with.  
This becomes, following Leont’ev, especially pregnant in the at-
tainment of intellectual activities such as reading, writing, counting 
and calculation. In the attainment of the capacity to participate in and 
perform such activities, it becomes obvious that the courses of events 
presents a character whereby the preceding generations’ experiences 
are appropriated under teaching conditions which steer one’s activity 
along particular paths. It is in this process that operations with the 
symbols that are involved in various activities are gradually built-up 
and edified.  
Leont’ev (1959/1977) refers here to Galpetrin and associates, who 
studied this process relatively carefully, and on the basis of this es-
tablished that: 
… when the adults demonstrate the action and its product, the children [orient] 
themselves first towards the task. After this “orienting foundation”, the child 
performs the action in shape of external operations with physical objects and 
with the assistance of adults. The transformation begins, however, already in 
this phase: The children learn to perform the activities on its own, they become 
generalised and shortened. 
In the next phase, the activities are transferred to the linguistic sphere; they 
become verbalised. The children begin, f. ex., to count aloud, without leaning 
on material objects. In this phase the activities take on a theoretical character; 
they are performed by means of words and linguistic concepts. At the same 
time they become transformed and in due time also automatised, as was 
described above. In the next phase, they little by little become transferred to 
the intellectual sphere; here it undergoes additional transformations until it 
finally take on all the traits that are characteristic for internal activities. In this 
phase, it can be controlled and corrected by the adult, in that the children can 
displace it to the external, f. ex. the sphere of audible speech. (ibid., p. 635 f.; 
my translation)] 
In order to appropriate concepts, generalisations, and knowledge, one 
must, following Leont’ev (1959/1977), [thus] form adequate in-
tellectual operations. This can only be done through relatively suc-
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cessful participation in particular forms of co-operation with more 
experienced others and arises first in shape of external actions, that the 
surrounding others lead one into. Later on, also under guidance, these 
actions are transformed into internal, intellectual operations.  
These activities as a rule involve the relative integration of the more 
encompassing activities that give subordinated activities their direc-
tion, at the same time as they to a certain extent also give the super-
ordinate activity its direction. Considering the character of the way 
whereby one learns and develops word meaning in individual history, 
and the changes that this processes undergoes as it develops, Vygotskij 
(1934/1987), pays special attention to the function of the word. 
Thinking that concept formation like all other higher psychological 
functions, is a mediated process and that signs are the basic means 
used to master and direct it, Vygotsky explains that in concept 
formation, that sign is the word (Vygotskij, 1934/1987, p. 121 ff.).  
For Vygotsky the word is indispensable and first “functions as the 
means for the formation of the concept” before later becoming “its 
symbol.”(Vygotskij, 1934/1987, p. 126). Developing this theory of the 
character of the development of the process of concept formation in 
individual history, the image that Vygotsky gives is that the process 
has its roots in the earliest stages of thinking in childhood, but that 
these mature only in the transitional age. Further, it is only at this point 
that “the intellectual functions which form the mental basis for the 
process of concept formation are constituted and developed.” (p.130).   
The general theory of the development of the meaning for words 
suggests that word meanings undergo a myriad of radical changes in 
individual history. In spite of this however, Vygotskij and his as-
sociates nevertheless suggest that one can discern four main gen-
erations of meaning for words there. In mentioned order with refer-
ence to the character of the word meanings these stages are called the 
stages of formation of: 1) syncretic images, 2) complexes, 3) potential 
concepts, and 4) concepts proper.  
In the first phase, meaning relates to concrete experiential appearances 
or series of appearances of a being, situation, striking feature or 
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property, where words functions as an indicator or pointer. The 
meaning for a word seems in this case to be just about the same as that 
which the word indicates. It is so interfused with the word that express 
it and the referents or properties or situations that fall under it, that it 
can hardly be thought and spoken except in the vicinity of that 
something to which it is applicable. These syncretic relationships, and 
the heaps of objects assembled under one word meaning, also reflect 
objective bonds, in so far as they coincide with the child’s perception 
or impression. Many words, therefore, have in part the same referents 
for both the child and the adult, especially words referring to concrete 
objects in the child’s habitual surroundings. The child’s and the adult’s 
meanings for a word therefore often “meet” in the same concrete 
object, and this suffices to assure mutual understanding.  
In the second phase, meaning relates to a composition of particular 
traits of a set of concrete experiential appearances that unite series of 
concrete beings, properties or situations into a group. The word here 
still refers to concrete manifestations of the meaning that is expressed 
by the word, but the assembly of entities that fall under the meaning of 
the word are conceived to be related like the members of a family are 
related. Consequently the word not only expresses an experienced 
similarity or unity between the class of entities that fall or can fall 
under its meaning, it also denotes a particular group or family of 
entities in the world. On this level of thinking and speaking, the word 
ceases to be the proper name of individual objects and becomes a 
family name of a group that has been or may be or may be found to be 
related in one or another respect.  
The meaning of the words at this level are not spontaneously devel-
oped by the child, but are taken over from and predetermined by the 
meaning that they already express in the language of adults. The 
child’s own activity in forming generalisations is however by no 
means quenched, though it is usually hidden from view and driven 
into complicated channels by the influence of adult speech. The 
language of the environment, with its stable, permanent meanings, 
indicate the paths that the child’s generalisations will take. But, 
constrained as it is, the child’s thinking proceeds along this 
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preordained path in the manner peculiar to his level of intellectual 
development.  
This is because the adult cannot pass on to the child his mode of 
thinking. He merely supplies the ready-made meaning for a word, 
around which the child forms a complex – with all the structural, 
functional, and genetic peculiarities of thinking in complexes. So even 
if the product of the thinking at this level may sometimes be identical 
in its content with generalisations that have been formed in conceptual 
thinking, the meaning of a word is not conceptual, but “complexive” in 
character. It is not formed through conceptual thinking, and it is 
usually both too broad and too narrow in scope in comparison with a 
true concept. Its character is namely marked by an overabundance, 
overproduction of connections, and a weakness in abstraction.  
In the third phase, which develops in dialectical interplay with the 
second and which therefore is only analytically separated from it, the 
meaning for a word is an abstraction of a particular trait or set of traits 
in a group of experiential objects that have been found or may be 
found similar, in that they share the particular trait or set of traits that 
have been or may be recognised in one or several groups of beings or 
situations. At this developmental level of thinking and speaking, a 
word refers to particular attributes of things or kind of things. It 
expresses an isolated trait or set or traits that have been or may be 
found among the classes of objects that fall under or may fall under the 
meaning that is expressed by the word. It differs from complexive 
meaning in that it is more stable and in that it discriminates sharper 
between things. For with this type of meaning the concrete totality of 
traits has been destroyed through its abstraction, and the possibility of 
unifying the traits on a different basis opens up. 
It is, thus, only after the child has mastered abstraction, which is made 
possible only at an advanced level of complex thinking, that he/she 
can begin to form true concepts. Because it is only when the abstracted 
traits are synthesised anew and the resulting abstract synthesis 
becomes the main instrument of thought, that the level of conceptual 
thinking and speaking is reach. This is a moment that is usually 
reached at about the age of twelve or thirteen or so and is a form of 
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thinking and speaking where the word, deliberately used to direct all 
the part processes, plays the decisive role. That the child/adolescent 
begins to form concepts means, however, not that he/she all of a 
sudden abandons the more elementary forms. Indeed these continue to 
operate for a long time and predominate in many areas of his thinking. 
Adolescence is in this respect therefore not so much a period of 
completion as it is a period of crisis and transition in the development 
of thinking and speaking in individual history.  
In the fourth generation of word meaning, the meaning for a word 
could, as has been implied above, thus, be conceived of as a verbal 
thought wherein a set of isolated, abstracted and integrated traits of 
experiential objects are united into a relatively distinct sense. It is a 
meaning that can be understood with one particular word or some 
particular words that could be said to be synonymous, but which in 
order to be explained takes several words. A word still refers here to a 
particular form of being or, perhaps rather, a particular class of forms 
of beings that fall under the meaning for the word. But it no longer 
merely indicates them. It represents them rather. It symbolises them as 
it expresses them. Because the meaning for words is not so much fixed 
and finished as it is fluctuating and in the process of being worked out, 
the meaning for words is first and foremost operative. As such it is 
discursive. It belongs to the thinking and speaking it emerges and 
plays a role in, which is a thinking and speaking that takes place in the 
thinker’s and speaker’s participation in various kinds activities. 
So if one with Vygotskij (1934/1987) considers the functioning of 
newly acquired concepts in the transitional age, one finds that they 
first and foremost belong to the concrete situations and discourses they 
are developed in. This means that if a person forms a particular 
meaning for a particular word through the participation in a particular 
conversation about a particular object, the meaning for that word 
makes first and foremost sense for the person in that particular con-
versation and situation and relative to that object, as it is understood 
by the meaning that is formed there. Moreover, if a conversation does 
not require of the participant to define the meaning for the words 
used, there is as a rule no reason to do so either. Because in order to 
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form and use a concept in an intelligent way, one does not first need to 
give an explicit verbal definition of that concept. On the contrary, the 
ability to give an adequate explicit definition of a concept emerges as a 
rule only a long time after the concept has been formed and used in an 
intelligent way.  
The fact that the adolescent may form and apply a concept correctly 
before he or she is capable of defining what is meant with it is, fol-
lowing Vygotskij, is a rule rather than an exception in some areas of 
thinking and indicates, according to Vygotskij, that “the concept arises 
as the result of a process other than the logical processing of certain 
elements of experience. Moreover, it comes into conscious awareness 
and acquires a logical character at a comparatively late stage of its 
development.” (Vygotskij, 1934/1987 p. 161). The point is, thus, that 
one takes over and applies concepts in some areas long before one is 
consciously aware of what one means with them more precisely. 
If one continues to consider the functioning concepts in the transitional 
age with Vygotskij (1934/1987, p. 167 ff.), one finds that once a concept 
has been formed, used and defined, the application of that concept to 
new concrete situations which must be defined in its terms is no less 
difficult. The account even asserts that it is a more difficult transfer, 
that it is mastered only toward the end of the adolescent period, and 
then only as a function of having been called upon, tried and managed 
through successful participation in communication with more 
experienced others. 
In sum, the account of the development of thinking and speaking and 
understanding and explaining that Vygotskij (1934/1987) has 
provided, suggests that the meaning for words arises and develops in 
and through concrete participation in communication with more 
experienced others, and suggests also that the direction of the de-
velopment of the meaning for words is to begin with mainly deter-
mined by the senses of the employment of words that others respond 
to. This suggests that the general direction is one from less conscious, 
complex, inclusive and exclusive towards more conscious, complex, 
inclusive and exclusive senses, but also that the development of word 
meaning in individual history is recognised by others and thus 
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contributes also to the development of meaning for words in the 
general history of the actual language and type of discourse. In this 
sense Vygotskij (1934/1987) has also provided a dialectical explanation 
of how the development of word meaning in individual history is 
related to development of word meaning in general and specific 
history. 

  
Chapter 3 
 
UNDERSTANDING IN PHILOSOPHY 
…be not children in understanding… (Paul, 55–
56/1979, p. 1455). 
The concept of understanding appears in the history of philosophy from 
about the beginning of the Seventeenth century until quite recently, 
first and foremost to have been associated with the philosophy of 
interpretation (Edwards, 1967). This means that it in the first place is 
not in the epistemological (Hamlyn, 1967), but in the hermeneutical 
tradition that an answer to what has been meant with understanding 
in philosophy is to be sought (Palmer, 1969). In addition to this, 
however, there is of course also a lot of meaning and moral philosophy 
that could be of interest for how understanding has been understood in 
philosophy (Wittgenstein, 1968; Levinas, 1987; Vattimo, 1997), but here 
the focus has been limited to how that appears to have been 
understood in the hermeneutic tradition. 
In an introduction to hermeneutics, Palmer (1969) notes that the term 
hermeneutics has a more than three hundred and fifty year long history, 
but that the practices of interpretation and reflection over 
philosophical prerequisites for interpretation, appears to be at least as 
old as the Western tradition as a whole. From the outset hermeneutics 
has denoted the science of interpretation, especially the principles of 
proper textual exegesis, but due to historical changes the 
interpretations of the field of inquiry have disciplinary differences. 
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Shifts in focus and interest among theorists have varied. in modern 
times, and the field of inquiry appears to have been defined in at least 
six fairly distinct ways.  
Palmer’s (1969) six definitions of hermeneutics are:  
(1) the theory of biblical exegesis; (2) general philological methodology; (3) 
the science of all linguistic understanding; (4) the methodological foundation 
of Geisteswissenshaften; (5) phenomenology of existence and of existential 
understanding; and (6) the systems of interpretation, both re-collective and 
iconoclastic, used by man to reach the meaning behind myths and symbols. (p. 
33) 
Behind each definition is a particular emphasis. But in addition to 
them there is also juridical hermeneutics, which also involves its own 
emphases, approaches, histories, subdivisions, and theorists.  
Each of these approaches and the various authors that could be said to 
respond for them, is believed to have at least something to say about 
what understanding has been understood as in the hermeneutical 
tradition. However, due to the long and rich history of each of them, 
and the plan, purpose and format of the study, it has been found 
necessary to limit the scope somewhat, to what the main 
representatives for the third, fourth and fifth approach; respectively 
Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer; have said, and 
particularly how this has emerged first and foremost from Palmer 
(1969) and also in the writings of Heidegger (1927/1990) and Gadamer 
(1960/1993). This means that whereas the accounts of the first two 
scholars (i.e. Schleiermacher and Dilthey) leans heavily on Palmer 
(1969), the accounts of the two latter are somewhat more detached 
from his interpretations. This is especially so regarding Gadamer 
(1960/1993). 
SCHLEIERMACHER: UNDERSTANDING 
AS THE REVERSE OF COMPOSITION 
When Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher (1768–1834) began his 
work, hermeneutics was, following Palmer (1969, p. 84 ff.), not more 
than a collection of practical advise for interpretation of various types 
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of writings. Schleiermacher was not satisfied with this, because beyond 
the obvious differences between different types of texts, all texts are 
authored in written language, and grammar is used to understand 
their meaning. Moreover, he felt that if one could just formulate the 
principle for all linguistic understanding, then one would also have 
created a general theory of interpretation, which could in turn form the 
foundation for all specific hermeneutics.  
In order to fill this function, it was, as he foresaw it, necessary to take a 
point of departure in an analysis of the prerequisites that belong to all 
dialogues, and to build an investigation of the concrete and factual 
circumstances that are involved in all understanding, and 
interpretation. The question he set for himself to answer was simply: 
“How is all or any utterance, whether spoken or written, really 
‘understood’?” (Palmer, 1969, p. 86).  
The understanding situation was for Schleiermacher a dialogical 
relationship: 
In every such relationship, there is a speaker, who constructs a sentence to 
express his meaning, and a hearer. The hearer receives a series of mere words, 
and suddenly through some mysterious process can divine their meaning. This 
mysterious, even divinatory, process is the hermeneutical process. It is the true 
locus of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is the art of hearing. (ibid., p. 86) 
Understanding is, with Schleiermacher, thus understood and ex-
plained as the reverse of composition. In understanding, a person 
begins with a fixed and finished expression and goes thereafter 
through an interpretation of the meaning of the same, back to the 
sphere from which it originates in order to grasp the idea behind it.  
This is described as follows by Palmer (1969):  
Understanding is a basically referential operation; we understand something by 
comparing it to what we already know. What we understand forms itself into 
systematic units, or circles made up of parts. The circle as a whole defines the 
individual parts, and the parts together form the circle. A whole sentence, for 
instance, is a unity. We understand the meaning of an individual word by 
seeing it in reference to the whole of the sentence; and reciprocally, the 
sentence’s meaning as a whole is dependent on the meaning of the individual 
words. By extension, an individual concept derives its meaning from a context 
or horizon within which it stands; yet the horizon is made up of the very 
elements to which it gives meaning. By dialectical interaction between the 
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whole and the part, each gives the other meaning; understanding is circular, 
then. Because within this ‘circle’ the meaning comes to stand, we call this the 
‘hermeneutical circle.’(p. 87) 
According to Schleiermacher, iterative comparison between the un-
derstood parts in relation to one another and in relation to the 
dawning understanding of the meaning of the whole, leads one to all 
of a sudden conceive the meaning of the whole and the parts together. 
These are pulled into a world that understanding/meaning causes to 
stand.1 
In order for a dialogue to take place, there must be a common field of 
understanding between the two actors, not only in respect of medium 
or language, but also in respect of thing or subject. This prerequisite 
for dialogue or discourse, is the minimal pre knowledge necessary for 
understanding. The hermeneutical circle appears, thus, not only to 
have been believed operative on the level of language, but also on the 
level of the thing being discussed.  
Schleiermacher, moreover, also meant that understanding of written 
language basically consists of two moments, grammatical and 
technical or psychological interpretation. Grammatical interpretation 
appears in connection to this to have been characterised as an 
essentially negative, general, boundary setting procedure, in which the 
linguistic structure that the motivating thought is assumed to operate 
in, is set forth. Psychological interpretation, which appears to have 
been said to grasp the meaning that the author is assumed to have 
woven into the linguistic structure as objective, appears to have been 
considered more creative. Both sides of interpretation are, however, 
necessary. They appear also to have been believed to not only 
presuppose, but also interact with one another.  
                                          
1 It is interesting to note that the Greek word from which the stem in the term for 
knowledge theory, epistemology,  appears to originate, i. e. episthanai, in translation just 
means “to cause to stand in the midst of” (Longman Webster's English College Dictionary, 
1984, p. 494). 
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In sum, Schleiermacher, according to Palmer (1969), presupposed that 
the goal of understanding and interpretation is reconstruction of the 
intended meaning behind particular linguistic utterances. This was 
conceived as the art of reconstructing the author’s meaning about a 
particular topic. The objective was, thus, not seen as that of 
understanding the author from a psychological point of view, but to 
understand the meaning of the author’s linguistic utterance from the 
point of view of the author him/herself: i.e. to grasp the meaning that 
the author, as it were, had induced. In order to achieve this, it was, as 
Schleiermacher conceived it, not only necessary to reconstruct the 
linguistic meaning of a linguistic utterance, but also to re experience 
the meaning that the author of the same had put into it.  
Understanding can, thus, be said to have been interpreted as the 
process whereby a person grasps what another person meant to 
communicate with what was uttered with a particular utterance. It is 
something that is believed to take place through a reconstruction and 
re-experience of the meaning that the other, as it were, put into that 
utterance through two interacting moments. These are namely: 1) 
reconstruction of the grammatical structure in the linguistic ex-
pression; and: 2) reconstruction of the psychological structure behind 
it. Each of the re-constructive moments are believed possible due to 
and through the functioning of the hermeneutical principle or circle. 
This leads over to the account of what Dilthey is said to have 
understood understanding as. 
DILTHEY: UNDERSTANDING AS THE MIND’S 
GRASP OF THE ‘MIND’ OF THE OTHER 
If Schleiermacher’s project was that of working out a general 
hermeneutics, Wilhelm Dilthey’s (1833–1911) can, according to Palmer 
(1969, p. 98 ff.), be put as that of laying an adequate epistemological 
and methodological foundation for the human sciences 
(Geisteswissenshaft). This was grounded in an experienced need to 
replace the reductionistic and mechanistic methodology that the 
positivists had provided for the study of human phenomena with a 
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methodology that could do such phenomena justice without for that 
sake running the risk of failing to meet the standards of objectivity.  
In this perspective Naturwissenshaften was one thing and 
Geisteswissenshaften something quite different. The experienced 
difference was believed possible to capture in two words, namely 
“explain” (erklären) and “understand” (verstehen). In accordance 
herewith, Dilthey [1958] proclaimed that Die Natur erklären wir, das 
Seelenleben verstehen wir (Palmer, 1969, p 105)1  
Dilthey meant that:  
A science belongs to the human studies only if its object becomes accessible to 
us through a procedure based on the systematic relation between life 
[Erlebnis], expression [Ausdruck], and understanding [Verstehen]. (Palmer, 
1969, p. 106 f.)2  
Erlebnis, or “lived experience” was by Dilthey defined as: 
That which in the stream of time forms a unity in the present because it has a 
unitary meaning is the smallest entity which we can designate as an ex-
perience. Going further, one may call each encompassing unity of parts of life 
bound together through a common meaning for the course of life an 
“experience” – even when the several parts are separated from each other by 
interrupting events. (Palmer, 1969, p. 107)3 
“Lived experience” appears, thus, as a historically operative con-
sciousness or meaning of something for someone. In this sense, lived 
experience can be the result of one encounter with what it is a meaning 
for, but it can also be a result of successive encounters with that or 
with similar things that due to experienced similarity have lent 
themselves to be included under the same theme. Lived experience 
was understood as experience as it is pre-reflexively given. 
                                          
1 This and the next four quotation of Dilthey are all renderings of Palmer’s (1969) 
quotations of Dilthey from B. G. Teubner’s 1958 reprint of vols. I-XII of: Dilthey, 
Wilhelm, Gesammelte Schriften, 14 vols. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1913-1967. 
This particular quote is taken from Gessamelte Schriften , V, p. 144. 
2 Gesammelte Schriften VII, p. 86. 
3 Gesammelte Schriften VII, p. 194 
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Dilthey explains the relationship as follows: 
The way in which “lived experience” presents itself for me [literally is there-
for-me] is completely different from the way in which images stand before me. 
The consciousness of the experience and its constitution are the same: there is 
no separation between what is there-for-me and what in experience is there-
for-me. In other words, the experience does not stand like an object over 
against its experiencer, but rather its very existence for me is undifferentiated 
from the whatness which is presented for me in it. (Palmer, 1969, p. 108 f.)1 
In spite of this emphasis on the personal character of lived experience, 
according to Palmer (1969) Dilthey also pointed out that this not just 
“some kind of merely subjective reality, for experience is precisely the 
reality of what is-there-for-me before experience becomes objective 
(and therefore admits of a separation from the subjective)” (p. 109). 
Lived experience refers, thus, to a realm of pre-reflective consciousness 
upon which all objectivities and subjectivities are supposed to be 
established through concrete acts of understanding/interpretation. It is 
a realm prior to any separation of subject and object, wherein the 
world and our experience are given together. 
Dilthey’s account of experience involves also an emphasis of the 
temporality of the context of relationships given in experience. 
Experience is, following Dilthey therefore not a static matter. It is 
rather a unity of meaning, that tends to reach out and encompass both 
a recollection of the past and an anticipation of the future in the total 
context of “meaning”. Meaning can not therefore be imagined, except 
in terms of what the future is expected to be, nor can it free itself from 
the dependence upon the material which the past supplies. This is 
because the past and the future form a structural unity with the 
presentness of all experience, and to form an inescapable horizon 
within which any perception in the present is interpreted. 
The temporality of experience is, following Dilthey, thus not an 
achievement of the intellect; as for instance Kant’s notion of time as a 
category of the understanding appears to suggest. It is rather “equi-
primordial” with or inherent in experience itself. This becomes, 
                                          
1 Gesammelte Schriften, VII, p. 139 
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Dilthey says, especially clear when we reflect over what we have lived 
through, live through and hope to live through: 
What happens when “experience” [das Erlebnis] becomes the object of my 
reflection? I lie awake at night [for example] worrying over the possibility of 
completing in my old age the work I have begun; I think over what to do. 
There is in this “experience” a structural set of relationships: an objective 
grasping of the situation forms the basis of it, and on this is based a stance 
[Stellungnahme] as concern-towards and pain-over-the-objectively-grasped 
fact, along with a striving to go beyond the fact. And all this is there-for-me in 
this its [the fact’s] structural context. Of course, I have brought the situation 
now to discriminating consciousness, and I have brought into relief the 
structural relationship – I have “isolated” it. But everything which I have here 
so brought out is really contained in the experience itself and has merely been 
brought to light in this act of reflection. (Palmer, 1969, p. 110)1 
The meaning of an objectively grasped fact is, thus, given with the fact 
itself, and the meaning is intrinsically defined in terms of one’s life or 
experiential context. Experience is, then, intrinsically historical and 
from here it follows that the understanding of experience must also be 
in corresponding categories, i. e. categories that can “express the 
freedom of life and history”. 
The second term in Dilthey’s formula against positivism, Ausdruck or 
“expression”, refers, according to Palmer (1969), to “objectification[s] 
of the mind – knowledge, feeling, and will – of man.” (p. 112). Since 
expressions are interpreted as objectification of lived experience, it 
means that human studies can begin with a concentration on a fixed, 
“objective” manifestation of man’s inner life, rather than relying on 
introspection or direct reflection on experience.  
The third term, Verstehen, is also a technical term. In ordinary language 
use, one understands not only agents, their actions and their products, 
but also the causes of natural phenomena, the constitution of 
mathematical proofs, etc. (Moravcsik, 1979; Furberg, 1981, 1982). In 
Dilthey’s explanation of the character of the Geisteswissenshaften, 
however, the term appears to have been reserved as a designator for a 
particular act, namely “the mental operation in which the mind grasps 
                                          
1 Palmer’s (1969) paraphrase of Gesammelte Schriften, VII, p. 139-140. 
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the ‘mind’ (Geist) of the other person” (Palmer, 1969, p. 114); the 
special moment when one human being, understands the being of 
another human being. 
Dilthey explains the relationship as follows: 
We explain by means of purely intellectual processes, but we understand by 
means of the combined activity of all the mental powers in apprehending. 
(Palmer, 1969, p. 115)1 
Understanding is, thus, conceived as a human experience of human 
being that presents a fullness that escapes rational theorising. It opens 
up not only the world of individual others, but thereby also hitherto 
unforeseen possibilities in the understanding being’s own being. It is a 
kind of non verbal thinking that is believed to involve the achievement 
of pre reflexive transposition of oneself into another person’s being 
and meaning. Due to this, the understanding human being is believed 
to share in the same being with the being that lends itself to be 
understood. And understanding is, thereby, in a deeper sense, also 
conceived as an understanding of oneself. As such, it is also believed to 
be an experience that presents a value in itself apart from all practical 
considerations.  
Understanding is, with Dilthey as with Schleiermacher, held to take 
place within the hermeneutical principle or circle. In this circle, or 
perhaps rather spiral (cf. Radnitzky, 1970), the whole receives its 
meaning from the parts and, reciprocally, the parts can only be un-
derstood in reference to a whole. Dilthey uses the sentence as an 
illustrative example of the interaction between the parts and the whole 
in understanding, and the need for both. The emerging meaning of the 
individual parts encourages an understanding of the sense of the 
whole, which in turn changes the indeterminateness of the words into 
a fixed and meaningful pattern (Palmer, 1969). This is also believed to 
hold for the relationship between the parts and the whole of one’s 
experience as a whole too. Palmer (1969) explains the relationship as 
follows: 
                                          
1 Gesammelte Schriften, V, p. 172. 
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The meaning of the whole is a ‘sense’ derived from the meaning of the in-
dividual parts. An event or an experience can so alter our lives that what was 
formerly meaningful becomes meaningless and an apparently unimportant past 
experience may take on meaning in retrospect. The sense of the whole 
determines the function and the meaning of the parts. And meaning is 
something historical; it is a relationship of whole to parts seen by us from a 
given standpoint, at a given time, for a given combination of parts. It is not 
something above or outside history but a part of a hermeneutical circle always 
historically defined. (p. 118) 
The circularity or “dialecticality” of understanding, means also that 
there cannot be any real starting point for understanding. 
Consequently, there can be no “presuppositionless” either, because 
every act of understanding and every meaning is given only within a 
certain context or horizon. Since one always understands from within 
one’s own experiential horizon, which is part of the hermeneutical 
circle, there can be no non-positional understanding of anything, at 
any time, in any place. 
In sum, Dilthey’s account of the character of understanding as a 
phenomenon, which is an integrate part of his attempt to articulate the 
nature of Geisteswissenshaften as opposed to Naturwissenshaften, and to 
found the former on hermeneutics as opposed to empiricism and 
introspective psychology, suggests, thus, that Verstehen 
(”understanding”) refers to the special moment in life where one 
human being understands another human being. Understanding is in 
other words, a term that is exclusively used as a reference to an 
operation that consists in the interpretation of objectifications of life 
and the re-experience of the experience of the other, which in a deeper 
sense appears to have been understood as an understanding of oneself. 
It implies that proper objects for understanding are human agents’ 
ideas, intentions, actions, activity and achievements, and that what is 
understood then is the character, meaning, signification, etc. of such 
objectification of life. It implies that understanding always takes place 
within the experiential horizons of one’s own being in the world and 
that due to this there can be no presupositionless or positions less 
understanding. All understanding of human phenomena is therefore 
intrinsically historical. With the discovery of the impossibility of 
presuppositionless inquiry, Dilthey should perhaps also have let go of 
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the ideal of objectively valid interpretations, but he apparently never 
did (Palmer, 1969).  
HEIDEGGER: UNDERSTANDING AS A MODE OF BEING 
If Dilthey’s discussion of understanding was a part of his project of 
working out an epistemological and methodological foundation for the 
human studies, Martin Heidegger’s (1881–1976) discussion can be 
conceived as a part of his quest for a more fundamental ontology 
(Palmer, 1969). This project is associated with Being and Time 
(Heidegger, 1927/1990) where Heidegger seeks to reach and go be-
yond the assumption that Western metaphysics had been erected on, 
and tries to formulate more fundamental categories on which this 
discipline could be built (Spiegelberg, 1965, p. 271 ff.).  
If this gives a glimpse of what Heidegger’s project was about, the 
purpose of his discussion of understanding within this project can then 
be put as that of providing a more fundamental and encompassing 
account of the philosophical prerequisites for understanding than the 
ones that Schleiermacher and Dilthey had provided. In his 
phenomenological hermeneutic of the general ontological structure 
being, Heidegger takes the point of departure in the assumption that 
being, or Dasein (“there-being”), which he prefers to call it, is a form of 
being that presents a special distinctiveness as compared with other 
entities (Heidegger, 1927/1990, p. 2 ff.):  
Dasein is an entity which…understands itself in its Being, and that to some 
degree it does so explicitly. It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its 
Being, this Being is disclosed to it. (p. 32) 
The point is, thus, that Dasein is a being can become an object for itself. 
The kind of being towards which Dasein can comport itself in one way 
or another, and always does comport itself, is called existence, which is 
also first and foremost for a particular Dasein. So whenever Dasein 
understands itself, it always “understands itself in terms of its 
existence – in terms of a possibility: to be itself or not itself” (ibid., p. 
33).  
 Understanding in philosophy  50 
Heidegger (1927/1990) suggests moreover, that “Dasein has either 
chosen these possibilities itself, or got itself into them, or grown up in 
them already.” (p. 33). To the extent that Dasein has chosen them, he 
maintains also that it has thereby also decided its existence, whether it 
has done so by taking hold of or by neglecting its way of being. This 
means that “Dasein’s understanding of Being pertains with equal 
primeordiality both to an understanding of something like a ‘world’, 
and to the understanding of the Being of those entities which becomes 
accessible within the world” (Heidegger, 1927/1990, p. 33).  
This suggests, thus, that Dasein differs from all other entities in that: 
1) “Dasein is an entity whose Being has the determinate character of 
existence other than its own”; 2) “Dasein is in itself ‘ontological’, 
because existence is thus determinative for it”; and: 3) that Dasein 
“with equal primeordiality… also possesses–as constitutive for its 
understanding of existence–an understanding of the Being of all 
entities of a character other than its own” (ibid., p. 34). In this per-
spective “understanding” (verstehen) means obviously neither what it 
usually means in English, nor what it appears to have meant in 
Schleiermacher, nor what it appears to have meant in Dilthey, but 
rather “the power to grasp one’s own possibilities for being, within the 
context of the life world in which one exists” (Palmer, 1969, p. 131).  
Understanding refers, thus, first and foremost to “a mode or con-
stituent element in being in the world.… the structure in being which 
makes possible the actual exercise of understanding on an empirical 
level.…Understanding is, thus, ontologically fundamental and prior to 
every act of existing” (ibid., p. 131). It is the ever shifting pre-giving, 
fore-seeing, pre-conceiving, basis for all interpretation, and as such it is 
contemporaneous with one’s existence.  
Dilthey had pointed out that meaningfulness is always a matter of 
reference to a context (Strukturzusamenhang), i.e. that understanding 
always operates within a hermeneutical circle rather than proceeding 
in an ordered progression from simple and self-sufficient parts to a 
whole. Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutic goes one step 
further, in that it explores the implications of the hermeneutical circle 
for the ontological structure of all human existential understanding 
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and interpretation. Furthermore, understanding is not separate from 
mood nor is it imaginable without “world” or “meaningfulness”. 
Understanding is, thus, like meaningfulness, a prerequisite for un-
derstanding and interpretation on an empirical level. It is an onto-
logical constituent in one’s being in the world. And as such it proceeds 
every act, wherein each and every thing is made known as a particular 
being that presents this or that character. However, in order to better 
understand the meaning of the term “understanding” in Heidegger, it 
is also convenient to learn more about what is meant with “world” and 
what he says about our relationship to objects-in-the-world.  
Like the term understanding, the term world is a technical term in 
Heidegger. But instead of referring to the term surrounding or uni-
verse as it appears to a scientific gaze, it refers to what one can call 
one’s personal world. Palmer (1969) explains the concept as follows: 
World is not the whole of all beings but the whole in which the human being 
always finds himself already immersed, surrounded by its manifestness as 
revealed through an always pre grasping, encompassing understanding. (p. 
132) 
World is, thus, something that one finds oneself in as well as all other 
things that one has and may have co-existence with in the world. To 
think of world as something distinct from ourselves in an objective 
sense would be to fall back into the subject-object schema that 
Heidegger obviously seeks to go beyond. World is what existence is 
before every subject-object dividing act takes place. For, world is: 
… prior to all “objectivity”, all conceptualization; it is therefore also prior to 
subjectivity, since both objectivity and subjectivity are conceived within the 
subject object-schema. 
World cannot be described by trying to enumerate the entities within it; in this 
process world would be passed over, for world is just what is presupposed in 
every act of knowing an entity. Every entity in the world is grasped as an entity 
in terms of world, which is always already there. The entities which comprise 
man’s physical world are not themselves world but in a world. Only man has 
world. World is so encompassing, and at the same time so close, that it eludes 
notice. One sees right through it, yet one could not see anything in its own 
manifestness without it. Unnoticed, presupposed, encompassing, world is 
always present, transparent and eluding every attempt to grasp it as object. 
(Palmer, 1969, p. 132) 
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Notwithstanding the assumed elusive, transparent character of world, 
Heidegger appears to have felt that he found access to it in the fact that 
world is something divined alongside the entities that emerge in it. At 
the same time however, understanding must be through world, which 
is therefore fundamental for all understanding. This gives world and 
understanding as inseparable parts of the ontological constitution of 
the being of Dasein. 
In order to give a glimpse of the unobtrusiveness of world, Heidegger 
compares it with the unobtrusiveness of the tools one uses in daily 
activity. Due to their mundaneness, they tend to become transparent, 
taken-for-granted, un-noticed. It is, Heidegger tells us, usually first 
when a breakdown occurs that they for a short moment become visible 
as what they are. It is also in these moment that one can become aware 
that their meaning lies in their relation to the structural context of 
interrelated meanings and intentions which they usually have their 
existence in. A hammer may be present merely as something that can 
be weighed, catalogued as to properties, and compared to other objects 
of the same kind. But this is, however, not what a hammer proximally 
and for the most part is, at least not in the contexts where it fulfils its 
function as a tool.  
It is, following Heidegger, thus, not by observing a hammer when it 
lies still, that one understands what a hammer essentially is, but when 
one uses it, or, perhaps rather, when one finds that it breaks down, or 
that it is required, but cannot be found. Because it is first then or, 
perhaps rather there, that it for a short moment emerges from world as 
what it proximally and for the most part is; namely something that is 
an essential and integral part of the activities where it is employed as a 
tool. This means that world and the things as they are experienced in 
being in the world, is thus “disclosed, not to the contemplative 
analytical gaze, but in the moment in which it suddenly emerges from 
hiddenness in the full functional context of world” (Palmer, 1969, p. 
133). It means, however, also that “the character of understanding will 
best be grasped not through an analytical catalogue of its attributes, 
nor in the full flush of its proper functioning, but when it breaks down, 
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when it comes up against a wall, perhaps when something it must 
have is missing” (ibid., p. 133 f.). 
The phenomenon of breakdown lights, thus, not only up the being of 
tools as tools and the being of understanding as understanding, but 
also says something about the being of world as world, i.e. as “the 
realm in which the actual resistance and possibilities in the structure of 
being shape understanding… the realm where the temporality and 
historicity of being are radically present, and the place where being 
translates itself into meaningfulness, understanding, and 
interpretation” (Palmer, 1969, p. 134).  
According to Palmer (1969), Heidegger’s “world” is thus “the realm of 
the hermeneutical process, the process by which being becomes 
thematised as language” (p. 134), where understanding operates in a 
fabric of relationships (Bewandnisganzheit) called world. The 
ontological ground for the intelligibility of that fabric of relationships 
is called “meaningfulness” (Bedeutsamkeit). Meaningfulness “provides 
the ontological possibility that words can have a meaningful 
signification; it is the basis for language” (Palmer, 1969, p. 134). It is 
thus: 
something deeper than the logical system of language; it is founded on 
something prior to language and embedded in world … words may shape or 
formulate meaning, [but] they point beyond their system to a meaningfulness 
already resident in the relational whole of world. Meaningfulness… is not 
something man gives to an object; it is what an object gives to man through 
supplying the ontological possibility of words and language. (ibid., p. 134) 
Furthermore, just as meaningfulness is embedded in world, under-
standing is also embedded in meaningfulness and world. 
Interpretation is seen as “the rendering explicit of understanding” 
(Palmer, 1969, p. 134). Interpreting is in Heidegger therefore not so 
much a question of ascribing a certain meaning to a given object, as it 
is a question of rendering the “as” explicit wherein something is 
already understood in understanding. For what is encountered arises 
as “pre-grasped” in a particular relationship. Interpretation thus 
presupposes, a particular being-in-the-world, meaningfulness, 
language, and understanding. And whatever presents itself as 
something with this or that character, is, following this interpretation, 
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always something that is encountered in the world from within a 
particular perspective, in a particular situation, through a particular 
understanding interpretation.  
The process whereby something is singled out from the world as a 
particular something whose sense may be rendered explicit in in-
terpretation, has, following Heidegger (1927/1990) moreover, a 
threefold structure:  
Whenever something is interpreted as something, the interpretation will be 
founded essentially upon fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception.( p. 191) 
It means that whenever something plays itself out as something, that 
something does always so through a particular understanding inter-
pretation and whenever the meaning of what something is understood 
as is rendered plain in explicit explanation, it is done so on the basis of 
a more primordial pre-understanding, interpretation. 
From here follows that there can be no “objective” or 
“presuppositionless” interpretation, because even “the most 
‘presuppositionless’ interpreter… has preliminary assumptions” 
(Palmer, 1969, p. 136). Hence: 
Even as he approaches a text, he may already have seen it as a certain text, say, 
a lyric, and is placing himself in the posture he interprets to be appropriate to 
such a text. His encounter with the work is not in some context outside time 
and space, outside his own horizon of experience and interest, but rather in a 
particular time and place. There is, for instance, a reason he is turning to this 
text and not some other, and thus he approaches the text questioningly, not 
with a blank openness. (ibid., 1969, p. 136)  
Thus interpretation is, according to Heidegger (1927/1990), “never a 
presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us” (p. 
191 f.), but rather always a projection of a possible meaning of 
something as it has emerged in preceding understanding interpreta-
tion. What is grasped in understanding interpretation and is exposited 
in explicit interpretation proves, thus, to be being that is neither 
entirely different from the entity that is the subject for understanding 
and interpretation nor identical with it. For being that can be and is 
understood and interpreted is, with Heidegger, never being-in-itself, 
but always being that is relative to the there-being of the 
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understanding and interpreting being and the there-being of the 
understood and interpreted corresponding counterpart.  
According to Heidegger, any interpretation that is to contribute to 
understanding must already have understood what is to be inter-
preted. This is a fact that has always been recognised in hermeneutics. 
The new thing is that Heidegger does not limit this basic truth to 
derivative understandings, such as those that, for instance, take place 
in the interpretation of literature in philological research, or in the 
interpretation of remains in archaeological research. He holds namely 
that it is valid not only for this kind of interpretation, but also for 
interpretation in natural science, and the more fundamental or 
primordial interpretations that provide the ground for such inter-
pretations. Namely the existential and ontological disclosures of the 
structure of understandings that forms the basis for each and all un-
derstanding interpretation and interpretative explanation whatsoever.  
Heidegger’s contribution to the development of philosophical un-
derstanding of understanding and interpretation is many-sided 
(Palmer, 1969). In Being and Time (Heidegger, 1927/1990), which has 
been focused upon here, Heidegger reconceived understanding in a 
radically new context in comparison with his forerunners. Namely, 
that of truth as unconcealement, thinking as bringing what is hidden to 
light, and understanding as the “process of disclosure whereby being 
comes into manifest existence” (Palmer, 1969, p. 161). In his 
subsequent works, Heidegger appears to have continued his attempt 
to go beyond the text of Western thinking and to try to answer the 
questions which he felt could be said to have given rise to the same, in 
a more profound way.1 In these he mainly appears to have worked 
out: 1) a critique of presentational thinking, subjectivism, and 
technology; 2) an account of the relationship between language and 
speaking; 3) an interpretation of the nature of thinking; 4) a discussion 
of explication and the typology of being; and finally: 5) an 
                                          
1 For a bibliography see Palmer, 1969, p. 256 ff. 
 Understanding in philosophy  56 
interpretation of the nature of works of art (Palmer, 1969 p. 140 ff.). 
This account will, however, not follow him into this. 
It can be stated that in Heidegger, hermeneutics points “to the event of 
understanding as such, not to historical methods of interpretation over 
against scientific methods” (Palmer, 1969, p. 161). It is interpreted in 
terms of engaged circumspective being-in-the-world, meaningfulness, 
threefold structure of understanding, language as speaking, and 
understanding as grasping one’s possibilities for being in the world. In 
Heidegger’s world, one exists relative to oneself, other persons, beings, 
entities, etc., in various forms of activities. Here, interpretation is an 
explication of the meaning of the being of the being as it is pre-
understood or pre-given in its mode of being ready-to-hand as 
opposed to its mode of merely being present-at-hand. Heidegger 
leaves, thus, the “historical-scientific dichotomy to which Dilthey 
devoted his whole life time… behind in the assertion that all 
understanding is rooted in the historical character of existential 
understanding” (ibid., p. 161). In so doing, he cleared the way for 
Gadamer’s (1960/1993) treatment of the phenomenon in question. This 
is to be discussed next. 
GADAMER: UNDERSTANDING AS A LINGUISTIC EVENT  
Hans-Georg Gadamer is perhaps first and foremost known for having 
focused on problems concerning the nature of understanding literature 
and history, but since his discussion of the hermeneutic phenomenon 
involves an ontological disclosure of the general structure of human 
experience, understanding his work has of course consequences that 
go far beyond these human science disciplines. In Truth and Method 
(Warheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik) 
from 1960, which above all represents his attempt to present the 
hermeneutic phenomenon in its full extent, Gadamer makes a critical 
appraisal and development of hermeneutics as it is found in 
Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Heidegger. In this he takes his point of 
departure in Heidegger’s reinterpretation of understanding, teases out 
the consequences of this for the understanding of aesthetical and 
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historical consciousness, and presents a comprehensive and 
penetrating account of how truth emerges or presents itself for oneself 
irrespectively of what activity it takes place in.  
Truth and Method (Gadamer, 1960/1993) is divided into three parts. In 
the first The question of truth as it emerges in the experience of art, 
Gadamer performs an existential philosophical critique of the notion of 
aesthetical consciousness. In the second, The extension of the question of 
truth to understanding in the human sciences, he criticises the ordinary 
understanding of history as something that stands over against oneself 
as an object. In the third, The ontological shift of hermeneutics guided by 
language, Gadamer gives a general account of how truth emerges for 
people and what function language fills whenever this takes place.  
The conception of art that Gadamer criticises is first and foremost 
“aesthetical consciousness” as something distinct and isolated from 
“non-aesthetical consciousness”. In this perspective, which he thinks is 
a relatively late accomplishment and which he traces back to the 
Cartesian tendency to subjectivise thinking, the subject contemplating 
the aesthetic object tends to be conceived as “an empty consciousness 
receiving perceptions and somehow enjoying the immediacy of pure 
sensuous form” (Palmer, 1969, p. 167). Over against this conception of 
the experience of art, which tends to isolate aesthetical experience from 
other more pragmatic spheres of experience and which also tends to 
consider experience in terms of enjoyment of form as opposed to 
content, Gadamer places a conception of the experience of art that 
opens up a world for the one that experiences it.  
It is an experience of something that concerns, that gives experience, 
that tells something about the being of being in the world and that 
does so as a result of the experiencer already existing in a world, 
already participating in the structures of self-understanding, already 
having some experience, and expectations of what addresses him/her 
anew and that contributes to the modification of his/her experiential 
horizons. The legitimation of art is therefore not that it gives aesthetic 
pleasure, but that it reveals being and assists in the realisation of what 
is.  
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In order to clarify the way of being as it presents itself in the experi-
ence of art, Gadamer (1960/1993) compares it with the way of being of 
a game or a play (Spiel, p. 101 f.) The significance of this analogy, 
which suggests the being of art as something that one shares in, lies, 
not only in that it: 1) frees interpretation from the myths of 
subjectivising aesthetics – especially the dichotomies of subject-object 
and form-content; 2) keeps understanding of works of art clear from 
authors’ opinions and creative acts; and: 3) steers away from the 
tendency to take the readers subjectivity as a point of departure for 
understanding (Palmer, 1969 p. 175 f.). It provides Gadamer also with 
a means to develop the dialectical and ontological character of 
understanding and interpretation one step further, because once he 
had shown the temporality and place of work of art, he had also de-
veloped a means whereby he could criticise the ordinary under-
standing of history as well.  
In his critique of “historical consciousness”, i.e. the experience of 
history as an assembly of fixed pastness, that can be reconstructed as 
what really was or happened on the basis of objective interpretations 
of a “non-speculative” meaning of relics, Gadamer takes his point of 
departure in his interpretation of Heidegger’s account of the pre-
structure of understanding and of the intrinsic historicalness of human 
existence. According to this, human being is a being in the world that 
arises in, and develops through an ontological entanglement with that 
world. As such, it presents the character of a life-world, or, in other 
words, a whole in which persons live as historical creatures (Gadamer, 
1960/1993, p. 247).  
In the life world, a person never approaches or encounters anything 
with a blank openness, but always from within particular pre-con-
ceived ways of relating to these things. These spring forth from one’s 
previous and present experience of those or similar things, and the 
possibilities to project oneself relative those things that are born out of 
previous and present engagements with things in the actual mode and 
activity of being in the world. Gadamer refers here to Heidegger’s 
description of the hermeneutical circle in Being and Time (cf. Heidegger, 
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1927/1990, p. 194 ff.). According Gadamer’s (1960/1993) account of 
this:  
A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a 
meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the 
text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the text 
with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. Working out this 
fore-projection, which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he 
penetrates into the meaning, is understanding what is there. (p. 267) 
The process that Heidegger describes suggests, as Gadamer interprets 
it, moreover, also: 
that every revision of the fore-projection is capable of projecting before itself a 
new projection…; rival projects can emerge side by side until it becomes 
clearer what the unity of meaning is; interpretation begins with fore-
conceptions that are replaced by more suitable ones. (ibid., p. 267)  
Furthermore: 
This constant process of new projection constitutes the movement of un-
derstanding and interpretation. A person who is trying to understand is exposed 
to distractions from fore-meanings that are not borne out by the things 
themselves. Working-out of appropriate projections, anticipatory in nature, to 
be confirmed “by the things” themselves, is the constant task of understanding. 
The only “objectivity” here is the confirmation of a fore-meaning in its being 
worked out. Indeed, what characterizes the arbitrariness of inappropriate fore-
meanings if not that they come to nothing in being worked out? But 
understanding realizes its full potential only when the fore-meanings that it 
begins with are not arbitrary. Thus it is quite right for the interpreter not to 
approach the text directly, relying solely on the fore-meaning already available 
to him, but rather explicitly to examine the legitimacy – i.e., the origin and 
validity – of the fore-meanings dwelling within him. (Gadamer, 1960/1993, p. 
267) 
From this account of the hermeneutical circle, it follows that under-
standing presupposes pre-understanding and that there can be no 
understanding without an anticipatory projection of the meaning of 
that which may come to be understood. It means that all under-
standing presupposes (understanding) interpretation, experience, and 
projective modification of the fore-meanings that are borne out in 
understanding interpretation, experience and explicit explanation of 
what is there. In this perspective, the cumulated experience of a person 
consists not only in what the person has experienced, and what the 
person has made out of it in terms of knowledge, but also in the 
 Understanding in philosophy  60 
orientation towards new experience that is implied or may be inferred 
by the experience as it is so far. It is “not only to experience in the 
sense of information about this or that” (Gadamer, 1960/1993, p 356). 
It refers also to experience in general, which is experience that must 
constantly be acquired and which is also something from which no one 
can escape.  
Thus experience is, following Gadamer (1960/1993), “something that 
is a part of the historical nature of man.… Only through negative 
instance do we acquire new experiences… Every experience worthy of 
the name thwarts an expectation.” (p. 356) The historical nature of man 
essentially implies a fundamental negativity that emerges in the 
relation between experience and insight. In this connection Gadamer 
also cites Aeschylus “learning through suffering” (pathei matos), 
asserting that this saying means “not only that we become wise 
through suffering and that our knowledge of things must first be 
corrected through deception and undeception” (Gadamer, 1960/1993, 
p. 356), but also that the reason why this is so, is that as a person one is 
bound to learn through the of the limitations of one’s previous 
experiences. The reason for this is the simple fact that all human 
experience is limited, or, in another word, finite.  
Experience is, thus, basically experience of our human finitude. The 
truly experienced person is, as Gadamer (1960/1993) presents it, 
namely “one who has taken this to his heart, who knows that he is 
master neither of time nor the future.” (p. 357). Experience is, always, 
experience of the limitations of one’s own experiences’. It is the 
experience that things are not as one expected them to be. It is, as has 
been implied above, however, also experience that opens up an 
interpretation of what is, or, of what cannot be done away with, for 
instance, one’s own historicity. According to Gadamer, interpretation 
that gives understanding always takes the way through asking and 
listening, i.e. through conversation.  
In order to understand something in another sense than the sense one 
has understood it in before, requires experience of particular 
restrictions of previous experience/understanding and a realisation 
that there is something one does not understand in all ways possible to 
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understand. This is something that cannot take place except within the 
experiential horizons of one’s own existence, because these 
experiential horizons exist as a being for which, for instance, being can 
become a problem. It is true that “being” can change them, but it 
cannot be done away with, for without it one would not have world.  
The experiential horizon is, thus, there for oneself and for other per-
sons, as long as oneself and the others are there. Because being 
conscious is not just about being open for something in a certain way. 
It is also about being open for something as something in the world, 
within one’s own horizon, which always includes oneself and other 
beings and things in a manifold ways, in an ever changing fore 
grasping understanding activity. Not even when the required 
openness for the other is acquired, when the hermeneutical horizon is 
established, does one leave one’s horizons. For what happens then, is 
not so much that one leaves one’s own horizon behind, as it is that 
one’s horizon has come to be modified to the degree that it now 
includes so much of the horizons of the inscription or the work, that 
one has moved into a position from which it begins to become possible 
to divine an answer to the question that the text or the work could be 
considered as an answer to.  
This is a question of finding a way to and setting the stage for the work 
or the text, so that it can address us where we find ourselves. It is a 
matter of bringing it back into play rather than playing for it. It is a 
question of allowing it to speak for itself, rather than speaking for it. It 
is acknowledging its right to be heard, listening to its message, 
allowing oneself and one’s self-understanding the right of being 
moved out into the open by it, and seeking to answer the question it 
addresses one with.  
Following Gadamer, the dialectic of questions and answers that is 
disclosed in the account of the structure of the hermeneutical expe-
rience allows us to explain more exactly what kind of consciousness 
historically effected consciousness is. The dialectic of questions and 
answers makes understanding namely appear to be a reciprocal 
relationship of the same kind as conversation. It is a type of 
consciousness that acknowledges its own historicity (i.e. that it op-
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erates in history and that it is limited by its lack of experience). It is 
consciousness that thereby is also open for new experience. It is also 
consciousness that assumes that thinking dialogue with its counterpart 
is worthwhile. This is because it expects that it has something to say, 
which it itself is relatively ignorant of. It is consciousness that 
questioningly turns to the work or the text, and takes up a dialogue of 
questions and answers with the same, whose own logic – given that 
the thinking dialogue can be and is successfully carried out – finally 
leads to a fusion of horizons. This is the creation of the hermeneutical 
horizon, the emergence of the question and the working out of the 
answer that mediates between the meaning of work or the text and the 
human being that interprets it.  
Following Gadamer (1960/1993), the dialectic of question and answer 
in thinking dialogue, not only results in the fusion of horizons, i.e. the 
hermeneutical question, but also works out an answer to it. In order to 
interact, the above need a medium wherein they can interact and 
wherein an eventual new truth of the disputed object may come into 
expression. And since the hermeneutical phenomenon has already 
been compared to a conversation, the step to assume that this medium 
is language is not far behind.  
According to Gadamer (1960/1993), language is, however, not only the 
medium of interaction between the two parties, it is also the “object” in 
which the subject matter under consideration is brought to light. 
Language is where what one encounters in experience is expressed 
and where an answer to the question that subject matter confronts one 
with can be worked out. Language and words are in this sense, thus, 
not so much something that belong to the human being that 
understands and explains, as is something that belongs to the world, 
and to the situation in the world wherein the understanding and 
explaining being finds him/herself. Language makes it possible for 
persons to have a world. But to have a world means to have an 
orientation (Verhalten) towards the world. And “[t]o have an 
orientation toward the world … means to keep oneself so free from 
what one encounters of the world that one can present itself to oneself 
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as it is. This capacity is at once to have a world and to have a 
language” (Gadamer, 1960/1993, p. 443).  
Gadamer (1960/1993) holds, moreover, that “the verbal world in 
which we live is not a barrier that prevents knowledge of being-in-
itself, but fundamentally embraces everything in which our insight can 
be enlarged and deepened” (p. 447). For every such world view is, 
continues Gadamer (1960/1993), of itself always “open to every 
possible insight and hence to every expansion of its own world picture, 
and is accordingly available to others” (p. 447). Furthermore, 
whenever one understands a view that is presented in another 
language, one does so from within one’s own verbal experiential view 
of the world by broadening its horizons to the degree that it can 
include the view of the other. “Our verbal experience of the world has 
the capacity to embrace the most varied relationships of life” 
(Gadamer, 1960/1993, p. 448). 
The reason why language is able to this is because it is not a creation of 
reflective thought, but itself helps to fashion the world orientation 
wherein one lives. Hence: 
Verbal experience of the world in language is “absolute.” It transcends all the 
relative ways being is posited because it embraces all being-in-itself, in what 
ever relationships (relativities) it appears. Our verbal experience of the world is 
prior to everything that is recognized and addresses as existing. (Gadamer, 
1960/1993, p. 450)  
Unlike the things that are assumed to appear in the world-views that 
are embodied in various sciences, the world which appears in lan-
guage and is constituted by it, has according to Gadamer (1960/1993), 
no being-in-itself. That is, it is not relative in the same sense as the 
object of for instance the natural sciences is. 
To have a language means, following Gadamer (1960/1993), thus, to 
have a relationship to the world wherein matters of fact may come to 
speak or, in other words, into language. In language the structure of 
being is not simply reflected, because the ground for the process is the 
finitude of our historical experience. The order and structure of our 
experience is itself originally formed and changed in language. 
“Language is”, says Gadamer (1960/1993), “the record of finitude, not 
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because the structure of human language is multifarious, but because 
every language is constantly being formed and developed the more it 
expresses its experience of the world” (p. 457). Its centre is “the event 
of language, whence our whole experience of the world and especially 
hermeneutical experience unfolds” (Gadamer, 1960/1993, p. 457).  
In his elaboration of hermeneutical experience – as an encounter 
between heritage in the form of a transmitted text and the horizons of 
the interpreter – Gadamer indicates that the phenomenon of un-
derstanding is linguistic in nature. It is, more precisely, described as a 
conversation between tradition and its interpreter. Trying to describe 
the manner wherein subject and object belong to one another and the 
general structure of the ways wherein truth manifests itself for man, 
Gadamer asks us to note that “the fundamental thing here is that 
something occurs (etwas geschieht)” (Gadamer, 1960/1993, p. 461 f.). 
Gadamer (1960/1993) illustrates what takes place whenever under-
standing happens with the following example: 
Whether a given traditionary text is a poem or tells us of a great event, in each 
case what is transmitted re-emerges into existence just as it presents itself. 
There is no being-in-itself that is increasingly revealed when Homer’s Iliad or 
Alexander’s Indian Campaign speaks to us in the new appropriation of 
tradition but, as in genuine dialogue, something emerges that is contained in 
neither of the partners by himself. (p. 462) 
Gadamer recalls all this in order to determine the meaning of the 
belongingness between subject and object as it corresponds to one’s 
hermeneutical experience. If one is seeking a right definition of the 
concept of belongingness that one is concerned with here, one must, 
according to Gadamer, take account of the particular dialectic that is 
contained in hearing. 
In a conversation, one who hears is not only addressed. In hearing 
there is also the element that one who hears must hear, whether one 
wants to or not. In seeing, one can always look away, but there is no 
such thing in hearing. This difference between hearing and seeing is, 
according to the philosopher, significant in this context for the simple 
reason that the primacy of hearing is the basis of the hermeneutical 
phenomenon. For as he sees it, there is nothing that is not available to 
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hearing through the medium of language. The language that one hears 
in is, however, not only that wherein everything can be expressed, but 
also something that opens up a world whence what is handed down, 
comes down in. In hearing, you listens to what reaches you and the 
truth of what is handed down is like the present that lies immediately 
open to the senses, with the difference that its mode of being is not 
sensible intimacy, but language. In interpreting the texture of 
language, one who understands it relates its truth to his/her own 
linguistic attitude to the world. The linguistic communication between 
the present and tradition is the event that takes place in all 
understanding.  
This structure of the hermeneutical experience depends on the eventful 
character of language. For the use and development of language is not 
just a process, but that process wherein what is said in tradition comes 
into being anew, as new understanding. As such it is at once both 
assimilation and interpretation. This event is, according to Gadamer 
(1960/1993), not our action upon the thing, but the act of the thing. 
However, the hermeneutical experience also has its own rigor: that of 
uninterrupted listening. A thing does not present itself to the 
hermeneutical experience without an effort special to it, namely that of 
“being negative toward itself”: 
A person who is trying to understand a text has to keep something at a distance 
– namely everything that suggests itself, on the basis of his own prejudices, as 
the meaning expected – as soon as it is rejected by the sense of the text 
itself.… The unfolding of the totality of meaning towards which understanding 
is directed, forces us to make conjectures and take them back again. The self-
cancellation of the interpretation makes it possible for the thing itself – the 
meaning of the text – to assert itself. (Gadamer, 1960/1993, p. 465) 
What makes the movement of the interpretation dialectical is primarily 
not the one-sidedness of every statement can be balanced by another 
side, but because “the word that interpretatively fits the meaning of 
the text expresses the whole of this meaning – i.e. allows an infinity of 
meaning to be represented within it in a finite way” (ibid., p. 465). 
In order to show that this is dialectic conceived from the centre of 
language, Gadamer goes on to discuss the way wherein this 
 Understanding in philosophy  66 
(hermeneutical) dialectic differs from the metaphysical dialectic of 
Plato and Hegel. Both have, says Gadamer (1960/1993), what Hegel 
called “the speculative element” in common: 
The word “speculative” refers here to the mirror relation. Being reflected 
involves a constant substitution of one thing for another. When something is 
reflected in something else, say, the castle in the lake, it means that the lake 
throws back the image of the castle. The mirror image is essentially connected 
with the actual sight of the thing through the medium of the observer. It has no 
being of its own; it is like an “appearance” that is not itself and yet allows the 
thing to appear.… 
Speculative means the opposite of the dogmatism… A speculative person is 
someone who does not abandon himself directly to the tangibility of ap-
pearances or to the fixed determinateness of the meant, but who is able to 
reflect or … who sees that the “in-itself” is a “for me”. And a thought is 
speculative if the relationship it asserts is not conceived as a quality un-
ambiguously assigned to a subject, a property to a given thing, but must be 
thought of as a mirroring, in which the reflection is nothing but the pure 
appearance of what is reflected, just as the one is the one of the other, and the 
other is the other of the one. (p. 466) 
So whereas Hegel and Plato seem to have thought of the speculative 
dialectic as a means to reach absolute knowledge of what is beyond all 
contingencies, Gadamer (1960/1993) makes no such claims. 
Furthermore, whereas what Hegel calls dialectic and what Plato called 
dialectic seem to be based on the belief that language has its true being 
in the form of statements that express the meaning of pre established 
concepts, the dialectic which Gadamer advocates is historical and 
based on the notion of language as speech: i.e. language that is always 
at work as an event of disclosure of being. Language itself presents in 
this sense, namely a speculative structure. As the realisation of 
meaning, as the event of speech, of communication, of understanding, 
which is speculative in that “the finite possibilities of the word are 
oriented towards the sense intended, as toward the infinite” 
(Gadamer, 1960/1993, p. 469). 
A person who has something to say, seeks and finds the words 
whereby he makes himself intelligible to the other. He does so not by 
making statements, but by saying what he intends, which means “to 
hold what is said together with an infinity of what is not said in one 
unified meaning and to ensure that it is understood in this way” (ibid., 
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p. 469). Someone who speaks in this manner may, continues Gadamer, 
very well use only the most ordinary and common words and still be 
able to express what is (as yet) unsaid. Someone who speaks behaves 
speculatively when his words do not reflect beings, but a relation to 
the whole of being. This is connected with the fact that someone who 
repeats what is said does not need to distort consciously, but will still 
change the meaning of what has been said. Even in the most everyday 
speech, there appears an element of speculative reflection, namely the 
intangibility of that which is the purest reproduction of meaning 
(Gadamer, 1960/1993, p. 469). 
The speculativity of language, which among other things expresses a 
relation to the whole of the totality of what exists, or, in other words, 
lets factual relationship come to speech in relation to other 
relationships, shows itself, says Gadamer (1960/1963), in the example 
of ordinary conversation between people that understand one another; 
i.e., in that what is said is more than what is spoken and in that what is 
understood is not what is spoken but what is said with these words in 
the situation that is shared by the speaker and the listener in their 
common understanding of the world. All that is said and understood 
with language, which per definition has the power to encompass 
everything that can be experienced, said and understood, is, thus, 
really ordered by a larger sense of meaning in a common world that 
both parties share. 
What is encountered in understanding and disclosed in explicit in-
terpretation is, following Gadamer (1960/1963), not a projection of 
subjectivity, but the being of something that acts on one’s under-
standing in presenting itself in a language that can be understood. 
Thinking that man’s relation to the world is absolutely and funda-
mentally verbal in nature, and hence intelligible, he says also that it is 
the language of whatever thing it now is that presents itself that is 
understood whenever understanding takes place. He also says that, 
whenever meaning is grasped and made manifest in explicit linguistic 
interpretation it is so done in the interpreter’s language.  
The insight that being is self-presentation and that all understanding 
presents an event-character, is in Gadamer an insight that transcends 
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the metaphysics of substance as well as the transformation of the same 
in the modern concepts of subjectivity and scientific objectivity. It is 
also his meaning that one can use the metaphysics of the beautiful to 
establish an ontological background for the hermeneutical experience 
of the world. Because in the light of the metaphysics of the beautiful, 
which – as has been mentioned before – Gadamer uses to explain how 
the understanding being and the being that unfolds itself to be 
understood belong to one another, and how it becomes possible to 
realise that understanding presents the character of an encounter with 
being in language. Hence: 
What is evident…is always something that is said – a proposal, a plan, a 
conjecture, an argument, or something of the sort. …what is evident has not 
been proved and is not absolutely certain, but it asserts itself by reason of its 
own merit within the realm of the possible and the probable. Thus we can even 
admit that an argument has something evidently true about it, even though we 
are presenting a counter argument. How it is to be reconciled with the whole of 
what we ourselves consider correct is left open. It is only said that it is evident 
“in itself” – i.e., that there is something in its favour. The connection with the 
beautiful is manifest. The beautiful charms us, without its being immediately 
integrated with the whole of our orientations and evaluations. Indeed, just as 
the beautiful is a kind of experience that stands out like an enchantment and an 
adventure within the whole of our experience and presents a special task of 
hermeneutical integration, what is evident is always something surprising as 
well, like a new light being turned on, expanding the range of what we can 
take into consideration. (Gadamer, 1960/1993, p. 485 f.) 
Understanding is, then, an encounter with being in language that can 
be understood. It is a genuine experience. It is a language event. It is an 
occurrence in one’s being in the world. It is a happening where one on 
the basis of one’s previous experiences of particular being in the world, 
projects oneself according to one’s possibilities for being toward that 
being as being that presents this or that character, and where that 
being in power of being different than one expects it to be, presents a 
for oneself hitherto unknown aspect of itself. It is an occurrence where 
one experiences particular limitations of previous experience.  
Understanding is also thus, an occurrence where what presents itself 
not only presents itself as being different than what one expected it to 
be, but also asserts itself as being a particular being that presents the 
character of something that has to be understood differently than it has 
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been understood so far. It is experience within understanding that 
creates a meaning difference between new and previous experience 
that calls for and eventually also may result in an understanding 
interpretation that can bridge the distance between the partly different 
forms of experience, can resolve the meaning differences between 
them, and can integrate them into new and more inclusive and specific 
forms of consciousness. Understanding is, thus, an occurrence in the 
world that means a new rebuilding of one’s possibilities for being in 
the world toward that being that is and can be understood differently 
now and in the future than it used to be understood.  

  
Chapter 4 
 
THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
…the path of all knowledge leads through the 
question…”(Gadamer, 1960/1993, p. 363) 
The present chapter is intended to fill the dual purpose of establishing 
the research situation and presenting the more specific purpose of the 
study. In the first part a summary of what has emerged from first three 
chapters is provided. In the second, these observations are forged into 
an account of the research situation. In the third there is an attempt to 
present a delineation of purpose of the study. This is in many senses 
similar to the presentation that was included in Chapter 1, but also 
goes beyond this presentation in the sense that the new illumination is 
now given also against the backcloth of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
RECAPITULATION OF THE DISCUSSION SO FAR 
In the first chapter, it was noted that “understanding” is a prestigious 
word in education and that what one tends to understand with it 
functions as a means whereby one plans, carries out and evaluates, 
cognitive transactions, as parents and children, teachers and 
pupils/students in educational activities. It was also noted that 
teachers, among others, are often aware that “understanding” means 
something other than rote learning, but that proximally and for the 
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most part one is not consciously aware of what is really involved in 
understanding.  
In trying to work out a preliminary definition of what understanding 
has been approached as in the study, it was pointed out that under-
standing should not so much be thought of as an achievement of 
desired knowledge, as it should be thought of as something that one 
exercises and undergoes whenever one arrives at understanding. In 
this sense, understanding was also conceived as something that takes 
place in one’s participation in educational practices and in practices 
that involve elements of education, where what one tends to 
understand with understanding in such activities also guides one in 
one’s role and influences what can be expected to develop in such 
activity. The overriding purpose of the present study was in the 
introductory chapter finally also determined as one of studying what 
studying persons tend to understand with understanding, what they 
tend to mean it takes to understand or, in other words, what 
(following their experience) is involved in understanding.  
In Chapter 2, it emerged that despite understanding obviously not being 
a research object in its own right, there is still quite a lot of literature in 
psychology and education about understanding. And a sample of such 
literature that has been found relevant for this study was reviewed. 
The sample was drawn from research in educational psychology on 
conceptions of learning and understanding on the one hand, and on 
the development of thinking and speaking on the other.  
In the review of the studies of conceptions of learning and under-
standing, one can ascertain that when participants ranging from pre-
school to university are called upon to explain what is meant with 
learning, they tend to understand and explain the meaning of learning 
in a number of different ways. In the light of the empirical evidence 
that is presented, what the participants tend to understand and explain 
with learning varies also with the context where they tend to locate 
learning. In the youngest participants’ accounts of the meaning for 
learning, learning is sometimes not possible to differentiate from 
doing. In the little older participants’ accounts, the meaning of 
understanding begins to be understood and explained as a particular 
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sort of activity and outcome of such activity, namely activity that aims 
and results in knowledge (Pramling, 1983).  
In the accounts of participants’ beyond pre-school age that tend to 
understand and explain learning as a successful completion of de-
liberate learning, understanding begins to be pointed out first as an 
outcome and then as both an aim and outcome of learning. In the 
accounts’ of participants beyond both primary and also secondary 
school age, learning is sometimes also understood and explained as 
and activity that not only involves understanding as an aim, but that 
also involves understanding as a prerequisite for learning (Säljö, 1979; 
Marton et al., 1993; Marton, Watkins, et al., 1997).  
The review of the literature on previous studies on understandings of 
understanding revealed similar understandings and explanations of 
understanding in the context of sixth grade chemistry (Burns et al., 
1991) and in the context of revision for final examination at the 
university (Entwistle & Entwistle, 1992). In addition, the review of the 
studies of understandings of understanding ascertained also that 
students’ that have developed clear orientations towards under-
standing are often more successful in examinations and grades than 
students that are more oriented toward “learning”. It revealed finally 
also that students that have developed orientations toward 
“understanding” sometimes find that this is obviously not what their 
teachers call for, and that they therefore sometimes also bring their 
approach in line with the perceived requirements.  
In spite of the obvious similarities between the discussed research on 
conceptions of learning and understanding and the research on the 
development of thinking and speaking, one has in this research – as far 
as it is known here – hitherto never tried to relate it to the research on 
the development of thinking and speaking (Vygotskij, 1930/1978, 
1934/1987; Leont’ev, 1959/1977; Lurija, 1979). This is an annoying 
limitation of the research.  
It is certainly true that the previous studies give some insight into the 
direction of the development of understanding of learning and 
understanding, but in so far as this research has not been related to 
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other types of research about the same and similar objects, and as long 
as the development of understandings of learning and understanding 
as an integrated part of the over all development of intellectual 
abilities is not conceived of, the possible scope will be restricted.1 
There is an absence of an explicit theory of the character of the 
structure where understandings of learning and understanding 
develop. this must attend to, the conditions for the development of 
understanding and explaining learning, what generates, propels and 
guides the development of understanding and explanations of 
learning. Without it one can hardly say anything about why under-
standings of learning and understanding develop and why they de-
velop in the way the do. What is called for is, thus, a move towards a 
more explicitly theoretical approach for studies of understandings in 
general and for understandings of understanding as a phenomenon in 
particular.  
Another limitation of the discussed research is that learning and un-
derstanding proximally and for the most part seems to be understood 
as an outcome of successful completion of deliberate goal oriented 
action aimed at understanding the meaning of something to the extent 
that one also can explain it to someone else in a way satisfying for both 
parties. If understood in this way, understanding presents first and 
foremost the character of an achievement. It is something that a person 
is believed to achieve through “the connecting of facts, the relating of 
newly acquired information to what is already known, the weaving of 
bits of knowledge into an integrated and cohesive whole” (Nickerson, 
1985, p. 234). And as an achievement of coherence, it is believed to be 
recognised both by oneself and by others, which is a conception of 
understanding that can be compared with what one has understood 
and explained understanding as in philosophy.  
                                          
1 It is true that Marton, Watkins, et al. (1997) touches upon this issue when it is suggested 
that it is the increase in the amount of literature between secondary and tertiary education 
that explain corresponding changes in approach to learning among students between these 
forms of education, but it is only mentioned in passing. 
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In the account about understandings of understanding in philosophy 
in Chapter 3, there was a concentration on the writings of four of the 
major theorists in the hermeneutic tradition, namely Schleiermacher, 
Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer. In this review it has emerged that 
whereas the first two of these philosophers seem to have limited their 
quest to the epistemological prerequisites for the understanding of 
language and/or human experience, the two later have not limited 
their quest to this, but seem rather to have tried to expand the 
perspective to general ontological and epistemological prerequisites 
for all understanding.  
Schleiermacher’s understanding of understanding is first and foremost 
thought of as a reconstruction of the meaning that is believed to have 
been expressed by a particular person through a particular linguistic 
utterance. In this perspective, understanding typically takes place in a 
dialogical relationship in which there is speaker who constructs a 
sentence to express a meaning about a particular being, and a hearer 
that listens to what is uttered with the intention to understand what is 
said. A necessary prerequisite for the conversation is that the hearer 
shares at least some initial understanding with the speaker.  
The point is, thus, that a listener never starts to listen with a blank 
openness, but always with some prior understanding. This prior un-
derstanding represents the listeners initial understanding of the 
sentence as a whole and presuppose a meaning for the sentence as a 
whole. The listener can, however, only receive one word at the time. 
As soon as the meaning of some of the words are understood in 
reference to the understood meaning for the sentence as a whole, the 
meaning for the sentence as a whole is revised. This gives an 
explanation of understanding as a partly comparative and partly 
intuitive and divinatory process where the meaning of the part and the 
whole are constructed by the speaker and reconstructed by the art of 
dialectical listening by the hearer.  
Dilthey’s understanding was also conceived of as a reconstruction. In 
this perspective, understanding is also believed to take place in a 
dialogical relationship, but whilst Schleiermacher appears to have 
limited the quest to prerequisites for understanding of linguistic ut-
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terances, Dilthey is more open to prerequisites for understanding 
human experience in a broader sense, no matter what medium it is 
expressed in. In comparison with the account of Schleiermacher, the 
account of Dilthey suggests also that what the understander brings to 
the understanding situation is not only certain pre understandings, but 
also prior experiences and interests in a much broader sense than has 
appeared to be the case with Schleiermacher. In spite of this obvious 
consciousness of the historicity of all understanding, it seems however, 
as if Dilthey could never let go of the ideal of correct interpretation as a 
norm for all interpretation. 
In Heidegger’s works, understanding was not so much conceived of as 
a subjective achievement of objectivity as a mode of being in the world 
that creates prerequisites for all understanding whatsoever. Rather, the 
beings for whom being can become a problem are actively engaged in 
the world and project themselves according to their possibilities. As 
such, one encounters a variety of presentations of being in a variety of 
ways in these activities. In so far as these presentations reveal new 
aspects of that being for the understanding beings, they can also give 
rise to new experience, which in turn creates possibilities for new 
understanding. There is no sense to try to go beyond the obviously 
irrefutable fact that since the being for whom being can become a 
problem is fallible, so are the being’s understandings; and in this 
limitation lies partly also the possibilities for being.  
So if Dilthey’s account of the epistemological prerequisites for un-
derstanding in the human sciences is more radical than 
Schleiermacher’s account of understanding of linguistic utterances, 
Heidegger’s account of the philosophical prerequisites for all un-
derstanding whatsoever can be considered more radical than both 
Schleiermacher’s and Dilthey’s, for it is not restricted to particular 
forms of understanding and it gives a positive assurance that there can 
be no understandings that are not relative to particular modes of being 
in the world. In this, Heidegger’s account cleared the way for 
Gadamer’s account of the philosophical prerequisites not only for 
understanding of aesthetical and historical being, but for all under-
standing as it is developed in Truth and Method, which is an encounter 
 The specific purpose  of the study 77 
with the being of understanding that takes it point of departure in the 
facticity of the philosophical prerequisites for understanding. 
In Truth and Method, Gadamer has, as pointed out, gone deeply into 
Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutics, or, in other words, 
existential interpretation of man’s being in the world; the historicity 
and linguistic character of his understandings; and developed it into a 
speculative hermeneutic, which in relation to his most influential 
teacher means an ontological and linguistic emphasis. Unlike, 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey, Gadamer does not restrict hermeneutics 
to the epistemological and methodological foundation for the sciences 
that have historical human being as research object, but reinterprets 
the concept of a universal hermeneutic into a conception of 
hermeneutic as the phenomenology of there-being (Dasein) and of 
existential, ontological understanding of being of any mode of being. 
Gadamer asserts the linguistic character of human reality itself and 
draws hermeneutics into a general philosophical hermeneutical 
discussion of the relationship of language to being, understanding, 
existence and reality. 
Understanding is, not primarily seen as an operation wherein an 
individual mind grasps that of another by Gadamer, but rather firstly 
as the basic way wherein one is in the world, and secondly as the 
linguistic event wherein reality takes shape as a new truth for oneself. 
Understanding is always manifesting itself as a historical, dialectical 
and linguistic event, and is never an achievement of absolute 
knowledge of an absolute object nor an accomplishment of a subject 
that constructs the world after its own fancies, nor a combination of 
these two absurdities. Rather, understanding is an ontological 
linguistic disclosure of the being of being in the world to the degree 
that it is known. In the light of the concept of play, understanding has 
the character of a linguistic event, a language game, a play of language 
wherein something comes to language and asserts itself as truth. 
Ontologically seen, understanding has its ground thus in the finitude 
of our human existence and in the linguistic character of being. It 
involves the genuine experience which comes of orientations towards 
the world on the basis of one’s previous experience and which 
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essentially has the character of a productive negation and confirmation 
of one’s expectations. It means that a subject matter is disclosed in a 
new and more penetrating light, that reveals a hitherto unforeseen 
aspect of it for oneself as one finds oneself there together with that 
something as it presents itself to oneself on the basis of being other 
than one had expected it to be. What is understood in understanding is 
language that belongs to what is played out. The language that 
addresses understanding interpretation has basically the structure of a 
question. It presents itself, in other words, as something that calls for 
an answer that mediates between previous understanding and new 
experience. The meaning of what one encounters can be fulfilled in 
explicit linguistic interpretation that corresponds to and reveals the 
meaning of what is understood in language that relates to being like a 
copy resembles an original. 
In sum one can say, that the review of the four philosophers’ un-
derstandings of understanding showed that while Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey, appear to have limited the scope of their discourses to the 
prerequisites for and the processes whereby the meaning of linguistic 
utterances or expressions of human experience of human conditions 
become an object for understanding, the two other, Heidegger and 
Gadamer, appear to have opened up to explain how understanding is 
in general at all possible. In the account, whereas the first two mainly 
appeared to have conceived understanding as a subjective 
reconstruction of objective meaning, the latter two appeared more 
open to conceive it as a language event, i.e. as a happening in active 
circumspective being in the world, whereby being takes shape as 
language that can be understood, and where such language also is/can 
be understood through the dialectic of questions and answers resulting 
in pertinent resolution of disagreement between and integration of 
emergent and remnant experience.  
RESEARCH SITUATION 
In the review of the research on understanding in psychology and 
education there was a special attention to studies of conceptions of 
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learning and understanding on the one hand and to a historical per-
spective on the other. Comparing, the prerequisites for these ap-
proaches to with those for the approaches to understanding of un-
derstanding in philosophy in Chapter 3, gives at least one common 
similarity and several differences.  
In each case, understanding has been approached as a human ex-
perience, but whereas in the first it has been heard and treated as a 
desired achievement in pedagogical practice, or as a function of the 
development of one’s participation in and performance of activities 
that involve the development of meaning, in the second it has rather 
been approached as what takes place whenever an utterance, ex-
pression or being becomes an object for understanding in any kind of 
activity. Another difference is that, where as in the first case the aim 
has usually been to understand and explain what pre-schoolgoing, 
schoolgoing and/or studying persons call learning or understanding 
and how one’s understanding and explaining of the general meaning 
for words develops as a function of the development of one’s 
participation in and performance of educational activities, in the 
second the intention seems rather to understand and explain what 
understanding essentially is, consists or involves. That is, in other 
words what it is that in general characterises understanding as a 
human experience.  
Bringing these things together, the research situation is such that what 
one tends to understand with understanding seems to function as a 
means whereby one plans, carries out and evaluates co-operation with 
educators and persons under education. But it is also such, that what 
one tends to mean with understanding varies systematically with one’s 
experiences of understandings ways of being. Moreover, the previous 
research on conceptions of learning and understanding has thrown 
some light over this variation, at least as it presents itself among young 
children, late teenagers and students at the university, even if the light 
it has manage to shed over the circumstances in, the conditions for and 
the mechanisms of development of understanding is quite dim.  
Over against this research stands the long standing historical research 
on the development of thinking and speaking, understanding and 
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explaining of the meaning for words in individual history on the one 
hand, and the even more long standing inquiry in the philosophy of 
interpretation on the general philosophical prerequisites for 
elementary mechanisms in understanding no matter within what 
activity it plays itself out in. This has not only provided well versed 
accounts of objects of research that are close to those of the present 
study, but that can also provide guidance for a more informed ap-
proached to this project.  
SPECIFIC PURPOSE 
This study resembles in at least some sense all of the previously 
discussed studies of experiences of learning/understanding in edu-
cation, the historical studies of the development of speaking and 
thinking and studies of understanding in the philosophy of interpre-
tation, in that it has also approached understanding as a human ex-
perience. In power of that, it has meant an approach to understanding 
as whatever takes place whenever one understands, and deviates from 
the previous studies of understanding in education, as in these studies 
understanding seems primarily to have been approached as an 
achievement. In so far as it deviates from these studies in this respect, 
it draws at the same time closer to the historical perspective on the 
development of understanding and the studies of understanding in the 
philosophy of interpretation.  
The present investigation deviates also however from the previously 
discussed studies of philosophy of interpretation as well, in that it does 
not have the general philosophical interest in all understanding as a 
research object, but only those understandings of understanding 
considered as a phenomenon. In so far as it deviates from these studies 
in this respect, it draws at the same time closer both to the studies in 
education of understandings of learning and understanding among 
participants in various forms of education and to the historical studies, 
because it is also conceived as a study of understandings.  
Assuming that what one tends to understand with understanding is a 
function of one’s previous experience of understanding, what one 
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tends to understand with understanding tends then to develop as one 
grows more experienced with understandings ways of being. This 
applies in that such understanding represents one’s immediate 
personal possibilities to engage in learning activity that involve the 
development of better understanding as an objective. On this basis the 
purpose of the study can now be specified as that of seeking to 
explicate the foundations for better understanding and what persons 
in various ages and with varying educational background tend to 
understand and explain with understanding as a phenomenon they 
grow more experienced with understandings ways of being. All this in 
order to if possible thereby also workout and provide an insight that 
can eventually make persons more consciously aware of what 
understanding might mean to them such that they thereby can also 
improve their activity in various rolls where it is important to develop 
more advanced understanding.  
The specific purpose of the study has, thus, been to investigate: 1) what 
understanding as a phenomenon is understood as by persons of 
various ages and with varying lengths of formal education; and on the 
basis of this also investigate 2) what different understandings of 
understanding mean for possibilities to engage in and carry out 
learning activity that aims at the development of more advanced 
understanding as an objective in it own right.  
In addition to this, the purpose of the study has also been to make a 
move in the direction towards formulation of a theory of the devel-
opment of understanding of understanding and its significance as a 
prerequisite for developmental learning, i.e. activity that involve 
productive transformation of less advanced systematic understanding 
into more advanced. 

  
PART II 
METHODOLOGY 

  
Chapter 5 
RESEARCH TRADITION 
…science is a way of life; it is a praxis… To the 
student in the field of human sciences the human 
being is a… “subject-object”… the object of 
research is not entirely different from the 
researcher… all students in those fields… 
communicate with their subjects-objects… do 
not reify them… consider themselves part of the 
social, historical, cultural world which they 
study. (Strasser, 1985, p. 56, 67, 73) 
The present study is an example of pedagogical research on learning 
and understanding that formed the core of the INOM-group tradition 
(Marton & Svensson, 1970; Marton et al., 1977; Marton, 1981; Svensson, 
1985; Marton, 1992a; Marton & Booth, 1997). In this chapter, the origin 
and development (and some of the general characteristics) of this 
research tradition will be discussed. The chapter commences with a 
consideration of its origins and development. After that follows an 
account of some of the basic assumptions and guiding concepts that 
make up the sense of the research approach. The chapter is concluded 
with a consideration of the tradition as a part of the human science 
movement (cf. Strasser, 1985). 
GENESIS OF THE RESEARCH TRADITION 
The research tradition has its roots in a research project on study skill 
and learning in higher education that was carried out by Marton and 
Svensson at the Department of Education, Göteborg University in the 
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beginning of the seventies (Marton & Svensson, 1970; Svensson, 1976; 
Marton & Svensson, 1978). Marton and Svensson, who had both been 
trained as psychologists, turned to education research in the late sixties 
and had a common interest in studying the kind of learning that is 
common at the university (Marton et al., 1977), particularly the 
learning which comes out of participation in particular "higher" forms 
of spoken or written discourse (ibid.). 
The purpose of their research project was threefold (Svensson, 1985). 
They wanted to learn: 
1. How knowledge can be observed and described in a fruitful way? 
2. How study skill and learning can be observed and described? 
3. How study skill and learning be influenced? (p. 3).  
In order to constitute the necessary data to answer these questions, 
Marton and Svensson arranged experimental learning situations 
wherein university students where asked to read texts about things 
that they could be expected to be familiar with.1 They were then asked 
questions about how they had read the texts and how they usually 
learn from reading (Svensson, 1976). 
When it came to their first question, how can knowledge be observed 
and described in a fruitful way, Marton and Svensson found that what 
the students learned could be described in a limited “number of 
clearly distinguishable ways of interpreting” the message of the texts 
that had been read (Marton & Wenestam, 1984, p. 11; my translation). 
When it came to the second question, how can study skill and learning 
be described, they discovered “…two different and relatively easily 
identified ways to approach and perform a learning or study task” 
(ibid., p. 11; my translation).  
In the first of these two ways of approaching and solving a study task, 
the learners were found to “…conceive that which is to be learnt as a 
whole and view its different parts in relation to one another as well as 
to the whole”, and thereby to also “…focus… the message that a 
                                          
1 See Svensson (1976, p. 86 ff.) for a complete description of the experiments. 
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spoken or written account is meant to convey or the phenomenon that 
the spoken or written language intends to explain”(Marton & 
Wenestam, 1984, p. 11; my translation). In the second approach, the 
learners were found to have directed “…their attention to various 
parts of the presentation, which are delimited from one another… to 
put that which [they] see or hear [or read] in their memory” (ibid., p. 
11 f.; my translation). This often meant that they thereby often missed 
the very point of the oral or written presentation  
The two main results of research on study skill and learning were 
thereafter turned into descriptions of two different, but closely related 
ways of conducting research on learning. In the first, which was 
proposed by Svensson (1976) and which was later called contextual 
analysis (Svensson, 1983, 1985), the main emphasis was on studies of 
learning as study skill (cf. Säljö, 1975, 1982). In the second, which was 
proposed by Marton (1978; Marton & Svensson, 1978) and which 
became called phenomenography (Marton, 1981), the focus was to begin 
with no longer on study activity as a whole (Svensson, 1984b), but 
rather on descriptions of the outcome of such activity (Dahlgren, 1975; 
Hasselgren, 1981; Hasselgren & Beach, 1997).  
The aim of this research was conceived in terms of description and 
systematisation of descriptions of qualitatively different conceptions of 
socially significant objects in the surrounding world. The obvious 
rationale for the research was that one through description, analysis, 
and understanding of differing ways wherein people, experience 
things could also find keys to grasp and explain critical differences in 
concrete cases of human functioning. The term phenomenography has 
thereafter, however, also been employed to denote both the first and 
the second proposed way of conducting research on learning 
(Svensson, 1985); as well all the other ways of doing research on 
learning that has developed under the influence and guidance of 
Marton, and associates at Göteborg University and elsewhere since then 
(Alexandersson, 1985; Ahlberg, 1992; Booth, 1992; Ekeblad, 1996; 
Lindahl, 1996; Marton, Hounsell, et al., 1984, 1997; Hasselgren & 
Beach, 1997; Åberg-Bengtsson, 1998).  
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“Phenomenographic research” has, in other words, become a quite 
broad and diverse research tradition and has not only come to concern 
study activity, educational effects on ways wherein various categories 
of persons tend to understand and explain particular being, and in 
terms of transitions between qualitatively different conceptions of 
particular being considered as whole. It has also come to concern a 
variety of more or less closely related issues like: teachers’ meaning for 
pedagogical significant concepts (Larsson, 1982; Andersson & Lawenius, 
1983; Hesslefors Arktoft, 1996); children’s conception of reading and 
numbers (Dahlgren & Olsson, 1985; Neuman, 1987); phenomenographic 
didactics (Kroksmark, 1987); schoolchildren’s map-reading and way-finding 
(Ottosson, 1987); how people relate their life with asthma/allergy (Hansson 
Scherman, 1994); and: differences in teachers’ goal-orientation and ways of 
teaching pupils things that are subject for teaching and learning in a 
particular school subject (Alexandersson, 1994; Runesson, 1999), just to 
mention some of the studies that has been carried out at the 
Department of Education, Göteborg University.1  
SOME GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
In the original project on study skill and learning in higher education, 
learning was approached as a study activity (Marton & Svensson, 
1970). The purpose of the research was to describe such activity in 
terms of its content and to gain insight into how such activity could be 
improved. This is research in education that can be characterised in 
terms of three typical characteristics, namely:  
1. a relational perspective on learning,  
2. a focus on description of qualitatively different ways of interpreting 
particular objects, and:  
                                          
1 Cf. Hasselgren (1999) for an overview; and Marton and Both (1997) for Marton’s 
personal account of the genesis, development and character of the research tradition.  
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3. a systematisation of descriptions of such interpretations by means of 
the development of descriptive categories and a rational system for 
the organisation of these.  
These characteristics will be discussed in the mentioned order. 
A RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
The initial Marton and Svensson (1970) experiment was set up in part 
in polemic with dominant research in education at the time which 
tended, they felt, to emphasise the ability to memorise, retain, and 
repeat previously memorised information or acquired behaviours 
(Marton et al., 1977). Against this obviously rather atomistic and 
mechanistic view of knowledge, learning and study skill, Marton and 
Svensson tried to place a more holistic, organic interpretation. 
However, according to the understanding that is sustained in the 
present study, knowledge can be understood and explained as a 
person’s or a group of persons’ cumulated experience of particular 
being and learning can be understood and explained as a change in the 
learner’s experience of this being. This means that study skill can be 
understood and explained as one’s acquired ability to develop more 
advanced understanding through deliberate study activity.  
In this discourse, learning tends, thus, always to mean that someone 
learns something in relation to something else, through some learning 
activity. A as a conclusion that can be drawn from this is that learning 
– as well as some other phenomena – ought to be studied in terms of 
their structure as lived experience or as historical activities rather than 
as things or processes with certain properties. This is different to the 
contextual and de-contextual research which developed initially and 
within the INOM-group tradition (Marton & Booth, 1997). 
The relational view of learning which has developed through the 
above research, has however has made it possible to acknowledge the 
fact that learning can mean several different things. these vary from 
the relatively successful completion of deliberate goal oriented 
learning activity and an achievement of knowledge in doing some-
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thing, to an achievement of knowledge about a previously unknown 
aspect of a given phenomenon, or an achievement of knowledge in 
doing something in a better way than before. The learning that has 
been of interest here has thus not been learning in “traditional” senses, 
but rather learning as a realisation of new ways of conceiving and 
relating to given objects in particular types of situation and within 
particular kinds of activities.  
In this sense, learning has been studied in at least four ways. In the 
first of these, it has been studied in terms of how and what people 
learn from reading a given text about a given phenomenon (Säljö, 
1982). In the second, it has been studied in terms of qualitatively 
different ways wherein people have come to conceive and explain 
particular being (Theman, 1983). In the third, it has been studied in 
terms of what people have learnt with regards to changes in their 
ways of conceiving and explaining aspects of life after having par-
ticipated in a certain form of education and teaching (Alexandersson, 
1985). In the fourth, it has been studied in terms of the ways wherein 
people’s ability to conceive and explain tends to develop over time as 
they grow more and more experienced of ways of being in the world 
(Marton et al., 1993).  
The understanding of ways wherein people tend to understand and 
explain given objects that are sustained in the discussed research has 
become more and more differentiated and sophisticated through these 
studies (Marton, 1981; Marton & Booth, 1997). The understanding of 
how people’s ability to conceive and explain given phenomena has 
also changed or, perhaps rather, developed (Åberg-Bengtsson, 1998). It 
is, however, only quite recently that there have been explicit attempts 
to give more general description of the structure of the studied form of 
learning (Marton, 1992b; Marton et al., 1993; Marton et al., 1997; 
Marton & Booth, 1997). So despite a lot of work on trying to account 
for what often is referred to as qualitatively different conceptions of 
various phenomena, and a lot of work on trying to better understand 
and explain how various people’s ability to understand and explain 
phenomena tend to develop as they grow more and more “educated”, 
it has not meant equally large efforts to describe the general structure 
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of the type of learning that has been studied and there has been little 
work in trying to understand why people’s ability to conceive and 
explain given phenomena develop the ways they appear to develop 
and not in other ways.  
This is one of the things that has not been focused on in the research as 
it has been developed so far, but which perhaps will be focused on in 
the future. In order to do so however, it seems necessary to shift focus 
from merely trying to describe people’s conceptions of things toward 
trying to account for things like the concrete prerequisites for the 
development of learning activity and the various characters of the 
contexts wherein learning and understanding develops. It is in other 
words, necessary to move beyond mere “phenomenography” toward 
what one can call a more informed hermeneutic phenomenological 
approach to research on learning as it takes place in educational 
activity.1 
INTERPRETATION OF UNDERSTANDINGS 
If the relational view on knowledge, learning, study skill, and all other 
phenomena is one of the main characteristics of the discussed research 
tradition, the focus on interpretation of qualitatively different ways of 
understanding and explaining can be considered as another 
characteristic. However, it must not be overlooked that the research 
has hardly ever settled with this as an end in itself, as the studies as a 
rule have involved interpretation of what has often been called 
qualitatively different conceptions as a means to something else, rather 
than as an ends in itself. However, it is still of some importance to try 
to clarify what seems to have been meant with what has been called 
conceptions. Not the least because of the ways the meaning of the term 
conception seems to have shifted over the years. 
                                          
1 Sharp (1986) has delivered a similar critique against self-contained ethnography in 
educational research. 
 Research tradition 92 
At the beginning of the research tradition, Marton and Svensson (1978) 
wrote that: 
Conception stands often for that which is assumed, that which is not necessary 
to say since it never has been subject for reflection. They make up the frame of 
reference within which we have gathered our pieces of knowledge or the 
ground upon which we build our reasoning. (p. 20; my emphasis and 
translation) 
However, on a latter occasion, Marton (1981) wrote that: 
A conception… [is] a mental act and it is exhibited by someone who does 
something in a certain setting. (p. 196)  
Two years latter, Theman (1983) explained that: 
A conception is a form of understanding, that is an intentional way of 
configuring a phenomenon. (p. 163; my translation) 
And a year after that Svensson (1984a) wrote the following:  
The conception is a relation between man and a part of the surrounding world 
that is created through the activity of man. The activity means a delimitation 
of, a differentiation within, and a sample and an organisation of meaning 
content of a part of the world. (p. 20) 
Marton has since then tried to develop this notion further. In Marton 
(1992a), for instance, he makes an explicit reference to Svensson 
(1984a) as he presents the following explanation of the meaning of the 
concept of conception: 
An experience or a conception of a phenomenon – the internal relation be-
tween subject and object – is a way of delimiting an object from its context 
and relating it to the same or other contexts and it is a way of delimiting 
component parts of the phenomenon and relating them to each other and to the 
whole… (Marton, 1992a, p. 5)1 
                                          
1 In Marton (1992) the words conception  and experience, as well as the words perceive, 
apprehend, understand, conceptualise, are used interchangeably (p. 4 f.). The object of 
research is there also put as “the differing ways in which people experience…” or the 
differing ways in which a certain phenomenon appears to people no matter what the 
character of the activity that they deal with it in (Marton, 1992, p. 4). This is not to say that 
there is no difference between experiencing, perceiving, understanding, etc., but to say that 
the focus in the research perspective first and foremost is the variant and invariant meaning 
in and between differing ways wherein the being of particular being tends to be presented 
and present itself as when the being of that is dealt with and encountered.  
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Under the influence of his reading of The Field of Consciousness by Aron 
Gurwitsch from 1964, Marton has (together with Booth) in 1997, also 
presented the following definition of the related and gradually 
developing understanding of the being of that is under consideration: 
“A way of experiencing something” is experiencing something as something, 
experiencing a meaning that is dialectically intertwined with a structure. “A 
way of experiencing something” is a way of discerning something from, and 
relating it to a context. The meaning of something for something for someone 
at a particular point in time corresponds to the pattern of parts or aspects that 
are discerned and are simultaneous objects of focal awareness…. an aspect that 
is discerned and held in focus is associated with a dimension of explicit or 
implicit. What is the case is explicitly or implicitly seen against the 
background of what could be the case. (Marton & Booth, 1997, p. 112) 
To further articulate the proposed meaning for the discussed key 
expression, Marton and Booth (1997) also provide an example: 
… discerning and being focally aware that something is in uniform motion 
implies an awareness of a dimension of variation with two (or possibly more) 
states: uniform movement (including rest) and non uniform motion 
(acceleration or deceleration). When an aspect is not discerned and not held in 
focal awareness – say, for instance, that something is at rest and we are not 
particularly conscious that it is so – we can either say that this aspect is absent 
altogether or that it is taken for granted and no alternatives are being explicitly 
considered. (p. 112) 
 A “conception“ is there, in other words, interpreted as a dynamic and 
meaningful relation between a particular person and a particular part 
of the world. It is the person that is held responsible for the creation of 
the relation, but since it is done in relation to particular being it is co-
dependent on both parts of the relation. 
The preferred term for the object of investigation has, as can be read 
out of the quotations, changed. So too has to a certain extent also the 
understanding of the general object of research, but the fact remains 
that the research still involves interpretation of qualitatively different 
understandings as a significant element. 
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SYSTEMATISATION OF INTERPRETATIONS 
OF UNDERSTANDINGS 
The immediate results of the research tradition discussed here have, as 
suggested before, been systematic presentation of descriptions of what 
have emerged as typical ways wherein people can be said to have 
interpreted definite objects in particular situations. These descriptions 
have been given in terms of categories of interpretation and systems of 
such categories which have typically been worked out through what 
Svensson (1985) has called contextual analysis. They represent 
deliberate attempts to relate general meaning structure of ways of 
interpreting given phenomena in relation to the general meaning 
structure of other ways.  
The purpose of the research has, however, as a rule never been limited 
to description and systematisation of descriptions of qualitatively 
different ways of understanding the same phenomena as a thing in 
itself. In so far as it has dealt with this, it has been done so in the hope 
of thereby perhaps also providing knowledge that can used to 
improve related and relevant elements of pedagogical praxis (Marton, 
1992a; Marton & Booth, 1997). This is perhaps particularly the case in 
work by Pramling and her associates (Pramling, 1994; Pramling, 
Davidsson, Fors & Johansson, 1995; see also: Hasselgren, 1981; Lybeck, 
1981; Johansson, Marton & Svensson, 1985; Alexandersson, 1985; 
Alexandersson, 1994; Rovio-Johansson, 1999). The discussed research 
could thereby perhaps also be characterised in terms of an immanent 
dedication to the improvement of pedagogical praxis.  
DEDICATION TO IMPROVEMENT OF PEDAGOGICAL PRAXIS 
The notion of learning as the process whereby persons develop 
relatively more advanced ways of relating to things spring from an 
assumption that one’s experience of (and one’s ability to conceive and 
further deal with) things in the world, represent deeper layers of 
meaning in meaningful relations to ways of being in the world, than 
those that often are referred to as “knowledge” and “skills” (Marton, 
1988). Moreover, whereas one in conceiving learning as acquisition of 
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facts, procedures, etc., tends to presuppose that the object for learning 
is already known in advance, in learning considered as realisation of 
relatively more advanced ways of relating to ways of being in 
meaningful action, one makes no such claims (Marton & Booth, 1997). 
Instead of presupposing this, one tends rather to presuppose that the 
object for learning is constituted in the learning activity itself and thus 
that learning involves a partly unforeseen productive transformation 
of ways of being. Furthermore, one has also tried to influence teaching 
and learning in direction toward more advanced ways of 
understanding (Lybeck, 1981; Marton, Svensson & Johansson, 1985; 
Pramling, 1994; Pramling, Davidsson, Fors & Johansson, 1995). 
Even the studies of typical ways wherein people tend to conceive and 
explain various phenomena may be seen as an expression of the desire 
to make a contribution to the improvement of pedagogical praxis (cf. 
Theman, 1983). Because these studies are only meaningful to the extent 
that what is made the subject for conceptions has also been, is, or can 
also be made subject for teaching and learning as well. The turning to 
the things themselves in the particular fashion that appears 
characteristic for the discussed research can, thus, be interpreted as an 
attempt to learn and communicate something that eventually might 
prove useful to be aware of in attempts to improve pedagogical praxis 
in relation to these phenomena. 
This doesn’t mean, however, that the results of the research have 
necessarily have been immediately applicable in educational praxis. 
Nor does it mean that it will be possible to draw clear cut conclusions 
concerning how to organise teaching and learning from the research. It 
does mean though, that at least the research has been and continues to 
involve a hope for generating knowledge about human understanding 
and functioning in pedagogical practice, that can prove useful to guide 
a future development of the fundamental values and objectives that 
are sustained and obtained in such practice (Bowden & Marton, 1998; 
Kroksmark, 1987; Marton & Booth, 1997; Strasser, 1985).  
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SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE 
In sum, the research tradition that this study is a part of originates as, 
from a research project on study skill and learning in higher education 
(Marton & Svensson, 1970; Svensson, 1976; Marton, 1992a). The 
research project concerned learning from reading writings. But since 
then the tradition has come to involve research on a variety of 
phenomena. The common denominator has from the beginning, 
however, always been the relational perspective on learning, as well as 
any other phenomena and the interpretation of understandings of 
particular ways of being. Added to these is always the systematisation 
of description of differing ways of understanding and the dedication 
to the improvement of pedagogical praxis. In a broader perspective, 
this research can be considered as a movement towards a 
transformation from behavioural or social science domination towards 
the inclusion of human science educational research and extra 
scientific praxis (Strasser, 1985) which also appears to parallel a 
corresponding movement in psychology (Giorgi, 1967, 1970, 1975, 
1985; cf. Alexandersson, 1981, and Karlsson, 1993, for introductions).1  
In the attempts to work out the philosophical grounds for the research 
tradition discussed in this chapter, inspiration was first sought in 
Bradley (1846–1924) and Moore (1873–1958) (Svensson, 1984a) and 
then in Gurwitsch (1901–1973) (Marton & Booth, 1997). However, my 
own feeling is that it is more fruitful to locate the tradition within the 
human science movement (Strasser, 1985) and to try to articulate its 
philosophical assumptions relative to Heidegger (1927/1993), 
Vygotskij (1934/1987), Leont’ev (1959/1977), and Gadamer 
(1960/1993). This is because in the perspectives developed by these 
agents, one is “dedicated to the human being as a concrete spiritual 
                                          
1 If interpreted as such, it must however not be forgotten that whereas the 
phenomenological psychology that Giorgi advocates was started as an explicit attempt to 
achieve the transformation of psychology on phenomenological grounds, the research in 
education that Marton (1981), Svensson (1985), and Marton and Booth (1997) advocate 
evolved from concrete research on study skill and learning in higher education. As the 
research tradition has evolved however, it has become more and more important to clarify 
its philosophical assumptions (Svensson, 1984a; Marton, 1992b; Marton & Booth, 1997).  
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material entity and to the concrete realisations of this entity” (Strasser, 
1985, p. 66). This means that the research involves an 
acknowledgement of the fact that human beings and human life has its 
ground in the humanity that is the origin of and the organiser of the 
world that human beings live in. Something which offers an 
acknowledgement that the world under consideration presents 
historical, cultural, social, religious and pedagogical aspects, and that 
it does so through the human and for humans.1  
The human scientifically of the research is thus manifest in that the 
research is assumed possible just because of the language that belongs 
to what is studied and the situations this is part of and through which 
it becomes possible to approach and objectify things through 
communication. This also shines through in that the assumption that 
communication with persons about subject-objects is the main source 
of information, and that the ways of delimiting and studying the 
subject-objects is not the only way to do so, but only the best way so 
far “seen” given the values that are striven for in research practice.2  
The present research has been carried out within the discussed re-
search tradition and presents, as suggested before, not only human 
scientific but also pedagogical aspects. This is, as suggested before, 
first of all believed manifest in that it involves a commitment to the 
                                          
1 This approach acknowledges that the research object is not “things”, but rather subject-
objects. This is an aim at objectification through communication without reification of what 
is under consideration as a research object and implies an acknowledgement that the 
research objects are not entirely different from the researcher, but are shared in attempts to 
objectify them through communication with self and others. 
2 The research also presents a human scientific character however in that it involves 
acknowledgement of that the results that emerge from the same are never independent of 
the researchers foreknowledge of the research objects and the ways of delimiting, studying 
and describing them. It is also human scientific in that it involves the conviction that 
research with advantage involves the need to, at least to a certain extent, address 
ontological as well epistemological, methodological and existential questions concerning 
the work. It is also human scientific in that it involves an acknowledgement that what is 
done and achieved have implications not only for future research, but also for extra 
scientific pedagogical praxis.  
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improvement of pedagogy. This both as a particular form of practical 
human science and as a particular form of extra scientific practice.  
The education potential of the research is in this respect perhaps most 
clearly manifest in the early works concerning the how and what of 
people’s learning (Svensson, 1976; Säljö, 1975, 1982), the works 
concerning teacher thinking (Larsson, 1982) and student thinking and 
learning (Hasselgren, 1981; Renström, 1988; Johansson, Marton & 
Svensson, 1985), and in the works concerning the development of 
definite abilities in teaching and learning in education (Alexandersson, 
1994; Pramling, 1994; Pramling, Davidsson, Fors & Johansson, 1995; 
Runesson, 1999; Rovio-Johansson, 1999). This is because in these works 
it is obvious that the research is conceived as a means to work out a 
systematic knowledge that can provide parts of a theoretical basis for 
the improvement of relevant aspects of pedagogical praxis.  
Moreover, the “educativity” of the research is also believed to be 
manifest in the works that concerns conceptions of learning and 
teaching (Säljö, 1979; Pramling, 1983; Marton et al., 1993; Marton, 
Watkins, et al., 1997) and teaching (Larsson, 1982; Andersson & 
Lawenius, 1983), because these seem also to have been conceived in 
order to develop pedagogical relevant understandings of these issues. 
This applies even to works such as Theman’s (1983), which at first 
sight perhaps do not look so “pedagogical”. This is because the 
phenomenon that is dealt with there are of great social importance, not 
the least from the point of view of democracy and popular education. 
Works like that have as a rule also served the purpose of developing 
the research approach.  
If what has been suggested above holds, the discussed research 
tradition can be interpreted as a movement in contemporary research 
in education towards a transformation of education as a behavioural 
or social into it as a practical human science. This includes the 
transformation of extra scientific pedagogical practice into practice 
that is more in line with the fundamental values and notions that such 
practice is intended to sustain and develop (Strasser, 1985).  
 Research tradition 99 
Being research in pedagogy that typically involves studies and ac-
counts of ways wherein various categories of people tend to under-
stand and explain ways of being in the world and how ways of un-
derstanding develop with experience it can perhaps also be inter-
preted as hermeneutical, phenomenological research in pedagogy and 
understood as a part of the more comprehensive project of developing 
the humanity of the human science in general and pedagogy as a 
practical human science in particular. This is, also the perspective that 
the present work has come to be conceived in.  

  
Chapter 6 
OUTLINE AND PROCEDURES OF THE STUDY 
[The study] is an inquiry process of under-
standing… that explore[s] a …human problem. 
The researcher builds a complex, holistic pic-
ture, analyzes words, reports detailed views of 
informants (Creswell, 1998, p. 15) 
In addition to the work attended to in the analysis of previous work in 
psychology, philosophy and educational research, the research 
activities of the present study have comprised four empirical studies. 
The first three however, mainly served the purpose of finding a way to 
constitute a research situation for the forth and a method for studying 
ways wherein a particular category of people tend to understand and 
explain understanding in such a way that could help me learn 
something about how such understandings develop.  
The present chapter has been divided into two major parts. In the first, 
there is a presentation of the three preparatory studies. After this 
follows a presentation of the main study. In this some descriptions are 
given of participants, the constitution of data and results and the 
character of the results. This is intended to give a sense of the 
constitution of the method of the study.  
PREPARATORY STUDIES 
In the first of the three preparatory studies, which was carried out in 
1983–1984, about twenty adults with various educational background 
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and occupation were interviewed (Helmstad, 1984). The interviews 
were divided into three parts. In the first, which concerned everyday 
experience of understanding, the participants were asked to recall and 
describe an occasion when they had experienced that they understood, 
grasped, or comprehended something. In the second, which concerned 
similarities and differences in the meaning of various concepts, the 
participants were invited to express their views regarding concepts 
such as: knowing, believing and understanding. In the third, which 
concerned experience of understanding in a problem solving setting, 
finally, the participants were invited to participate in one or two 
simple teaching/learning “experiments”.  
The first of these “experiments” was intended as a replica of 
Wertheimer’s (1945) problem about finding the structure of the area of 
the parallelogram. The second “experiment” was a replica of a reading 
situation that Bransford and MacCarell (1977) used for studying 
inferences in reading. The purpose of these “experiments” was to 
evoke experiences of understanding, which thereafter could be used as 
points of departure for further discussion of the meaning of 
understanding. 
The purpose of the study was to: 
1. find out if it would be possible to study and describe conceptions of 
understanding, 
2. discover some of the difficulties that one can run into in a study of 
this kind, and: 
3. to gain more insight into how a more encompassing study of 
conceptions of understanding could be designed. 
The interviews were tape recorded and selected parts of the recordings 
were transcribed into verbatim interview protocols. This was the parts 
that contained accounts of experiences of understanding. 
As an immediate result, it was found that the participants as a rule 
found it very difficult to recall and describe experiences of under-
standing. In spite of this, nine of the altogether twenty participants 
could recall and relate at least one or two such experiences. It was also 
found that as a rule it was quite difficult to follow up on the 
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participants oral accounts in order to learn more precisely what could 
be said to have taken place on the described occasion.  
Contemplating the reasons for this, it emerged that one reason was 
that it was often quite difficult to grasp what it was they felt they had 
understood. Another reason was that they often didn’t seem to have 
much more to say about the event than what they had already 
captured in a few phrases. Further, it also occurred that questions 
about what took place led to new reconstruction rather than an ar-
ticulation of previously presented reconstruction.  
This study also revealed that the participants found it as a rule very 
difficult to give explicit verbal accounts of their meaning for under-
standing, knowing, believing and that the attempts to evoke under-
standing didn’t work. Indeed the effect on participants who had ini-
tially been unable to voice assumed and expected experiences of 
understanding, was that they became annoyed, frustrated, and em-
barrassed by then. The study resulted finally also in a preliminary 
description of similarities and differences between various accounts of 
instances of understanding (Helmstad, 1984). 
The second preparatory study was carried out in 1985. In this five 
different school-classes in grade six of the Swedish compulsory school 
from two different schools, were invited to write one or several essays 
over one of three themes. In my order of preferences the themes were: 
1) When I understood…, 2) When I did not understand, and finally, 
3) Something which I would like to understand (Helmstad, 1985a).  
The purpose of this second preparatory study was similar to the first 
and aimed at learning more about how a future study of people’s 
conceptions of understanding could be designed. It aimed more 
precisely, at finding out whether twelve year old could be expected to 
recall and write down accounts of instances of understanding, but it 
was also intended as an attempt to study and describe ways wherein 
persons in this age tend to understand and explain the meaning of 
understanding as phenomenon.  
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The participants were contacted through their teachers and the task 
was introduced. This involved an explanation of the purpose of the 
study, an explanation of the task and an plea to the participants to try 
to write something that applied to the first theme. The participants 
were given 40–60 minutes to complete the assigned task. About 80 of 
the altogether 100 pupils wrote about the first theme, 15 wrote about 
the second, and 23 wrote about the third theme. Some of the 
participants wrote about more than one of the themes.  
The length of the participants written accounts varied from three lines 
to one and a half A4-sized pages. Against the background of the 
previously observed difficulties whereby adults had recalled and 
described instances of understanding, it was quite surprising that as 
many as 2/3 of the participants had written about the first of the three 
topics, i.e. “When I understood…”.  
At a closer inspection, however, it was found that the majority of the 
essays were not really accounts of instances of understanding, but 
rather accounts of things that the story-tellers claimed they under-
stood. It was also found that those accounts that were not judged to 
represent accounts of instances of understanding, could be divided up 
into two different groups. On the one hand, there were accounts that 
merely contained a listing of things that the narrators claimed they had 
understood. For instance, how to behave when sport-fishing, what 
spoon-bates to use, where to fling the bait, and how to crank the reel in 
order to catch the big fishes, etc. On the other hand, there were 
accounts wherein the narrators typically mentioned what they used to 
think about something and what they tend to think about it now. The 
following account may serve as an exemplification of this kind of 
accounts: 
When I was little I thought you could fly like a helicopter if you swung a rope 
over your head. Now I know that the propeller is formed so that it sucks itself 
through the air. (Helmstad, 1985a, p. 3) 
The narrator, a twelve year old boy, relates about something he used 
to think was the case when he was younger, but which he now knows 
is wrong, because now he knows that something else is the case. The 
account is, as in the previous mentioned types of accounts, not a 
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description of an experience of understanding, but rather an account 
of something that the narrator thinks he knows. This is because there is 
no account in the story of how he came to understand what was 
understood. 
Understanding was, in other words, in these cases, not dealt with in 
the intended sense. Instead of giving an account of an occasion when 
the narrator experienced he or she came to understand something, 
these participants gave accounts of things they meant they had learnt 
and thereby achieved knowledge of.  
There was however, as suggested before, also a category of essays that 
was identified as what had been asked for. Namely, accounts of 
occasions when one had experienced that one had understood, 
grasped, or realised something. The following account may serve as an 
example of this category of accounts: 
It was a perfectly normal summers day. All of a sudden the phone rang and 
mom answered. It was grandmother. I sat down in the stairs and mom said: 
“Has Ivan passed away?” Then I understood that grandfather was dead. 
(Helmstad, 1985a, p. 9) 
In this particular case, the narrator, a twelve year old girl, tells about 
an occasion when she understood that her grandfather had died by 
apprehending the significance of what her mother said as a response 
to what grandmother told her on the phone.  
An attempt was made to describe the typical ways wherein the par-
ticipants appeared to have understood understanding in the com-
position of these narratives. The experience that was gained from the 
study showed that at least some persons as young as twelve, at least in 
part, are capable of recalling and giving written descriptions of 
instances of understanding, which was the main thing which this part 
of the investigation aimed to find out about. 
The third preliminary study of conceptions of understanding on the 
basis of a concordance containing all the entries of the verb förstå (to 
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understand) (Helmstad, 1985b).1 The concordance had been gathered 
by Department of Swedish, Göteborg University (Språkdata, 1982/1983) 
and consisted of an alphabetical listing of all words in their immediate 
context from all the novels published in 1981 and 1982 by a particular 
publishing house (Helmstad, 1985b). 
The purpose of this study was twofold. On the one hand, it was in-
tended as a means to become more consciously aware of the various 
senses of the verb to understand and the noun understanding in the 
Swedish language. On the other, it aimed at finding out the extent to 
which the material analysed could provide a ground for an analysis of 
conceptions of understanding.  
The sample from the database consisted of about 50 A4-sized pages 
with about 60 lines on each page. Each line consisted of about 10 to 20 
words with the key word in the middle. The extracts were, however, 
not always as meaningful as one could have hoped. The context the 
key word was presented in was sometimes, namely, so narrow or so 
incomplete that it was difficult to determine the sense made of the 
verb. This meant that many lines had to be ruled out as data.  
The analysis was carried out on what then was thought of as three 
different levels of analysis and description: The 1) word level, 
2) conception level, and: 3) conceptual level. The analysis was carried 
out on the two first levels at the same time in a series of successive 
steps. These steps were: 1) two free readings of the material as a 
whole, 2) one reading of the material as a whole marking what 
appeared as typical uses of the key word, 3) a transcription of these 
lines, and finally: 4) a reading of the material in an attempt to describe 
the various uses on the two levels. All told this meant an end to the 
analysis on the first level and it resulted in a description of about 
twenty different senses of the verb to understand. 
This phase of the analysis was followed by an attempt to improve the 
first version of the categories of description. And an attempt at finding 
                                          
1 This study was inspired by Allwood (1984). 
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out what the different kinds of categories of description meant with 
reference to understanding as a phenomenon was also made. The 
attempt resulted in part in a smaller number of categories of 
description and in part in a limited number of significant propositions 
about understanding as a phenomenon. These significant propositions, 
which included sentences such as “Understanding appears in different 
forms and on different levels” or “One may think one understands 
something and at the same time be aware of that one doesn’t 
understand it completely”, was also exemplified with significant 
quotes from the database that appeared to confirm these sentences. 
The first sentence was, for instance, exemplified by the following 
quotation: “If people that don’t understand one another, understand 
that they don’t understand one another, then they understand one 
another better than if they don’t understand that they don’t 
understand one another…”. The second sentence was, for instance, 
exemplified with the following quotation: “Ellen both understood and 
did not understand” (Helmstad, 1985b, p. 9).  
The above analysis is also provided as an answer to the first part of the 
main study, which will be discussed in the next section. And after it 
had been completed, the concordance data was finally also analysed 
with respect to what understandings, types and conceptions of 
understanding can be said to have appeared in the reading of this 
material. The results of this analysis are presented in Appendix 3.  
In sum, the three preparatory studies revealed some interesting things 
both about understanding as a human experience and about one’s 
possibilities to study understandings of understanding. The main 
insight was that understandings of understanding can be studied and 
that one can find access to understandings of understanding through 
interpretation of peoples’ narratives about occasions when they have 
experienced that they have understood. The conclusion was that the 
main study could involve narratives about experiences of having come 
to understand (something). 
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MAIN STUDY 
The main study has been carried out through two major interpretative 
turns. In the first turn, which for the most part took place between 
1986 and 1991, the focus was on trying to study, describe and 
systematise descriptions of typical ways wherein participants have 
understood understanding as a phenomenon into categories and on 
trying to fit their contributions to this system of categories. In the 
second turn, which for the most part took place between 1992–1995, 
the focus was on trying to explore the significance of understanding 
understanding in these ways. This part of the study has also 
developed into an attempt to draw up an account of how and why 
understanding of understanding develops in the ways it seems to. The 
research situation and the data in the first turn were constituted 
initially during the school year 1986/1987 and with respect to the 
second phase between 1992 and 1998. The constitution of the method 
and the results was with respect to the first part mainly carried out 
between 1988 and 1991, but this part has continued further since then 
and in parallel with the constitution with the research situation.  
A preliminary account of parts of the result from the first turn has, as 
mentioned before, been discussed earlier in Helmstad and Marton 
(1992). The constitution of the interpretation and communication of the 
results and interpretation that is presented here has with respect to the 
first turn, for the most part been worked out between 1993 and 1996. 
The constitution of the interpretation and communication of the result 
of the second turn has been worked out between 1995 up until the 
writing of Preface in April 1999. 
PARTICIPANTS 
The study involved altogether 101 persons in four different age 
groups. The four groups were: A) twelve-year old children; B) fifteen-
year old adolescents; C) eighteen-year old young adults and, D) adults 
that with few exceptions had less than nine years of formal schooling. 
The first three groups belonged to one grade six school-class, one 
grade eight class, and one class in the second year of the Social Sciences 
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programme in the gymnasium. The adults came from two study groups 
for active workers, one study group for retired workers, and two adult 
municipal school-classes. The age of the participants varied between 
12 and 75 years. The length of formal education varied between 6 and 
12,5 years. The adults had, as a rule, participated in less than ten years 
of formal schooling. There was only one of them that had studied at 
the university, but that person had only studied there for one term. 
Most of them could therefore be said to have undergone a rather short 
period of formal education.  
The participants can also be divided into a group that only partici-
pated in terms of providing one or more written accounts for the re-
search and a group who also participated in interviews. The partici-
pants were divided over groups and the extent to which they partic-
ipated as follows in the table below: 
Table 1. Number of participants over groups and the extent to which they 
participated in the study 
 
Group 
Status as participant: A B C D Total 
written 13 11 18 25 67 
written plus interviews 8 8 8 10 34 
Total 21 19 26 35 101 
14 of the 34 participants that participated in the interviews were male 
and the remaining 20 were females. This sex distribution was about 
the same as in the group as a whole (cf. Table 1 in Appendix 2 for the 
exact numbers). 
CONSTITUTION OF DATA 
The participants were initially contacted by telephone or after contact 
with the school teacher or head teacher, and personal contact in their 
own class-rooms. A short introduction was given. This involved a 
presentation of myself and my view of the education science. The 
project was presented as one aiming at description of how people in 
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various ages tend to understand understanding. And the participants 
were invited to give a written account of an occasion when they 
experienced they understood something.  
They were instructed to write the account under the title of: “When I 
understood….”. They were informed that some of them on a latter 
occasion would be invited to participate in a following research in-
terview. They were also told that in these following interviews their 
essays would be discussed and that they would also be asked some 
questions about what they usually tend to understand with under-
standing.  
The participants that were engaged in the various forms of formal 
schooling, were thereafter allowed to use one or two school hours in 
the following week to write down their accounts. The participants that 
were engaged in the adult study circles were invited to write their 
accounts at home and then return them to their study circle leader 
within two weeks.  
This step of the first part of the study, resulted in 101 of the altogether 
about 150 persons handing in one or several written accounts. The 
procedure yielded about 130 accounts. These were read with the 
explicit purpose to make a selection of accounts and narrators to the 
subsequent interview, that could be said to representative for each age 
group and for the material and group of narrators as a whole. Out of 
each group 8–10 persons were called upon to participate in the 
research interview. The selected were contacted either through their 
teacher’s or directly by telephone. All but two of them were 
interviewed. The ones that were not interviewed were simply not 
present in school the day or days when the interviews were 
conducted. 
The immediate aim and the plan for the interviews was to: 
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1. Follow up on the written description. Try to get a more extended 
description of the described instance of understanding. Discuss the 
meaning of understanding in this particular case with them. Ask for 
further examples of occasions when they experienced that they 
understood. And, if possible, follow up on these accounts too. Discuss 
the meaning of understanding in each of these cases. Discuss 
similarities and differences between these instances of understanding.  
2. Invite the participants to give some examples of how they use the key 
word. Discuss these sentences in terms of different meanings for 
understanding. 
3. Try to find out what they preferably intend with understanding by 
inviting them to imagine what they would say to someone who one 
day all of a sudden would ask them what is meant with 
“understanding”. 
The interviews with the school pupils were conducted in a secluded 
room at their school. The interviews with the rest of the participants 
were carried out in their homes. The interviews were, as a rule, carried 
out according to the plan. However as, they were carried out, it was 
noticed that the attempt to follow up on the participants written 
accounts often either lead to them bringing in new information that 
appeared to change the meaning of the event that they had accounted 
for, or to them not being able to say more about it than what had 
already been said. Quite a few of the participants could, however, 
come up with more examples of instances of understanding, but when 
trying to follow up on these it was my experience that it was often 
difficult to get the chronological order between various events in the 
narration straight.  
The attempt to discuss differences and similarities between various 
descriptions was, to the extent it was possible at all not found very 
fruitful. In connection to the second of the three moments in the in-
terviews, asking for example of sentences that make use of the word 
understanding, it was found that the participants often had difficulties 
in giving more than a few examples. And the attempt to discuss 
differences and similarities between the suggested sentences with 
reference to the use of the word understanding was not as fruitful as 
expected either. 
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In connection to the third of the three moments, it appeared that while 
the younger participants often had only a few words to say, the older 
participants had more to say, but still had great difficulties to deal with 
the explicit question. It was as a rule only some of the participants, 
mainly the young and mature that could deal with this question.  
The interviews, which lasted from about 25 minutes to 2 hours, were 
recorded on audio tapes and thereafter transcribed into verbatim 
interview protocols. The transcriptions were, with exception of seven 
of the interviews, carried out by the researcher himself. The remaining 
interview recordings were transcribed by an assistant, but to the extent 
that these have been quoted they have also been checked for accuracy 
against the audio recordings by the researcher.  
The written accounts of instances of understanding and the interview 
protocols cover about 600 machine written A4-sized pages. Each 
interview protocol covers between 10 to 36 pages. This gives thus a 
total data for this part of the investigation of, on the one hand, 130 
written accounts of instances of understanding from 99 participants 
and 600 machine typed pages from 34 interviews. These comprised 
eight participants from each of the first three groups and ten from the 
forth group of the part study. The interview protocols contain about 40 
additional accounts of instances of understanding when compared to 
the written accounts.  
CONSTITUTION OF THE RESULTS 
The constitution of the results is allied with the two major interpre-
tative turns. In the first of these, which represents a rather uninformed 
straight forward approach, and which for the most part is centred 
around analyses of the previously mentioned narratives, the aim has 
been to work out a systematic account of the different ways wherein 
the participants appear to have understood and explained 
understanding as a phenomenon. In the second, which represents a 
relatively more informed round about approach centred around an 
analysis of the cumulated contributions of a choice of participants, the 
aim has been to work out a systematic interpretation of the 
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significance of the ways of understanding and explaining represented 
by the contributions of the members of the select group. In the aim of 
this analysis has been to forge the data into a preliminary account of 
the prerequisites for the development of understanding of 
understanding with respect to both how and why certain kinds of 
understandings develop rather than others. 
INTERPRETATIVE TURN ONE 
The first turn began with several rounds of gradually more successful 
attempts to discern, relate and systematise discernment and relations 
of forms of consciousness of understanding on the basis of written 
accounts and has been presented previously (Helmstad & Marton, 
1992). Moreover, the version of the interpretation of understandings of 
understanding that is under presentation in the present thesis has, 
unlike the previous, presentation however, not only included 
interpretations of written accounts but also the accounts that emerged 
from the interview transcriptions. Since the later rounds of reading of 
these data were carried out parallel and relative to the play of the 
second interpretative turn, they profited not only from the additional 
ingredients that were brought in through the reading of the additional 
data, but also from the things that came out of the second 
interpretative turn and from additional reading of literature.1 
This iterative and reflective data differs in at least two respects from 
the materials that have been used earlier in the research tradition 
which the present project is a part of. It differs for one thing in that 
where as the earlier studies (with few exceptions) have been based on 
interview protocols, the discussed analysis has (for the most part) been 
based on written accounts. And it differs for secondly, in that where as 
the earlier studies (with few exceptions) have been based on analyses 
of people’s answers to explicit questions about the general meaning of 
a particular object, here the analyses have almost exclusively been 
based on consideration of what people have answered to an implicit 
                                          
1 The differences between the two interpretations are explained in Appendix 4. 
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question about when they have experience and what they feel 
understanding means.  
This has its strengths but would have been a real drawback if the data 
had been conceived of and used as some sort of window to what really 
took place when understanding took place. However, data have not 
been interpreted in this sense. Nor have they been interpreted and 
used as a window to what the participants really mean with 
understanding – as if meaning where some fixed and finished free 
floating idea in people’s minds (Kvale, 1996). Rather the data have 
been interpreted as accounts of experiences of understanding that a 
given group of people composed when called upon to describe an 
instance of understanding that could be used for a subsequent analysis 
of qualitatively different ways wherein people tend to explain 
understanding as a human experience.  
The interpretation of data was in this interpretative turn driven by the 
intention to work out descriptive accounts of ways wherein par-
ticipants appeared to have understood and explained understanding 
as event and provide a systematisation of these descriptions. The aim 
of the analysis was thus to work out an account of what, until further 
notice could be considered as (a) the different ways of conceiving 
understanding that have been manifest, (b) what characterises each of 
them in relation to each and all of the others, (c) what accounts 
represent these ways of understanding and explaining understanding 
as a phenomenon, (d) how many times these ways of 
understanding/explaining have been expressed and (e) how these 
expressions are distributed over categories of descriptions and groups 
of participants. 
As indicated above, the data and analysis procedure can be described 
as a form of iterative and reflexive reading of parts of the material and 
the material as a whole, with the intent to discern and describe 
meanings. The questions to be answered through the contextual 
analysis were rather straightforward and like the following:  
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Which accounts express the same meaning of understanding as a 
phenomenon? How can the essence of these meanings be described in 
relation to each other? Which accounts express which meanings and 
which participants and groups of participants can be said to have 
expressed which meaning with which accounts?  
A guiding principle for the interpretation was from the beginning the 
previously developed notion of “understanding” as “a certain 
delimitation of a phenomenon from the context or background, and of 
its component parts and the relations between them” (Marton et al., 
1993, p. 278; Svensson, 1984a). But as this guiding understanding of 
understanding developed – partly from the influence of the 
proceeding studies of the philosophy of interpretation and partly from 
the influence of the meaning about understanding that was brought 
out of interpretative turn two and put into the later rounds of reading 
of interpretative one – the interpretation came to be guided by another 
concept, namely the concept of understanding as a pre-reflexive 
consciousness that precedes any conceptualisation.  
This is a construct that reminds of what Dilthey referred to as Erlebnis: 
“a lived experience encompassing a unity of parts of life bound 
together through a common meaning for the course of life” (Palmer, 
1969, p. 107).1 In this perspective one’s lived experience or 
understanding, of for instance loneliness, is not so much what one 
encounters when one finds oneself lonely as it is what loneliness has 
come to mean for as a result of the ways one has encountered it. This is 
a result of one’s encounters with instances of various types of 
loneliness, at different times, and in different situations, and places. It 
includes – and perhaps most emphatically – other persons narratives 
about loneliness (and of course most importantly) one’s dominant 
meta-narratives of loneliness as carved in one’s major/main official 
discourses.  
It presents in other words, the character of a contraction of meaning; 
an operative consciousness that reaches out and encompasses both 
                                          
1 Gesammelte Schriften, VII, p. 194. 
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recollections of the past and anticipation of the future in the total 
context of meaning that could be said to make up one’s life world 
(Palmer, 1969). This is a conception of understanding that is believed 
to steer away from the tendency to make visual perception into a 
paradigm for understanding of consciousness. It is also a conception 
that has been developed further in Heidegger (1927/1990) and in 
Gadamer (1960/1993). The meaning of the conception is that 
consciousness is not so much a question of having grasped a particular 
object in a particular sense, as it is a question of orienting oneself 
towards “being in the present”, as being that has presented this or that 
character for in the past and that – at least in part – also is expected to 
do so in the future.  
In the light of this, the objective of the research shifted in the later 
rounds of interpretative turn one from trying to describe conceptions 
of understanding toward trying to infer forms of consciousness of 
understanding as a whole, that could be rendered as the experiential 
ground where one can relate to understanding as being that presents 
this or that character rather than another character.  
A second guiding principle for the interpretation of understandings of 
understanding in interpretative turn one, was to begin with the 
previously developed notion of that conceptions are logically related 
to one another (Marton, 1981; Svensson, 1984a, Marton et al., 1993). As 
the guiding understanding of understanding for this interpretative 
turn continued to develop, however, not only from the influence of the 
reading of philosophy of interpretation and from the influence of the 
meaning about understanding that was brought out from 
interpretative turn two, but also from the reading about historical 
interpretations of the development of thinking and speaking, it 
occurred that conceptions can also be said to be related to individual 
and collective developmental history.  
A third guiding principle for the first rounds of interpretative turn 
one, was the previously developed notion that since conceptions are 
obviously logically related, i.e. that there are different ways of making 
sense of the same things, they ought to thereby also reveal different 
facets of the same (Svensson, 1984a; Marton, 1992a). However, this 
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notion has now been abandoned. This has been because of ideas 
developing in the wake of the reading of philosophy of interpretation 
and historical psychology, where it became clear that the truth of this 
notion is relative to the very understanding of a conception as “a 
relation between man and the surrounding world that is created 
through the activity of man” and where “[t]he activity means a 
delimitation of, a differentiation within, and a sample and an 
organisation of meaning content of a part of the world (Svensson, 
1984a, p, 20). Instead of conceiving the object of research in this sense, 
it was re-conceived in the thesis work as relating to a particular being 
that presents a particular character, that presupposes more 
fundamental and more encompassing experience than what is 
contained in that particular way of relating and that can also be 
understood as the personal experiential ground for relating to it in this 
way (Heidegger, 1927/1990; Gadamer, 1960/1993). 
Once the new and alternative system of categories of description had 
been worked out, the various accounts of experiences of un-
derstanding was thereafter classified according to it. This procedure, 
which in itself can be conceived as test of the fit between the system of 
categories of description of understandings, types and conceptions, 
and the data from which it has been generated resulted in lists of 
frequencies. These lists have finally also been used as a means to 
further order the system of categories of description and as a means to 
try to find out at least something about how understandings of 
understanding seem to develop in individual history. 
The tenability of the emergent interpretation that has been worked out 
through this interpretative turn shines first and foremost through in 
the relationship between the presentation of categories of description 
and exemplification and categorisations of data. The usability of the 
emergent interpretation has in a certain sense also been put into 
practice in the application of the categories and the system of 
categories to the previously described concordance material (cf. 
Appendix 3). 
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INTERPRETATIVE TURN TWO 
The second turn differs from the first with respect to approach, aim, 
material and procedure. It represents, as mentioned before, an attempt 
to work out a systematic interpretation of the significance of different 
understandings, types and conceptions as represented by the collected 
contribution of the participants in both the first and the second round 
of the constitution. It also represent to a certain extent however, an 
attempt to drive the emergent results of the first and the first part of 
the second turn into a preliminary account of what until further notice 
can be considered as what the development of understanding of 
understanding is like and why it develops as it does. This has been 
done with the aid of the culture historical respectively philosophical 
hermeneutic concept of understanding, the results of previous studies, 
the available data from the participants and from the concordance, and 
the available interpretations  
The analysis began with a consideration of the individual patterns of 
categorisations of participants’ narratives with respect to under-
standings, types and conceptions and the purpose to identify such 
participants’ who had contributed with more than one narrative and 
whose narratives had appeared to distinctively consistently express 
the same form of understanding. On the basis of this, one participant’s 
collected contribution was chosen to represent the significance of 
understanding understanding as a receiving of knowledge. Another 
participant’s contribution was chosen to represent the significance of 
understanding as an achieving of desired knowledge or skill. A third 
participant’s contribution was chosen to represent the significance of 
understanding understanding as a realising of new comprehension. A 
fourth participant’s contribution was also chosen to represent this 
form of understanding, but whereas the previous’ contribution was 
chosen to represent relatively under developed understanding of 
understanding as a realisation, the later’s contribution was chosen to 
represent a more developed one. 
The data consisted in this turn primarily only of the contributions from 
four of the participants. However, to compensate the contributions 
were not narrowed down to spoken narratives only, but consisted of 
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both written and orally expressed narratives in relation to the rest of 
the interview transcripts from the recordings of the interviews with 
these participants. Once this choice had been made, the collected 
contributions of these participants were made objects for several 
gradually more informed rounds of reading.  
These readings proceeded in the second turn, from the assumption 
that the results of the first turn gave a relatively good picture of the 
ways wherein the participants tended to understand understanding as 
event. These readings proceeded also however, from the assumption 
that the interpretation and categorisation had only revealed what until 
further notice could be considered as a partial truth about how these 
groups tended to understand understanding, and that the further 
readings of these contributions could be expected to reveal more about 
this. The readings of these data proceeded also from the assumption 
that one through such reading could also generate at least some light 
over what such understandings can say about possibilities to 
participate in, plan, perform and evaluate study activity that involves 
the development of better understanding of whatever is made the 
object for study. 
These somewhat more informed, focused and profound readings of 
four separate participants’ contribution as a whole can, thus, be said to 
have been driven by a desire to work out answers to questions such as: 
What does it mean to understand understanding as X, Y or Z obviously 
tended to understand it as? What do these data say about the possibilities 
these participants’ at that time had to understand and explain what 
understanding is as event and how and why understanding comes about? 
What do these data say about how understanding of understanding can 
be said to develop as one grows more experienced with the ways of 
being of understanding? 
A basic guiding principle for these readings has, thus, been the as-
sumption that different experiences of understanding provide persons 
with different possibilities to understand and explain understanding? 
Another guiding principle has been the assumption that the richer 
experience of understanding a person has gained, the better are the 
possibilities to understand and explain understanding as events that 
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are available to the person. A third guiding principle for these 
readings has been the assumption that consciousness of understanding 
can be expected to expand as one grows more and more experienced 
as a practitioner of understanding and interpretation, and that the 
development of consciousness of understanding as an event can 
therefore be considered as a function of gradually more insightful 
participation in activities where the development of better 
understanding tends to present itself as a significant objective in its 
own right.  
In accordance with these principles, each of the four particular par-
ticipants’ collected contributions was thus read as a coherent narrative 
about what understanding as phenomenon tends to be understood 
and explained as, from within the corresponding stances and 
perspectives as understood from the interpretation of their contribu-
tions. This analysis began with a consideration of what the least ex-
perienced participants’ contributions say about understanding as a 
reception of knowledge and it continued with a consideration of what 
the next least experienced participants’ contribution say about 
understanding as an achievement of desired knowledge. Thereafter 
followed a consideration of what the next most experienced partici-
pant’s can say about understanding as a realisation of a new com-
prehension as truth. After this followed a consideration of what the 
most experienced participant’s say about more advanced realisation 
understanding of understanding as a phenomenon.1  
This analysis was in the light shed by the gradually developed un-
derstanding of understanding as a phenomenon on the being under 
consideration. This was finally also forged into a preliminary account 
of the developmental course of understanding of understanding and 
why it unfolds as it does.  
                                          
1 This is also the order wherein the significance of the different understandings as 
represented by the understandings and interpretations of these participants contributions are 
considered and discussed in the result section of this thesis.  
 Outline and procedures of the study 121 
CHARACTER OF THE RESULTS 
In this section, the subsequent presentation and discussion of the 
results of the interpretations will be foreshadowed by a consideration 
of what types of interpretation we are dealing with and which 
methods have been proposed and used to check their quality. In the 
effort to determine more precisely which types of interpretation and 
which methods have been and are proposed to be used to try out the 
quality of the interpretations, one can, for example, with Hermerén 
(1983) begin by noticing that there are obviously many different types 
and that there are several different methods for checking 
interpretations. In the schema for analysis that Hermerén (1983) offers, 
interpretations differ at least with reference to: 1) author, 2) object, 
3) aspect, 4) addressee, and 5) the purpose of interpretation.  
Applying this schema to the two interpretative turns of the main 
study, one can start by noticing that there is a difference between the 
two interpretations with respect to: object, aspect, and the purpose or 
interpretation, but no difference with respect to: author and addressee. 
Continuing the comparison in this schema, one can with respect to the 
second variable say that where as the object for interpretation in the 
first case is a set of descriptive texts and transcribed recordings of 
narratives about experiences of understanding, in the second case it is 
a selection of descriptive texts about experiences of understandings 
and transcriptions of recordings of subsequent interviews with the 
authors of these. In the first case the data were interpreted as 
expressions of different forms, types and conceptions of 
understanding. In the second case the data were interpreted as 
examples of what persons that consistently tend to understand un-
derstanding from within different forms of understandings of un-
derstanding say about what it means to understand, what gets un-
derstood, when that takes place and how, and what this in turn may 
mean for their possibilities to participate, initiate and carry out 
learning activities that aim at the development of understanding. With 
respect to, purpose, one can say that whereas the main objective of the 
first interpretation was to understand and explain the character of the 
forms, types and conceptions of understanding as a phenomenon that 
can be assumed to have come into expression in the narratives, the 
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objective of the second was to understand and explain what it can 
mean to consistently tend to understand understanding in one or 
another of these senses. 
Hermerén (1983) also offers a list of eleven ideal types of interpretations. 
This list be used to further determine the character of the discussed 
interpretations. The types are in the mentioned order called: 
1) Emendation, 2) Linguistic (semantic) interpretation, 
3) Interpretation of the author’s meaning, 4) Interpretation of inten-
tions, 5. Psychological extrapolation, 6. Application (demonstration of 
relevance), 7. Theoretical (or allegorical) re-interpretation, 
8. Interpretation of symptoms, 9. Historic reconstruction, 
10. Augmentation of value (aesthetic interpretation), and 
11) Performance (p. 146 ff.). These ideal types are understood as “sorts 
of idealisations which only approximately correspond to the types of 
interpretation proposed in the actual practice of scholars and critics” 
(Hermerén, 1983, p. 157). Each ideal type is believed to involve its own 
task/s and basic question/s.  
In emendation, which can be interpretation of corrupt or cryptic texts in 
order to reconstruct the original, the basic question is: What words and 
sentences did the original contain. In linguistic (semantic) interpretation, 
which can be interpretation of text in order to establish its meaning, 
the basic question is: What do the words and sentences which 
constitute the original mean? In interpretation of the author’s meaning, 
which can be interpretation of utterances in order to determine what 
the author meant with the utterance made, the basic question is: What 
did the person mean about what with this utterance? In interpretation of 
intentions, which can be interpretation of utterances in order to 
determine what the author intended to say or said about a particular 
object, the basic question is: What did the author mean to say or said in 
and by what he/she uttered in what situation? In psychological 
extrapolation, which can be interpretation of a part of a narrative in 
order to give a more complete picture of the part than the one that is 
explicitly explained in the text, the basic question is: What does this 
part of the narrative mean? In application (demonstration of relevance), 
which can be interpretation of a passage in order to learn what it can 
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tell about a particular situation, the basic question is: What does this 
tell about its object? In theoretical (or allegorical) re-interpretation, which 
can be interpretation of a text in order to show that the theory the 
interpreter favours can be found in or read into the text, the basic 
question is: What does this text tell when it is read from within these 
points of departure?  
In interpretations of symptoms, which can be interpretation of a work in 
order to show that certain features of the same are symptoms of 
conflicts in the historical author, the basic question is: What does this 
mean from this point of view? In historic reconstruction, which can 
mean interpretation of various documents or remains from the past in 
order to reconstruct what happened there, the basic question is: What 
happened when and why? Who did what, when and why? In 
augmentation of value (aesthetic interpretation), which can be 
interpretation of a work in order to demonstrate what is vital and 
original in it, the main question is: What is it that makes this work 
interesting? In performance, finally, which can be interpretation of a 
score or script in order to communicate a particular feeling, idea, etc., 
the basic question is: What is the (aesthetically, morally and/or 
politically) proper or best way of rendering this score or script given 
these intentions? 
If one applies these ideal types (with corresponding characteristic 
task/s and problem/s) to the problem of characterising the two inter-
pretations of the study more precisely, one can start by noticing that 
both the first and the second presuppose emendation to the extent that 
they have involved transcriptions of audio-recordings of oral 
utterances. This is because there is no way to come around that such 
procedures with necessity involve linguistic complementation. 
However, emendation has not been involved as an active ingredient in 
neither the first nor the second interpretation, because this took place 
before the interpretations began. One can perhaps also say that the 
first reminds more about linguistic (semantic) interpretation, 
interpretation of the author’s meaning and interpretation of intentions 
than the second, and that the second reminds more of psychological 
extrapolation, application, theoretical interpretation, interpretation of 
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symptoms and augmentation of value than the first, but also that 
neither the first nor the second remind very much of historical 
reconstruction and performance. If this is accepted as a relatively 
satisfying characterisation of the two interpretations, one can thereby 
also go on to consider which arguments can be, have been and should 
be used to check their quality. 
In the discussion that Hermerén (1983) provides, it is assumed that 
historical truth seeking interpretations, represent one form of inter-
pretations and that other kinds of interpretations represent another 
forms. The ground for this distinction is not made explicit, but if one 
reads between the lines, one can learn that the main difference be-
tween the first and the second form has to do with what one can 
presuppose is true about the being of the object for interpretation and 
what one, on the basis of this, can also believe possible to accomplish 
in interpretation. Because where as one in the first form presupposes 
that the object for interpretation is distinct, unitary and finished, and 
that there can be only one correct interpretation of this, which it is also 
desirable and possible to work out on the basis of systematic 
appreciation of characteristics relative a limited catalogue of criteria, in 
the second form one makes no such strong presuppositions and does 
not seek to reach such definite ends.  
When it comes to the question of what standards can be and should be 
used to check the quality of interpretations, Hermerén (1983) suggests, 
thus, that it depends on which form of interpretation one is involved 
in. More precisely, Hermerén suggests different methods to check the 
quality of proposed interpretations depending on what type of 
interpretation it is question of.  
When it comes to the first type, historical truth-seeking interpretations, 
he suggests the following: 
1) the proposed interpretation should be compatible with all (essential) known 
circumstances and well-established hypothesis, and possibly also 
2) the proposed interpretation should be the only one that is compatible with 
these circumstances and hypothesis. In addition to these criteria of 
correspondence, criteria of coherence of the following type are also used: 
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3) the proposed interpretation should be consistent (internally coherent) and 
demonstrate how events, actions and structural changes hang together. 
(Hermerén, 1983, p. 152) 
What is proposed here is, thus a), that correct historical, truth seeking 
interpretations are 1) compatible 2) unique and 3) consistent; b) that 
the presence of these properties can be established; c) that the presence 
of these properties should be demonstrated by presentation of 
evidence and d), that one can and should accept any interpretation 
that has live up to these criteria as potentially true. 
When it comes to checking the quality of interpretations of the second 
type, Hermerén is not equally certain, because what he proposes here 
is not so much one particular method but several depending on what 
type of interpretation it is question of: 
In my view it is fairly obvious that there cannot be any definite or correct 
interpretations, if “interpretations” is used to refer to application 
(demonstration of relevance), theoretical re-interpretation and value aug-
mentation. But the situation becomes quite different, if one is referring to the 
kinds of interpretation I have called linguistic interpretation, interpretation of 
the author’s meaning and interpretation of intentions. Here it is at least in 
principle possible to demonstrate that certain proposed interpretations are 
incorrect – and sometimes that others are correct. (Hermerén, 1983, p. 152) 
Hermerén also offers a list of nine different sorts of such arguments 
that he thinks can be and should be used. These are: 
1. Linguistic… 
2. Biographic … 
3. (Other) historic… 
4. Contextual… 
5. Psychological… 
6. Object-oriented … 
7. Receiver-oriented… 
8. Normative… [and:] 
9. Arguments of fruitfulness. (ibid., p. 153 f.) 
These arguments are also systematised in a model that is intended to 
facilitate explorations of the logical relations between them. This 
model is shown in Figure 1. 
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codes and conventions 
 
author text reader
what the text is about  
Figure 1. A model for survey and exploration of relations between arguments for 
meaning developing interpretations (Hermerén, 1983, p. 158). 
If the model is applied to categorise arguments along its dimensions, 
one will find that each argument has its own place; “some arguments 
are related to the author, others to the receivers, still others to the 
codes and conventions, and some to what the text describes, 
symbolises, and so forth.” (Hermerén, 1983, p. 155).  
The argument is here, thus, that the meaning and reference of 
“correct” (as in the expression “correct interpretation”) may vary with 
form and type of interpretation, but also that there are types of 
interpretations whose quality can probably can be better appreciated 
in terms of: truthfulness, plausibility, probability, fruitfulness, value, 
“insightfulness”, decisiveness, usefulness, emancipation, etc. than in terms 
of correctness. The argument for this is that truth with these (and 
perhaps also with the other) interpretations is not so much a question 
of an indubitable objective demonstration of what really is, as it is, a 
question of resolutions of dispute among persons with varying, but in 
all cases limited experience.  
Correspondingly, with these interpretations one is therefore not so 
much called upon to set up and check the quality of relative clear and 
precise criteria of correctness, as one is called upon to bring out 
relevant arguments for proposed interpretations which are discussed 
as openly and decisively as possible. This is because truth is, with 
these (and perhaps also with the other) interpretations, first of all 
neither subjective nor objective, but rather dialogical and emergent.  
The message is, thus, that there are different types of arguments for 
different types of interpretations, that different interpretations consist 
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of combinations of several different types, that one as interpreter 
makes (and/or on theoretical and normative principles should make) 
a selection of arguments, declare these and should make relatively 
intelligent and defensible use of them. This should be done whenever 
interpretations and knowledge claims are made and should always 
include one indication of one’s understanding of their relative 
advantages and disadvantages, and their limitations and possibilities.  
If one applies this line of reasoning, one can in the light of what has 
already been said, start by establishing that both the type of inter-
pretation and the arguments of the present study have written and 
orally presented, audio recorded and transcribed narratives about 
occasions “When I understood…” as objects for interpretation. 
However, in addition to this, the second interpretations have also used 
additional interview data about usage of the verb to understand and 
data concerning similarities and differences between narratives about 
experiences of understanding.  
In the first interpretation, the purpose of the interpretation was to 
understand the meaning of narratives as expressions of different un-
derstandings of understanding as a phenomenon. That is to discern, 
describe and systematise descriptions of understandings and types 
and conceptions of understanding as a phenomenon. Since this in-
terpretation is basically semantic the arguments that have been used 
and should be used to check its quality are first and foremost lin-
guistic, contextual, biographical and object oriented. This means that 
the quality of the interpretations has first and foremost been (and 
should be) checked with reference to its compatibility with the rules of 
language, the emergent coherence that has been created by the 
interpretation, the known facts about the knowledge and interests of 
the author, and the known facts and hypotheses about the objects the 
texts are about, describes, reefer to and symbolises.  
In the second interpretation, which presupposes and involves the 
results of the first as a tool to make an appropriate selection of data, 
the purpose of the interpretation was to understand the meaning of 
understanding understanding as it had appeared with reference to 
possibilities to participate in, initiate and carry out learning activities 
 Outline and procedures of the study 128 
in general and learning activities that aim at the development of more 
advanced theoretical understandings of certain objects in particular. 
Since this interpretation likens psychological extrapolation rather than 
linguistic interpretation of the authors meaning and intentions; and 
also more focused on the object than the text; the arguments that have 
been and should be used to check its quality of this are more 
psychological than semantic. This means that the quality of the 
interpretation has not so much been (and should not so much be) 
checked with reference to its compatibility with linguistic rules, the 
author’s meaning and the author’s intentions, as with reference to its 
compatibility with common sense psychology and known facts about 
the historic, social, cultural and psychological context of the object.  
In sum, one can with respect to the character of the results say that the 
outcome of the first interpretation is a system of categories of 
descriptions and categorisations of narratives about “literally” ex-
periences of understandings as phenomenon. The quality of this 
interpretation has been and should be checked with reference to its 
compatibility with linguistic rules, its coherence, the fit between 
categories of description and interpretations and categorisations of 
data. The outcome of the second interpretation is an application of the 
results of the first interpretation to the complete contribution of four 
participants with reference to what these data tell about the meaning 
of the understandings of understanding that are represented by these 
participants. The quality of this interpretation is nested with the 
quality of the first, but has in addition to this also been (and should 
also be) checked with reference to what it reveals about 
understandings of understanding and the significance of such as 
represented by four individual cases.  
In each case, it is a question of contextual interpretation, but the in-
terpretations vary with respect to object, purpose, and argument. In 
the first interpretation, the object is first and foremost what under-
standing is understood as in a particular narrative in relation to other 
narratives that have involved understanding in the same sense, those 
that have involved understanding in other senses. In the second, the 
object is first and foremost the meaning of understanding 
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understanding in one as opposed to other possible senses. In the first 
interpretation, the purpose has first and foremost been to work out a 
systematic interpretation of what understanding has been understood 
as in the discussed narratives about instances of understanding. In the 
second the purpose has first and foremost been to work out an 
interpretation of the significance of understanding in one sense rather 
than in others as this has come into expression in particular 
participants’ complete contributions of data to the study. In the first 
interpretation the arguments that have been and should be used to 
balance the interpretations are first of all semantic. In the second the 
arguments that have been and should be used to balance the 
interpretation are first of all psychological. In a wider perspective, 
however, the interpretations are two parts of the same interpretation 
of understandings of understanding as personal prerequisites for an 
active engagement in learning activity that aims at the development of 
better understanding. It worth essentially lies in how educative it can 
become. 

  
PART III 
RESULTS 

  
Chapter 7 
 
FORMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS OF 
UNDERSTANDING AS A PHENOMENON 
Understanding the words of others also requires 
understanding their thoughts. And even this is 
incomplete without understanding their motives 
or why they expressed their thoughts. (Vygotskij, 
1934/1987, p. 283) 
The study has first and foremost involved an analysis of the partici-
pants accounts of experiences of understanding and has led to an 
identification of three different types, which have in their turn led to a 
discernment and description of three different forms of consciousness 
of understanding. These have been forged into a system of categories 
of description of the three different understandings of understanding 
and the accounts have then been categorised with respect to the 
meaning for understanding that they appear to represent. The 
distributions of the categorised accounts have also been analysed with 
respect to how frequently each type has been expressed and how 
common they are for each group of participants.  
The results that are presented in this chapter consists of both an in-
terpretation and categorisation of the available data as expressions of 
different understandings of understanding and of an analysis of the 
numeral aspects of the categorisation. Their presentation starts with an 
account of the first part of the analysis which is followed by an account 
 Forms of consciousnes of understanding as a phenomenon 134 
for the second part. The chapter is concluded with a summary of these 
results.  
THREE UNDERSTANDINGS OF UNDERSTANDING 
The study has resulted in a discernment of three qualitatively different 
understandings of understanding as a phenomenon. Trying to catch 
what can be considered as the essences of these in a few words these 
has led to them being called: Understanding as: I. a reception, 
II. an acquisition, and III. a realisation. The three different forms of 
consciousness of understanding will be described, exemplified, 
compared and discussed below. This will be done under the following 
headings: Understanding as a reception, Understanding as an acquisition, 
and: Understanding as a realisation. 
UNDERSTANDING AS A RECEPTION 
In the first form of consciousness of understanding, understanding is 
understood as a reception of knowledge about a particular being in the 
world the knowledge as given either by observation or by the 
communication of information. The understander is typically un-
derstood as a more or less passive recipient of knowledge about 
something that is accepted to be the case with a particular and oth-
erwise relatively familiar being and is typically understood as 
something that the understander didn’t know in advance, but acci-
dentally ran into, found, learnt, etc., when he/she all of a sudden 
simply noticed or was informed about it. This can be seen in examples 
such as the following : 
When I understood that I needed an appendix operation  
One night I and my friends were to meet in church. We meet at 4.30 PM and 
everything was fine. At five o’clock we had some refreshments and ate some 
sweets. Then my tummy began to ache very badly. Our meeting was over so I 
went home. It was a Tuesday so I should actually have gone to a choir 
rehearsal, but I didn’t. When I arrived home, my sister asked me how I was. 
She saw that I didn’t feel well. I checked my temperature, but I had no fever. 
Oh, I had such a pain in my tummy, at the side of my tummy. I went to bed 
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early that night. It was about 8.30. But I didn’t sleep. I lay awake all the time 
and I suffered from the pain in my tummy. The morning came and I was 
exhausted. What should I do. Mummy said that I had to go to the school nurse 
that she could check me. I did like she told me and I did not bring any school 
bag with me. I suffered so badly from pain in my tummy that I cried, but I had 
to go to the school nurse. When I got to the school nurse’s place it was not the 
nurse we used to have before, but another. She touched the tummy were it 
ached. When she was done she said that we should phone mummy at her work 
place. I wondered what was wrong with me. The sister said that I was to have 
appendix operation. Sister also called the hospital. Some hours later I was 
signed in at the hospital and was about to be operated. (Alexandra 22:1w)1 
The story-teller describes a situation where she learns that she is going 
to be operated due to some problem with her appendix and that she 
learns this by being told by the school nurse. The account resembles 
the previously discussed example of the second type of accounts about 
what was earlier referred to as Getting to know with respect to what 
becomes an object for understanding. But whereas the given matter of 
fact in that account is said to have become an object for understanding 
through an experience of a lack of knowledge that led one to take to 
actions to achieve it, in this case it is described as a receipt of 
knowledge as given information. The understander appears to be 
conceived of as a receiver of knowledge. This can also be exemplified 
with the following account: 
When I understood… 
When I understood that my stick insects had died. I had owned three such for 
about a half year. It was in the evening when I was to feed them. I kept them in 
a big ginger-bread can with a lot of sticks, sand and weed in. I became sad and 
didn’t think so much about them any more. (A 15w) 
Understanding is also here discussed as the reception of knowledge of 
something through simple perception. But whereas the previous 
example suggests that the knowledge was received via a second 
person, this example suggests that it was received through the subjects 
                                          
1 The original name has been replaced with a pseudonym. This is also the case with every 
other name in the quotations that follows in this and the next chapter. All persons that were 
interviewed has thus been given “new” names. The twelve year old has been given name 
that starts with “A”. Girls have been given even numbers. The numbers after the colons 
indicate which account it is. And “w” signals that the account was written.  
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own identifications. In spite of the obvious difference between the two 
examples, it is still argued that both can be interpreted as expressions 
of a form of consciousness of understanding as a simple reception of 
knowledge of matters of fact through observation or by information.  
UNDERSTANDING AS AN ACQUISITION 
In the second form of consciousness of understanding as phenomenon, 
understanding is discussed or presented as an achieving of desired 
knowledge through a relatively successful completion of a deliberate 
learning activity. The understander is given as an active achiever of 
desired knowledge or skill within a socially constituted context that 
typically involves a learner acting in relation to more proficient others 
that are believed to facilitate the desired learning. The achieved 
knowledge is typically understood as a personally and socially 
significant knowledge or skill, with new knowledge or skill being 
typically understood as something that the understander knows more 
experienced, proficient, significant others have already achieved. 
Understanding is in this respect something that one managed to 
achieve first and foremost through the power of one’s own effort, even 
though this may be due to one’s successful co-operation with more 
experienced others. In this form of consciousness of understanding, 
understanding is a personal achievement of desired knowledge.  
In some accounts the achieved knowledge or skill is presented as 
something that one managed to achieve in spite of the unfavourable 
circumstances and/or in spite of relatively poor communication 
between oneself and the more experienced other. In each of these 
types of cases, the presence or absence of the more experienced other 
appears to be conceived as a significant part of the context from within 
which understanding is conceived. For as the examples indicates, the 
context for understanding always involves a less or more 
understanding person in relation to other people that share in and/or 
interfere with one’s learning.  
This form of understanding of understanding can be exemplified with 
the following account: 
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In the year of 1984, I began to become interested in wind surfing. Previously I 
had sailed quite a lot, but now my friends began to devote themselves to wind 
surfing. I had a friend called John who had an extra job in a sports shop that 
sold wind surfing boards. We were often there during the spring and one day, 
just before school was out for the term we made up our minds: We should 
wind-surf on our own. We were allowed to borrow wind surfing boards, wet 
suits and everything else that was necessary and set of for Lake Round. We 
were left alone on the beach to set the sails, it took about a couple of hours 
before everything was put together fairly acceptably. It was calm, but we 
didn’t care about that. We threw ourselves into the wet suits, put up the rigging 
and messed about out in the ice-cold water.  
I stood carefully on the board, bent down to pull out the rigging from the 
water, whereupon I fell flop down backwards into the water. After a while I 
nonetheless learnt to pull up the rigging out of the water, even stand there with 
a cramp-like grip around the boom, I was very proud. The only problem was 
that I didn’t get anywhere. At last, even I realised that it was not the right day 
for wind surfing. We gathered our things together and set off for home. 
Next time I stood on a wind surfing board was in the fall. During the summer I 
had devoted myself to “ordinary” sailing since I was so bad at surfing. Some 
time in September I bought a wind surfing board that you could barely stand 
on and “pull rigging”, a so called semi-sinker. The first time I tried it out was a 
rather windy and half overcast September day. I froze when I saw the cold 
lake, but I had made up my mind to make it. John, my friend, had of course 
learnt to wind-surf and was now with me as a “first-class instructor”. After 
having set the sail and crawled into the wet suit there was no turning back. All 
of a sudden I found myself out there in the water. The board was slippery and 
rickety, I could hardly stand on it before I fell into the water again. Although 
John stood on the bridge and instructed me, it just didn’t work. When the belly 
of my suit was full of water and my toes and hands where blue and white, I 
gave up and swam towards land with the board in tow. I was depressed and 
thought about giving in, but John kept on encouraging me: “Stand here on the 
edge, direct the board toward the way you intend to sail, hold the sail over 
your head…”. It sounded good and I stood on the edge with the board in the 
right direction, gripped firmly around the boom, the sail over my head. I 
carefully placed one foot upon the board, when the next wind puff came I 
suddenly understood. I had managed it. 
The board got going, the wind blowing in my ears, the water foaming around 
my feet, what a fantastic feeling. Carefully I turned my face backwards in 
order to see Johns face, when all of a sudden without notice, I was thrown 
head over heels forward due to a strong wind puff.  
I did not get up on the board any more out there in the water, but had to swim 
back, no problem, I understood. (C 7w) 
In this account, understanding an achieving of desired knowledge that 
the understander brings about through relatively successful 
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completion of deliberate goal-oriented learning. From within this form 
of consciousness, what one achieves knowledge of or skill in tends to 
be conceived of as an already established matter of fact or possibility 
known or mastered by others, but not by oneself. This reminds of the 
previously discussed form of consciousness, but differs from it with 
respect to how the understander tends to be conceived. Because 
whereas the understander previously appeared as a relatively passive 
part of the person-object-others relation, here the understander tends 
to be conceived as the most active part.  
UNDERSTANDING AS A REALISATION 
In the third form of understanding of understanding as phenomenon, 
understanding is a realising of something through experience and 
interpretation of experience that presents this or that character. The 
emergent objects for understanding are the meaning, significance, 
structure, etc. that experientially encountered being takes on for the 
understander. The object for knowledge is also understood as new 
truth that comes to stand over and above old on the basis of partial 
negation or confirmation of pre-conceptions and the integration of 
experience in a way that transcends previous understanding.  
This form of consciousness of understanding has also appeared to 
involve the possibility for the persons that sustain it, to understand 
and explain what become objects for understanding and how that 
appears to take place in one or several different senses. The different 
ways wherein this has appeared understood will be described, ex-
emplified and discussed in the subsequent section.  
DIFFERENT TYPES OF REALISING 
The analysis of the accounts found to represent understanding of 
understanding as a realisation of something through experience and 
interpretation has resulted in a discernment of three different types. 
The first type is represented by accounts that indicate that under-
standing involves a change of the understander’s meaningful relation 
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to the world and experience of it in some global sense. This type of 
understanding has been found manifest in two different conceptions 
with respect to what becomes object for understanding. Since what 
become object for understanding appears to be experienced as matters 
of fact, this type of understanding as a realisation of something has 
been called factual understanding.  
The second type is represented by accounts that imply that the real-
isation of something involves an expansive change of the under-
stander’s meaningful relation to the understood. This means that the 
understander experiences that he/she understands the meaning of the 
understood or the meaning of the understood better than he/she has 
been able to understand it before. This type has manifested itself in 
three different conceptions. Since what is experienced as understood is 
the meaning of something as a realisation through experience and 
interpretation, this understanding has been called referential 
understanding. 
In the types mentioned so far, the object for understanding presents 
the character of an unbroken whole, but in the third type of under-
standing the object for understanding presents the character of an 
essential structure or a functional system. This indicates that objects 
for understanding are constituted through the experience of successive 
encounters with the understood. This type has been found to manifest 
itself in three different conceptions.  
Since these conceptions imply that both the understood and what 
becomes an object for understanding presents the character of a 
system, this type has been called systemic understanding. The different 
types and conceptions of understanding as a realisation will be 
discussed and exemplified below. 
A. Factual understanding 
Factual understanding is represented by accounts that imply that both 
the understood and what becomes the object for understanding 
present the character of a fact and is manifest in two different 
conceptions. In the first of these, understanding means that one comes 
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to believe that something is the case and that one takes this to one’s 
heart and soul as a matter of fact. In the second, understanding means 
that one realises what really is the case as opposed to what appeared 
to be the case. The two different conceptions are explained and 
exemplified below. 
A1. That something is the case 
According to this conception, understanding is the understanding of a 
true state of affairs, a conclusion about what a situation is like or what 
ought to be done. The object for understanding is often of great 
personal significance. The temporal structure of this conception 
implies that experience of what comes to be understood precedes its 
realisation. For as understanding is described here, there is always 
some delay between the experience and the realisation of its meaning, 
even though this delay may be very short. Furthermore, the 
understanding projects itself into the future, the realisation has 
important implications for time to come. 
A recurring episode which reflects this meaning of understanding was 
mentioned earlier. When a child is learning to ride a bicycle a more 
capable or experienced other is running behind, holding it for the sake 
of balance. After a while the child notices a change (in his bodily 
relation to the bicycle). Shortly thereafter he turns around and 
discovers that the more experienced other is not holding the bicycle 
any longer, and since he apparently rides the bicycle on his own he 
realises that this means that he has learnt to ride.  
In the following example there is another element, a conclusion about 
how one should behave. The structure is, however, very similar to that 
of the bicycle example. For here something which “was there” prior to 
its realisation is appropriated: 
When I understood that it was dangerous to ride through a red light 
It was almost two months ago. I was on my way home from the chess club and 
I rode through a red light. A car drove into my bicycle and I flew up onto its 
bonnet. The bicycle-frame was twisted. But at least I had no injuries. (A 
13:6w) 
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Of course, it was true even before the accident that it was dangerous to 
ride through a red light. After the accident, however, the previous 
carelessness emerges as an understanding that what was said to be the 
case really is the case; it is dangerous to ride through a red light. 
There are some instances within this category which are of a special 
kind. Here, “understanding that something is the case”, has the form 
of a two-stage process. These stages are (a) that the person becomes 
aware of something on one level, and later (b) grasps or experiences 
that this is really the case: 
When I understood! 
The telephone rang and I got slowly out of bed. Hello! The voice on the other 
end of the line was low and sad. I sat a long while before I got up and thought: 
She’s only on holiday. 
A week pass, when I saw the notice in the newspaper it felt more real. 
The air is clear and cold, the sun shines on the white church. I walk slowly up 
the gravel path towards the crowd of people standing outside the church door. 
A church warden shows me to the seventh row. Everything is still. The clock 
which stands at the front of the right hand pew ticks loudly. People are crying. 
I am getting knots in my stomach. I want to go outside. 
The priest is speaking but I’m locked in my own thoughts and can’t con-
centrate on what he says. Flowers, the whole church is full of flowers. Is she 
lying there at the front in the coffin? Yes it must be so. Why would everybody 
be crying otherwise, it must be so. 
In the car on the way home all of a sudden everything bursts and the tears 
begin to flood. 
We will never see her again, never again be infected by her laughter, nor feel 
the confidence she radiated. Her fun, her inventiveness. Just egocentric 
thoughts really. Now I feel I understand that she is dead. Life will go on, even 
if it feels unfair. And the knot in my stomach will loosen. We will laugh loudly 
when we talk about her and remember her. (D 14:1w) 
Understanding means in this sense, thus, not that one gets to know 
something about something, but that one realises that what one has 
heard or seen actually is the case. It means that one, as it were, makes 
something one has learnt about, but not grasped real for oneself. It is 
realised through that one, as it were, takes what through experience 
and interpretation of has present itself as a given fact of a matter to 
one’s heart and lets it be real. 
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A2. What really is the case 
In the previously discussed conception, That something is the case, what 
became the object for understanding was what was experienced about 
something in particular. In this second conception, understanding 
means that one experiences that one discovers what really is; the true 
or real identity of something as opposed to what previously appeared 
to be true. The focus is on the contrast between the perceived and the 
true identity (appearance and reality). The paradigmatic case is the 
rather frequently described episode of when the true identity of Santa 
Claus was realised. There are, however, some seemingly quite different 
examples of this conception too. As an example, we may consider the 
following account: 
When I understood 
The alarm clock rang, I turned it off and turned round. After a while I sat up 
with a start. The children were playing in the sitting room, why hadn’t they 
woken me! I rushed up and washed, threw my clothes on, ran down to the 
kitchen and began to prepare breakfast. Typical! When autumn comes I always 
have problems with getting up. Now I will be late again. The third time this 
term. I put the corn flakes and milk on the table and called the children, poured 
coffee for me and Mike. “Mike!”. He was still in bed. I ran up the stairs and 
into the bedroom. “Mike!”, I shouted, “we’ve slept in”. He woke and looked 
around sleepily. It was eight o’clock already and he’d usually worked for an 
hour by this time. He lay down and sighed, looked at me unsympathetically.  
“What day is it today?” he said calmly. 
I sat on the edge of the bed. Of course, now I understood, it was Saturday. 
You become a bit distracted when you go to KomVux. (D 10:1w)1 
What is understood or becomes the object for understanding in this 
particular case is what day it really is as opposed to what day one 
thought it was. This was realised by the understander finding reasons 
to question her belief of the situation, questioning it and realising her 
mistake. When this took place, everything else made sense, why the 
children had begun to play without waking them, why the husband 
was sleeping etc. The situation is not only experienced to take on a 
different meaning, but that meaning is also the true or the inter-
                                          
1 “KomVux” is an abbreviation for “Municipal Adult Education”. 
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subjective as opposed to the apparent meaning. Understanding means 
here thus, that one experiences a realisation of what is the case as 
opposed to what appeared to be the case.  
B. Referential understanding 
Referential understanding is represented by accounts that imply that 
both the understood and what becomes the object for understanding 
presents the character of a meaning. This type of understanding has 
been found manifest in three different conceptions. These conceptions 
are discussed and exemplified below. 
B1. The existential meaning 
In the first type and group of conceptions, understanding concerned a 
relation between the individual, reality and the individual’s different 
perception of reality. In this and the two next conceptions, un-
derstanding means that one experiences the meaning of something in 
one sense or another either for oneself, or for others, or, as it were, 
independently.  
Understanding is here, in other words, primarily conceived and in-
terpreted as a question of a relation between two perceptions of 
something; one which has been taken for granted and another which 
has been discovered to reflect that something from another 
perspective. This means that one experiences for instance, what it 
means to be poor, what it means to have a functioning mouth, 
something’s importance for oneself, etc. This is understanding that is 
often said to have evolved from a personal experience of that which is 
understood, but can also be understanding that has evolved from 
reflecting over one’s experience of something or from reflecting over 
someone else’s description of how they live or have lived a certain 
experience or situation in another and more profound sense than 
before. The focus here is, unlike in the two earlier described 
conceptions, thus neither on the forward projected conclusion of what 
one has understood nor on the contrast between reality and 
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appearance. It is rather on the meaning of that which has been 
understood. 
The conception could be exemplified with the following account: 
When I understood 
Last summer during the school break I worked a few weeks. The hours were 
inconvenient. I was forced to work every other weekend. It was three weeks 
altogether. The weekends I worked my husband and children were in the 
country. I was on my own in town. It was great. I am rarely alone, and for that 
reason I enjoyed it tremendously. It was quiet and peaceful when I woke up in 
the mornings. I could eat breakfast in peace and quiet while I read the morning 
papers. When I came home after my day’s work I was completely shattered. I 
was used to sitting at a school desk. Now I had a job where I moved around a 
lot. I treated myself to something nice to eat on those days, preferably 
something which didn’t take too much getting ready. And then I read or 
watched the TV before going to bed fairly early so I could get up for my next 
day’s work.  
But by the third weekend having my family away in the country was no longer 
such a pleasure. No, after I got home from work on the Saturday and had 
relaxed a while I began to walk up and down restlessly. And I actually felt 
alone. This was a new experience. I was usually never alone. Yes, I felt 
terribly lonesome. Then I understood how all those people who genuinely were 
alone felt. And that they don’t have an easy time of it. Therefore I try to think 
of them sometimes and make contact with them from time to time. Because I 
understand how much that can mean. (D 48:1w) 
What is described as understood in this particular case is first and 
foremost what it means to be “alone” without one’s family and/or 
friends. It is an understanding which is said to have evolved from an 
experience of loneliness which in turn led to a more generalised 
realisation. This leads over to the next conception.  
B2 How something appears for someone else  
Understanding in this conception means that one experiences that one 
understands how something appears for someone else and is 
expressed as a relation between two perceptions of reality. One of 
which has been taken for granted and the other of which has been 
discovered to reflect a given object or situation as seen from someone 
else’s perspective. This is an object for understanding that is reached 
by experience of not understanding the other’s behaviour, wanting to 
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understand the reason why the other behaves or behaved in a certain 
way in a particular situation, gaining experience that makes it possible 
for oneself to take on the perspective of the other, finding that the 
other’s behaviour makes sense and experiencing that this is obviously 
how the other apparently lives or lived a particular situation.  
The conception will be illustrated by two examples. In the first of 
these, the object for understanding is what another person and group 
of persons apparently experience in a particular object. The account is 
stated as follows: 
I’m going to write about when I understood why my friends, who had just 
moved house, spoke so much about their new home. They live in Uppsala. 
Before they bought their new house they lived in a fairly ordinary house on a 
housing estate. Now that they live in Uppsala we can’t get together as often as 
before, most of our contact is by phone or through letters. 
One day, it was sometime in August, their daughter rang me. She told me they 
were going to move. It wasn’t planned in any way. They had just seen an 
advertisement for a house for sale and went out to look at it. The advertisement 
described the old house so clearly, and they went mainly because it would be 
fun to see the house. Most people have a built-in interest for old things. 
Whatever the case may be, she described to me how all the family had been so 
captivated by the house that they had decided to buy it. During the 
conversation I was infected by her enthusiasm and listened carefully to her 
description. 
Days and weeks went by and life went on as usual. All contact with the family 
in Uppsala centred on talk about their home, about moving problems and 
decorating. I must confess that each time I talked to them I understood less and 
less how their interest could be so totally dominated by an old house. Of 
course I was happy for them. Listening to these people who I liked very much 
talk so warmly about the house and how happy they felt at the prospect of 
moving into it naturally pleased me. Nevertheless I felt they “went on a bit”.  
At the end of October I had my seventeenth birthday. In the evening the girl 
from Uppsala rang. She just talked and talked about their house. 
“Aren’t you going to congratulate me?” I asked a little sullenly. 
I think she was a bit ashamed. She asked herself how she could forget to 
congratulate me when that was why she had called in the first place.  
Last weekend we finally went up to Uppsala to visit them. We drove through 
Uppsala and out into the country. With the help of a long description of the 
route we managed to find the famous house. When I saw it I understood why 
they had talked so much about it. We drove up the drive to the house, turned 
off the engine and climbed out. It felt a bit strange at the same time as it didn’t 
feel strange at all. There stood a family we knew so well on their veranda and 
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welcomed us to the house which was now their home. What made me 
understand all their talk about the house was my seeing it. It was so incredibly 
beautiful. If I don’t remember wrongly I think I said out loud: “Now I 
understand”. 
The more I saw of the house and its garden the more the feeling that I un-
derstood their “talk” grew. But I suppose that it was also all those beautiful 
things in and around the house that filled me. I, Carol, a human being on earth 
stood there and I was full of confidence at life and all that it had to offer me. 
(C 12:1w)  
In this example, the object for understanding is said to have been 
reached first after finding the behaviour of the other person and group 
of persons strange. It then took the following “passage”. First not 
understanding how they could go on talking about a particular object 
like they did, then gaining first hand experience of the object they had 
talked so much about and being given the opportunity to experience it 
as the others did and then finally finding it so charming that it felt as 
though it made sense to talk so much about it as the others did. When 
the beauty of the house and its surroundings stood clear for her, Carol 
also felt she understood and sympathised with them. She felt it was 
OK for them to talk so much about their house, because it appears 
praiseworthy. She was able to empathise with them. 
In the next example, the understanding is not described as something 
that was understood all of a sudden, but rather after a long time of 
trying to make sense of why an other party had behaved like he did: 
I sat in my bed with the telephone receiver in my hand and understood that it 
was too late to try to speak with my father. I hung up and felt powerless, 
because no one can overcome death. 
It has taken many years for me to understand why he drank. But I think it is 
like this: He felt inferior to his wife, he couldn’t bear to see how strong she 
was. There was nothing that she did not manage. While he always failed. He 
could not take it and let her help him. The only way to build his self 
confidence was the bottle, then he was always very talkative and promised a 
lot of things that he could not fulfil. I understand that he must have suffered 
terribly the last years of his life. When I visited him he just didn’t have the 
strength to be sober. 
What I wish many times is to be able to hug him and say: “I love you 
anyway”, but it is to late now. You often only understand these kinds of things 
when it is too late. (Doris 46:1w) 
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This account has, like some other accounts, been found to express 
more than one sense of understanding with respect to what is said to 
have become the object for understanding and how this is said to have 
been reached. The one focused on here has been interpreted as 
suggesting that what was said to have become the object for un-
derstanding was how the father lived his situation. When the main 
character of the narration experienced she understood this, she also 
felt that she could understand why her father drank. But not through a 
flash of insight. Rather, through growing more and more aware of the 
fact that her father appeared to have had an inferiority complex, that 
he was alcoholic and what that means. This involved working out of a 
social psychological theory that at least to some extent explained his 
behaviour in what appears to be experienced as a relatively satisfying 
manner.  
This is understanding fulfilled by experience and explanation. It is 
understanding worked out as a quasi-causal or perhaps rather teleo-
logical explanation of the other’s behaviour. It is the kind of under-
standing of a person’s behaviour that a psychologist or psychother-
apist might also develop. However, it is also interesting to notice that 
the narrative explicitly states that this is the way the subject thinks it 
was. That this is the way she has made sense of something that used to 
be more or less incomprehensible for her and can thereby also 
indirectly be understood as an understanding of why the father drank 
in relation to a future possibly more profound understanding of the 
same thing.  
Understanding appears in this case, thus not so much as a question of 
all or nothing, as a question of a relatively sufficient and improvable 
insight. It represents thereby also an openness for future experiences 
of alcoholism as a psycho-social phenomenon in an even more 
inclusive and distinctive sense than the one that serves as current for 
the time being.  
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B3. What is meant with something 
In What is meant with something the object for understanding is either 
experienced as what someone meant with what they said, signed, 
wrote, etc., or what is meant with a certain word. On the one hand, it 
implies a distinction between what someone uttered for instance and 
what that person obviously also appears to have intended to 
communicate by this. On the other, it implies a distinction between 
what one thought was meant with a given word as opposed to what 
one now understands is meant with it. To understand means here, 
thus, not just that one hears what someone, says, it also means that one 
makes out a meaning which is experienced to be valid for it.  
The focus here is on the relationship between an expression and its 
meaning. And understanding means either that one experiences one 
apprehends the meaning of what is said, or that one experiences that 
one makes sense of what is said in a relatively satisfying sense. In the 
first case the focus is on what a given expression means in a particular 
situation that comprises both the speaker and the understander and it 
is realised by the understander first making an unsuccessful attempt to 
understand. In the second case the focus is on what a certain word 
refers to independently of the particular situation where the 
understander develops a relatively more advanced understanding of 
the meaning of the given word than the he or she had developed 
hitherto. 
The first case of this conception may be illustrated with the following 
account: 
One day someone came to school who was going to be a doctor of something. 
He said he wanted us to write an essay about when we understood. I 
understood nothing then. What was it we were supposed to understand 
actually? I couldn’t understand why we should write something which we did 
not understand. But then I understood that I only had to write about when I 
understood or learnt something. (A 1:1w) 
In this case understanding is implied to have been realised through a 
reinterpretation or restructuring of the meaning of the situation 
wherein a statement was made. This suggest that understanding was 
reached by trying to understand a statement, finding that one had 
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failed to do so and then searching for another way of taking what was 
uttered. That is, looking for and finding, as it were, an appropriate 
context for an utterance, or a context wherein it can make sense.  
This is clear in that the writer makes a distinction between what 
someone expressed and what the person meant with it. In the second 
case of this conception, a distinction is made between what one used to 
understand with a given word and what one tends to understand with 
it now. Understanding means then, thus, that one experiences one 
realises what is meant with an expression, or, that one experiences one 
understands it better than previously.  
The accounts that have been understood to express the second type are 
sometimes quite difficult to differentiate from those accounts of 
understanding as I. a reception on the one hand, and II. an acquisition on 
the other. At least in the sense that these suggest that what appeared 
as the meaning of a word was replaced by the correct meaning of it. 
(See the example about “Safety first” in Appendix 4.) There too, 
understanding may mean an experience that one learns what a given 
expression means! But whereas the subject in those accounts for the 
most part appears to say that this type of object for understanding was 
reached either through being told, or through relatively successful 
completion of deliberate goal oriented action, in the present case 
understanding is implied to have been reached through some sort of 
productive transformation of one understanding of an expression into 
what appears as a better understanding of it.  
If understanding is a process that consists of “no idea at all” or a “false 
idea” of a given word being replaced by “the true meaning”, it occurs 
through a process in which the “wrong meaning” simply is pushed 
out by the “correct meaning” by new information. This differs from 
the present case which means rather that a previous understanding of 
the meaning of a definite word or expression is replaced by a more 
advanced understanding of it through a process in which the 
understander has an experience of the meaning of the expression 
which only in part negates the previous experience of the thing in 
question, and which allows him/her to realise the limitations of the 
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previous understanding and to develop a more comprehensive and 
exclusive understanding of the meaning of the term.  
This case of the conception is given in the following account:  
When I understood what a divorce between mom and dad meant 
I will start from the beginning: When we moved to Part of town I was eight 
years old and went in the second grade. I sensed that dad lived with us there, 
which mom has explained that he didn’t. My best friend during these years 
was my cousin Christina. She and I talked about everything, yes such things 
one speaks about when one is 8-9 years old. And naturally I told her a ”very 
big secret”. It was that my mom and dad were to divorce one another. 
Christina was absolutely not allowed to tell it to her parents or anyone else. 
I/we did not grasp that Christina’s parents were naturally involved and knew 
about the divorce. It was not so strange either. But one day when I and 
Christina’s younger brother and my second cousin Carl were outdoors on our 
own I just had to tell it to him too. So I explained that my parents were 
divorced. I thought that I was the only one that knew since it was me and my 
family that was concerned. But Carl asked then if they really were divorced. 
“It’s obvious that they are divorced, dad does not live with us any longer!”, I 
said. “True, but they need not to be divorced you see just for that”, Carl 
answered. Until then I had believed that one was divorced from one’s partner 
by not sharing the same home. Think that I the ”all-knower”, had been so 
wrong! But later I realised that they were to divorce one another! 
Then when I was to start in the third grade, we moved back to Suburb. We had 
lived there before we moved to Part of town, and therefore I did not have to 
change school. This time we moved on our own, my mother, my two brothers 
and I. At Part of town dad had his own apartment, but had been with us quite 
often. Now he only helped us move. We should have stayed with him every 
weekend, but later on we only wanted to come every second weekend. 
This divorce has meant more than what is written here. I could write a whole 
book about it. It was the nice part of the story, that which my father wanted to 
appear outwards. But the backside was much more unpleasant. The nightly 
quarrels with mother, etc. 
Nowadays I have very little contact with him, which I don’t suffer that much 
from. The story maybe doesn’t fit so well with the title, but still… (Barbara 
6:1w) 
In this particular perspective, the object for understanding is the 
meaning of the word divorce, where a previously partly inadequate 
understanding of the word is transformed into what is experienced as 
a more adequate one. This is described to have been reached through a 
process in which a previous experience of the meaning of the word is 
described to have been transformed in a conversation with a slightly 
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older relative, where the subject had used the word in a particular 
sense and on the basis of the response to this usage experienced what 
appeared to be a more advanced meaning of the word. This led her to 
realise the inadequacy of her previously taken for granted 
understanding and to integrate new and previous understandings into 
a more correct conception.  
So if the first exemplification of this conception merely suggests that 
understanding is experienced as a transformation of what is meant 
with an expression, the second example suggests rather that 
understanding means that what was experienced as understanding 
was developed into a better understanding. It is also interesting to 
notice how the participant, by means of her account, differentiates 
between developing a more advanced understanding on the one hand 
and gaining fresh and first hand insight into what a divorce between 
mom and dad means through experiencing it on the other. However, it 
is also interesting to notice how she, as it was, puts them to into a 
contradictory relationship to one another and thereby indicates that a 
person may understand what is meant with an expression and yet not 
have any experience of the event or situation which the expression 
may refer to. 
This conception of what is meant with an expression as an object for 
understanding, presents understanding not so much as a transition 
from not understanding to understanding, as it does a transition 
between what appear as weaker and more advanced understandings 
respectively. This is a point that also can be illustrated with the fol-
lowing account: 
Where we lived when I was a child… some one had bought a Mercedes 190, a 
sports car and then I had heard that it somehow had 150 horse power… an 
incredible amount of horsepower’s at that time when cars usually had about 
20, 30, 40. And I remember that we children always used horsepower as a 
measure of cars. The more horsepower the faster it went. But I did not know 
what horsepower was, what aspect of the car that was measurable in 
horsepower… I had then at least understood that it was something generally 
positive… and so I stood there one day beside my father and spoke with him 
about the car… and then I said… I don’t remember exactly how, but I said 
something about like “That car over there has 150 horsepower, so it must be 
very thick sheet”… I thought thus that it somehow was a strength in a global 
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sense, some sort of muscle really, you see… And my father sad: “Well, it 
doesn’t have thicker sheet than a regular car” or he sad something like that. 
Yes, but then I thought… then I said: “Yes, but it does have 150 horsepower 
doesn’t it” and then he explained that it was the effect of its engine that was 
150 horsepower and that it was that which made it go very fast…, I recalled, 
that then I grasped that… previously I had somehow experienced that it was a 
bit strange… that big cars could have different engine power, while small cars 
could have the other way around… there was no relation between size and 
engine power… then I grasped that it was the engine and the engine power that 
was the aspect that one could measure in horsepower… while I earlier had a 
very global strength oriented… I think… sheet and generally sturdy. What I 
then understood was that a car could be very fragile and still have a high 
amount of horsepower. Somehow it was a decontextualisation. I grasped what 
aspect is reasonable to designate in horsepower. I moved from a very rough 
picture of something to a somewhat more precise picture… (Helmstad, 1984, 
episode 11) 
In this case, what becomes an object for understanding is also un-
derstood as the meaning of a given expression which is arrived at 
through a conversation with a more experienced other about a par-
ticular object that can be considered in terms of the particular ex-
pression. This involved using the expression in accordance with 
known possibilities, finding that the other uses it in what appears to be 
a better way and then searching for and developing language that has 
the power to integrate new and previous experience into what is 
experienced as a better understanding of what is meant with the 
particular expression. 
One difference between this account and the previous one is that the 
author also tries to explain how he conceives the nature of the process. 
Another difference is that while what was understood in the first case 
was the meaning of a word that refers to something that concerns the 
relations between human beings, in the second it was understanding 
of the meaning of a word that refers to something that concerns the 
relationship between the power that a given engine can deliver and a 
unit for measurement of the amount of that power.  
Notwithstanding these differences, the accounts imply that under-
standing means a development of one understanding into what is 
experienced as a better understanding of an expression. They also 
suggest that development of what is experienced as a better under-
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standing of the meaning of an expression typically takes place on the 
basis of new experience of what is meant with particular expressions 
as they are played out in constructive or creative conversation with 
others about the things that lend themselves to be discussed in terms 
of these expressions.  
In contradistinction to the first variation of the conception, under-
standing means in the second case, thus, not so much that the un-
derstander experiences that he or she understands, as it means that he 
or she experiences that he or she understands what is meant with an 
expression better than before.  
C. Systemic understanding 
In the remaining three conceptions of what becomes an object for 
understanding and how understanding is understood as a realisation 
of something through experience and interpretation, focus is on the 
discernment of component parts and relations between parts of a 
given phenomenon, which give an inherent structure or regularity in a 
given phenomenon. These three conceptions thus represent “systemic” 
rather than “factual” and “referential understanding”.  
C1. How something works 
In the first case of the present conception, the object for understanding 
is how something works in terms of its essential constitutive functional 
structure, and it is also implied that a shift of awareness takes place. 
The direction of this is from one’s own relation to the thing in 
question, to a consideration of the thing in terms of what appears as its 
own structure. This is a kind of understanding that is experienced to 
involve a discernment of the component parts and the functional 
relations between them in the phenomenon considered as a systemic 
whole. It is also said to mean a feeling that one is able to give a 
relatively coherent account of the phenomenon in question in terms of 
its essential parts and their functional relations as an aspect of a 
functional whole that presents the character of system. This conception 
can be exemplified with the following account by Donald: 
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When I understood… 
Where I work there is a “variator”, a continuously variable gearbox. It was a 
grey box with a shaft through both of its short sides. What it does is that when 
the shaft at one side, called the input shaft, rotates, the shaft at the other end, 
the output shaft, also rotates. What’s so good about it, however, is that the 
pace of the output shaft can be varied from still to full speed. This is done 
through a lever on one of the long sides. It worked well so there was no 
problem. What did give me a problem, though, was that I began to wonder 
what it looked like inside. 
First I asked the people who had bought it, but they seemed totally unin-
terested. Then I got all the brochures and instruction manuals. They didn’t help 
much either, funnily enough. What do you do then? 
My worrying about what the thing looked like inside overshadowed all my 
other everyday worries. I had to do something. When the boss went away on 
business I took my chance. 
I unscrewed the sides of the box and opened it up. It wasn’t so easy. I got a 
couple of litres of oil down my trousers when I tried to open the lid. But my 
persistence was rewarded. The lid came off and there was the construction for 
me to see. It was built up around a number of cogs, that is bearings which can 
only rotate in one direction, and this together with the centre discrepancy 
between the attachment of the lever point formed the transmission. Everything 
controlled by the lever on the long side. (Donald 7:1w) 
In this particular case, understanding is arrived at through experi-
encing a frustration about a particular device in terms of its structure 
as a functional whole of essential parts and the functional relations 
between them, trying to figure this out, and finally gaining new ex-
perience that contributes to discerning and explaining this structure. 
This means a development of gradually more insightful discernment 
of an interrelation of essential parts and functional relations within a 
device considered as a system of working parts.  
To have achieved understanding of a definite system means, in other 
words, that one has tried to and succeeded in giving a coherent 
principal explanation of how the system or function under con-
sideration essentially works. This can be compared with the following 
account by a twelve year old boy in grade six: 
When I understood how a jet engine functioned. I had for a long time 
wondered over how a jet-engine functioned. At one occasion when I watched 
the TV they showed jet-engines and jet-aircraft, [and] a factory where they 
make jet-engines. A jet-engine consists of turbine which consists of a lot of 
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connected wings. And then I understood what a jet-engine was. (Helmstad, 
1985, p. 6) 
In the beginning of the narrative, the teller gives the impression that he 
is going to tell a story about when he understood how a jet-engine 
worked, and he informs us that he had been wondering about this for 
some time. One day when he was watching a TV-program from a jet-
engine factory, from watching and listening to this program, he 
gathered that “a jet-engine consists of a turbine made up of a lot of 
connected wings”.  
As the previously discussed account suggests, this type of under-
standing should not be reduced to getting to know more about how a 
particular thing works, because it also implies integration of what one 
gets to know into what is experienced as the coherent structure. Such 
an understanding involves not only a belief in the ability to give a 
relatively satisfying explanation of how a thing works, it also involves 
the experience that one can actually explain it to the extent that 
someone else can also understand how it works. 
C2. An inherent regularity or structure 
In An inherent regularity or structure, the object for understanding 
presents itself either as an obvious regularity or pattern in a particular 
way of being or as what a particular being obviously is in terms of its 
inherent structure or inherent regularity or essence. This implies that 
the development or constitution of this particular object for 
understanding is reached through a course of events that involves 
development of some understanding of a particular thing, relating to 
the thing in question as a thing that presents a particular structure, an 
experience of particular limitations and an integration of new or 
previous understanding into what is experienced as a systemic 
understanding of that something in terms of its inherent structure. 
This can be exemplified with the following account: 
Now I’m going to tell you about my sport tennis and about when I learnt how 
to read the game. It was the summer of 1984. I, Mike and Perry practised at the 
gravel court down by the lake. As usual we warmed up outside the court. Then 
we played ball for ten minutes, before an exercise called “the tough one”. I 
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saw a good ball duel between Mike and Perry. I paid attention to how Mike 
held the racket in a particular way on his forehand. When I played against him 
later on, I saw that he held the racket in the same manner as previously, so I 
was prepared for the forehand stroke and ”whoops” I was right. He held the 
racket in a certain way when he hit forehand, and then I thought that he must 
hold the racket in a particular way when he hit backhand as well. Next ball I 
played against him I tried to move slightly to the left when he hit backhand, 
and then I understood that you have a different grip for different strokes. I tried 
this manner of moving on forehand in certain directions in the volley too, and 
it worked. When I grew older and met better opposition, I noticed that this did 
not always succeed. Some players mask their strokes very well. But for the 
most part I went in the right direction. This “discovery” to read the game has 
meant an important part in my playing of tennis. (C 1w) 
In this particular case, understanding has been interpreted as a course 
of events that essentially consists in the discernment of what appears 
as a recurring structure of the way that tennis player’s usually hit their 
shots. This is an object for understanding that has been constituted 
through engaged participation in the practice. It is participation that is 
said to have involved an implicit desire to improve one’s performance, 
experiencing a particular regularity in the way that a particular 
practitioner carries out his actions in the practice, trying to figure out 
what this regularity comprises, formulation of a preliminary principle 
about what at least so far has appeared as the obvious regularity, 
application of the principle as a means to interpret the structure of a 
more advanced participation, experiencing limitations in the 
formulation of the principle, revision of the formulation of the 
principle, new application, etc. This can also be exemplified with the 
following account: 
It was three, four years ago or so, when the word apartheid began to be used 
more frequently, particularly in mass media, but I could not really figure out 
what was meant by it. The only thing I knew was that it took place in south 
Africa. But in time more and more emerged about it and I got to know it 
naturally.  
I understood all of a sudden what it was and it felt good. The word’s meaning 
changed in next to no time a part of my life view. Distinction between blacks 
and whites. But did it mean that I understood? Someone had explained the 
word, but I did not understand apartheid just because of this. Many let it stop 
with understanding the word only, and so did I until a year ago. Then I got 
hold of a book by James A Michener that was called “The lake of freedom” 
and dealt with the history of South Africa in the shape of a novel. I read it and 
pondered quite a lot about it, and as time went by it occurred to me what 
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apartheid really was. It was not just distinction between blacks and whites but 
a religion, Calvinism in such an extreme form that it oppressed other races and 
the blacks in particular. I realised that it is not so simple this problem. One 
thinks that the Afrikaans ought to be able to accept the demands that the 
surrounding world has posed. But it is not so easy, they have as we know a 
several hundred years tradition built-up through religion as a hot bed and a 
law. 
Even though I now say that I understand, this must not be misinterpreted to 
that I accept because I do not. 
But when I understood this, when it dawned upon me, it felt terribly good. I 
knew about the ground for the problem and could assert my opinion and show 
my knowledge in discussions and it led to a certain advantage. To understand 
brings a certain advantage with it, and has meant that my view of the 
surrounding world changed to a certain extent. 
But to refer back to the heading, it all happened rather slowly, the most of it 
perhaps unconsciously. And when I sat and watched The News one night there 
was a report about apartheid I understood more fully what it was, meant and 
implied. I could with the help of what I had read, connect my knowledge to the 
pictures and understand. And I felt that the connection was important and it 
felt good. 
Finally I will allow myself to “analyse” when I understood. There were three 
decisive occasions, three different senses of what I understood, but yet they 
gave me the same. And the, at least similar, “aha-experiences” taken together 
meant that I changed as person. (Camilla 2:1w) 
This account can be interpreted as an expression of more than one type 
and conception of understanding as a realisation of something. As it is 
interpreted here, the account is taken as one that suggests that what 
becomes the object for understanding presents itself as the general 
meaning or structure of a particular practice. This is described as 
understanding that was not reached through a sudden flash of insight, 
but rather through having an experience of what it essentially is or at 
least how it could be seen. This implies a distinction between what a 
word means on the one hand and what a general word and its main 
meaning refer to, or at least could be said to refer to from a certain 
perspective.  
The object for understanding is experienced as the obvious general 
structure or meaning of the phenomenon under consideration. It is 
described to have been arrived at through a process that involved a 
pre understanding of the phenomenon in question, an encounter with 
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it, expansive new experience of what it is and interpretation of it in a 
certain sense that is believed to represent a certain general structure. 
C3. What something is  
In What something is, what becomes the object for understanding is a 
relatively sufficient and coherent understanding and explanation 
either of a particular object in terms of its meaning or function as an 
integrated part of a determinative system of functionally interrelated 
objects on the one hand, or of a particular phenomenon or practice in 
terms of its existence and character on the other. In the first variation 
of the conception, the object for understanding appears as the meaning 
or function that a particular object has come to have as a part of the 
determinative system. This can be related as a result of an experience 
one didn’t understand the function of, but which one sought for, 
found and worked out as a part of the whole that it was found to be a 
part of.  
In the second variation, the object for understanding appears as the 
obvious general structure of the particular being or practice, its re-
lation to other phenomena within a particular societal and historical 
situation and the context that sustains, explains and determines its 
existence. This is a conception, that suggests that the object for un-
derstanding is a comprehensive and exclusive awareness of one’s 
experiential encounters in the play of questions and answers that make 
up one’s meaningful relationship to the understood object. 
In the first variation of the conception, it seems thus that the object for 
understanding presents itself as an understanding of a particular 
object as an integrated part of a more encompassing functional whole 
that is experienced to determine its function. In the second case, the 
object for understanding is believed to be constituted through an 
experiential course of events that includes pre understanding of the 
phenomenon in question and new encounters with it in a theoretical as 
opposed to a practical context. This presents the object of 
understanding in terms of having an experience and a formation of an 
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explanation of it in terms of its structure and its relatedness to an even 
larger structure, such as a societal and historical situation and context. 
The first sense of the conception can be illustrated with the following 
example: 
When I understood 
It was a couple of years ago. I had worked the night shift. In the morning the 
children went to school, and I went to bed. I was so tired that I did not hear the 
phone, it had rung many times. About two a clock in the afternoon I woke up, 
and heard the telephone. It was my nephew that called, and he told me that my 
boy was at the hospital, he had damaged his leg. The ambulance came and 
picked him up, and they placed his leg in a plastic bag. 
I did not know what to do then, probably I just sat and starred up in the ceiling, 
before the thought came that I could call the hospital.  
I was then given to hear that it was not so bad. But the plastic bag continued to 
haunt me, so I took the car and went to the hospital. 
There I could see my son lying in the bed. I took and lifted up the quilt and 
touched his legs, both of them were where they should be. What a feeling I 
turned absolutely feeble, had to sit down. 
That plastic bag you know was a pillow that the ambulance man had placed 
under his leg so it wouldn’t shake or move about.  
It is not easy to know everything, when one is ten years old. But my nephew 
really scared me. (D 22w) 
This account has been interpreted as a conception of understanding as 
a realisation of what something is. As an account of this kind, it 
suggests more precisely that understanding means that the under-
stander realises what function a given object had filled as a part of a 
whole in a given context. Unfortunately the account does not describe 
the way whereby the understanding of the given object as a part of a 
whole is believed to have been achieved. But it has been assumed here 
that it means that understanding was achieved in a process that 
involved finding a proper context for the information available; i.e. a 
perception of the situation that could be used to fuse given pieces of 
factual information into a systematic and intelligible whole.  
The second variation of the discussed conception, can be exemplified 
with the following account: 
The short story of understanding I intend to write down for you can be split 
into two parts; it is partly the actual “experience” and partly when I understood 
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what I had experienced. There was a considerable time lag between these and 
it is not at all certain that I really do understand as I am not an expert on the 
social question concerned. My story is in fragments because of the time 
discrepancy so you will have to phone to fill in any questions you have. 
At 17 I got the chance to fulfil a dream, to see the world, or at least parts of it. 
For a working class lad there was only one possibility, to go to sea. I had luck 
and got the first boat to Central and northern South America. The trip took 
three months. We left Gothenburg and drew into our South American port 14 
days later. All through the crossing I was introduced to what would happen by 
stories from different members of the crew, and pretty vulgar they were too. 
Once in port a number of “old hands” and innocent old me went ashore, took a 
taxi and went up into the hills outside the town somewhere in Columbia. After 
about an hour in the taxi we came to a deserted spot, a plateau with just one 
big house, a house with no walls. It was just a huge bar with its assembly of 
whores. The whole establishment was one huge whorehouse. We sat round a 
table, ordered a beer each and straight away there was a woman in each of our 
laps. 
With my background the experience was quite a shock, but I became used to 
such things after a while without wondering too much about them. Perhaps the 
experience also changed my view of women as until then I had only met “nice 
girls”. 
Ten or twelve years later I found out more about the continent’s problems 
through books and TV programmes and got answers to a number of questions I 
had never thought about before. For example, how girls from the inland areas 
go to the coast to prostitute themselves and earn money to live, to support 
families and to provide themselves with a dowry. Then they go home, get 
married, and have daughters who in their turn go to the coast and become 
prostitutes, and so on and so on. (Douglas 3:1w) 
Understanding means here, that the person experiences insight into 
the relations that explain the character, the existence and the factors 
that sustain the existence of a given phenomenon in a certain historical 
and societal context. It means also that he experiences that he becomes 
aware of things he had not been able to see before. The phenomenon 
in question presents itself as a part of a larger whole. The 
understander experiences also that he gets answers to questions that 
he had never asked before and that he as a result thereof became able 
to explain – at least in one sense and to some extent – things in relation 
to the understood that he had not been able to explain before. As 
examples of such things, the account mentions, why it is the case that 
the phenomenon in question appears as it does in this particular 
setting. 
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The object for understanding is implied to have been arrived at by the 
understander, on the basis of what he already knew about the thing in 
question and on what was revealed to him about it as he learned more 
about the place and the circumstances where it exists, worked out a 
coherent description of a set of generating and sustaining 
circumstances that gives a principle explanation of a kind of existence. 
This is also implied as attained in terms of what the understood 
obviously essentially is as well as what causes and sustains it.  
It is interesting to notice that the account suggests that although the 
understander experiences that he has gained insight into the relations 
that explain the existence of the phenomenon in question, the account 
also suggests that he is aware that he is “not an expert” on the 
phenomenon under consideration. Being experienced in what it means 
to understand in this sense, however, the understander is also aware 
of that human understanding is limited, that there is more to “being” 
than what is present to him as a historical subject. Consequently, he is 
open for the possibility of new experience and for the possibility of 
developing even more advanced understandings of the phenomenon 
under consideration than the one he has developed so far.  
QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
In the following, a consideration of how many accounts were given 
altogether, how many were given by each group of participants, and 
what was the average number accounts given per participant, will be 
made. There will also be a consideration of how many times each 
conception has been expressed, which conceptions were the most and 
least frequently expressed in the material as a whole and which was 
most or least frequently expressed by each group. Finally, there will 
also be a consideration of what extracts have been taken to express 
what conceptions and how the extracts are distributed over categories 
of descriptions of these assumed conceptions.  
There was, as mentioned previously, altogether 101 participants in the 
study. Of these 67 participated in terms of providing one or more 
written accounts of what they considered as an instance of 
 Forms of consciousnes of understanding as a phenomenon 162 
understanding whilst the remaining 34 also participated in a following 
interview. The 101 participants contributed with altogether 173 
accounts, 132 of these were written accounts and the remaining 41 
were composed in the following interview.  
About one seventh (24) of the accounts could not be categorised. The 
reason for this was either that they did not refer to recognisable 
descriptions of instances of either learning or understanding or that 
they were so obscure that it were not possible to figure out what 
meaning of understanding they expressed. The following account may 
serve as an example:  
When I understood how one played ice hockey 
I was 11 years old when I began and now I am twelve. When I got there it was 
rather difficult, but then it went better and better. When I got there the second 
time [it went] very well, at least I thought so. I had of course skated on a lake 
back home where I live. The week after we were to play at a place called 
Grästorp. It is obvious that it was a little nervous in the dressing room. When 
the game began. All on the ice skated so fast. I only had the puck twice and I 
didn’t score. Luckily we won the game with 3–2. On the way home we all 
sang on the bus. That year we won the league and were promoted. We are in 
the third place. (A 17w)  
As follows from the heading, the author, a boy, signals that he is going 
to give an account of when he learnt how to play ice-hockey. On the 
basis of this one could perhaps have expected that he would at least 
tell us something about what he understood in relation hereto, but he 
doesn’t, at least not explicitly. It could be the case, that he meant that 
he learnt how to play ice-hockey through practice or participation in 
training, and that the ice-hockey game led him to experience that he 
understood the existential meaning of playing ice-hockey, but the data 
does not hold for either of these interpretations.  
Accounts from 89 participants have been categorised. The result of this 
categorisation is presented in Table 2. Some accounts have been found 
to express more than one conception. Consequently, they have been 
categorised into more than one category, which also explains why the 
numbers in the table sometimes don’t match the number of accounts 
categorised.  
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Table 2. Distribution of accounts over categories 
 
Categories: n 
Understanding as:  
I. a reception of knowledge  16 
II. an acquisition of desired knowledge  14 
III. a realisation of  
a. factual understanding of  
1. that something is the case 60 
2. what really is the case 16 
b. referential understanding of  
1. the existential meaning 7 
2. how something appears 14 
3. what an expression means 12 
c. systemic understanding of  
1. how something works 3 
2. inherent regularity or structure 6 
3. what something is 4 
∑ 152 
The numbers in this table may among other things show that about 
three fifths of the episodes are considered to deal with understanding 
as it was defined above. Furthermore, over one third of the episodes 
represent the same conception of understanding, namely, that called 
Understanding as a realisation of that something is the case. The 
distribution of the episodes across the different categories within each 
of the four groups of participants (twelve, fifteen and eighteen year old 
school pupils and adult students) is presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Distribution of episodes across categories within groups of participants 
 
 Groups  
Categories: 12 15 18 ad ∑ 
Understanding as      
I. a reception of knowledge 14 - - 2 16 
II. an acquisition of desired knowledge 3 6 2 3 14 
III. realisation of      
a. factual understanding of      
1. that something is the case 21 10 12 17 60 
2. what really is the case 9 1 3 3 16 
b. referential understanding of      
1. the existential meaning - 1 2 4 7 
2. how something appear - 1 4 9 14 
3. what an expression means 2 2 2 6 12 
c. systemic understanding of      
1. how something works - - 1 2 3 
2. inherent regularity - - 6 - 6 
3. what something is - - 1 3 4 
∑ 49 21 33 49 152 
A reading of Table 3 can suggest that there is some covariance be-
tween frequencies of applicable categories and groups of participants. 
In order to make this relationship clearer, the different categories of 
conceptions has been collapsed into the three types of understanding 
as a realisation.  
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Table 4. Distribution of episodes across types in % within groups of participants 
 
 Groups 
Categories: 12 15 18 ad 
Understanding as     
I. a reception of knowledge 29 - - 4 
II. an acquisition of desired knowledge 6 29 6 6 
III. a realisation of     
a. factual 61 52 45 41 
b. referential 4 19 24 39 
c. systemic understanding - - 24 10 
These percentages lend support to the previously advanced obser-
vation that it seems as if the idea of understanding becomes devel-
opmentally differentiated from the idea of learning. This is supported 
because more than 1/3 of the accounts by the twelve year old are void 
of this differentiation. The most frequent type of understanding as a 
realisation is that labelled Factual understanding. This holds for all the 
groups, but the percentages suggest that it tends to become less and 
less dominant the older and more formally educated and experienced 
the participants are.  
The percentages also suggest that Referential understanding tends to 
become more frequently expressed the older/the more educated/the 
more experienced the participants are. It is also interesting to notice 
that the last category, Systemic understanding, is only expressed by 
participants from the last two groups, namely the eighteen year old 
high school students and the adults. Furthermore, it is relatively more 
commonly expressed by the members of the first of these two groups, 
which also is the group with the most advanced formal education.  
SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF TURN ONE 
The study has concerned studying persons’ understandings of un-
derstanding as a personal experiential prerequisite for engagement in 
learning activity that aim at the development of better understanding. 
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It resulted first and foremost in an account of three different 
understandings of understanding. In an attempt to in a few words 
catch the essence of these forms of consciousness of understanding as 
a phenomenon they were called: Understanding as: I. a reception, II. an 
acquisition, and III. a realisation.  
With respect to the assumed third form of understanding, the study 
also resulted in a discernment of three different types of understand-
ing with respect to what can be said to have become the object for 
understanding as realisation. These have been accounted for in terms 
of: a) factual, b) relational, and c) systemic understanding. 
The results of the study indicates also that understanding under-
standing as a realisation means that the following can become object 
for understanding: A: 1) that something is the case; and; 2) what really 
is the case; or: B: 1) the existential meaning; 2) how something appears; 
and; 3) what an expression means; or: C: 1) how something works; 
2) inherent regularity or structure; and: 3) why something is.  
With respect, to the numerical results, the analysis of the distribution 
of narratives over categories resulted among other things in a notation 
that the reception respectively the acquisition forms of understanding 
appear to be represented by about one sixth each and that the 
realisation form appears to be represented by about four sixths of the 
participants’ accounts. It also resulted however, in a notation that the 
realisation form appears to become more frequently expressed by older, 
more educated and experienced participants and that the relative 
proportion of participants’ accounts that appeared to represent the 
acquisition form varied. Finally, the numerical analysis resulted in a 
notation that the relative proportion of participants’ accounts with 
respect to representation of the three different types of realisation varied 
in terms of the following percentage patterns over the four groups: 
A. 38, 21, and 0%, B. 26, 21, and 5%, C. 53, 34, and 27%, D. 59, 35, and 
11%.  
  
Chapter 8 
 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS OF UNDERSTANDING 
Only within a system can the concept acquire 
conscious awareness and a voluntary nature. 
Conscious awareness and the presence of a 
system are synonymous when we are speaking of 
concepts, just as spontaneity, lack of conscious 
awareness, and the absence of a system are 
three different words for designating the nature 
of the child’s concept. (Vygotskij, 1934/1987, p. 
191 f.) 
In the previously presented results, the participants accounts of ex-
periences of understanding were said to represent three different 
kinds of understandings of understanding as a phenomenon. In this 
chapter the significance of these different forms of consciousness will 
be explored further. This will be done by means of a more close up 
analysis of the cumulated contribution of four of the participants, 
whose contributions have been found especially significant as 
examples of what it may mean to understand understanding in each of 
the discussed senses.  
The four participants are: Abraham, Bo, Constance, and Douglas. 
Abraham, a pupil in grade six, represents participants whose contri-
butions have mainly appeared to express understanding as a reception 
of knowledge. Bo, a pupil in grade eight, represents participants 
whose contributions have mainly appeared to express understanding 
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as an achievement of desired knowledge. Constance, a student in the 
second year of the Social Science programme at the gymnasium and 
Douglas, finally, the only participant that had some experience of 
studies at the university, represent participants whose contributions 
mainly have appeared to express understanding as a realisation of 
something.  
The significance of the different forms of consciousness of under-
standing as represented by these participants’ contribution will be 
considered in the mentioned order. 
RECEPTION UNDERSTANDING 
The interview with Abraham, was, like the interview with the other 
interviewees, conducted according to the interview plan. This con-
sisted of: 1) a follow up on the written accounts; 2) a probe for further 
accounts of occasions when the participants experienced that they 
understood; 3) a probe for examples out of their repertoire of sentences 
that involve the verb “to understand”; 4) a consideration of similarities 
and differences between the accounts and sentences with respect to 
what and how aspects of understanding; and 5) an invitation to 
explain what is meant with understanding as a phenomenon.  
Abraham’s written contribution to the investigation is as follows: 
When I understood… 
That 1–1 was 0 was when I was six years because my mother said so. 
That my father was ”Santa” was when I was five years because I recognised 
his beard. 
That snow was not salt because I tasted the snow and the snow tasted better. 
How easy it was to whistle was when I inhaled and made my mouth look as 
though I was about to kiss somebody. 
That bicycling was easy when I got my first three-wheeler then I was three 
years because then I wanted to buy a big bicycle. 
That I learnt how to count was when I knew how much 3 times 1 was.  
That my spider was gone when I came from school. Then my mother said what 
have you done with the spider. Then I said “what spider”. “Your spider”. “O 
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that”. I asked my mother if it had disappeared. Then she said don’t play 
innocent I know that you have taken it to school. Then I understood that my 
brother had taken it. (Abraham 5:1–7w) 
The interview with Abraham began with a follow up on the written 
accounts. The follow up began with the first “example”. It continued 
with the second and the third. From there it jumped to the seventh and 
last example.  
After this follow up, there was a probe for additional examples, but – 
as indicated in the extract from the interview protocol below – this 
didn’t yield any more accounts from Abraham: 
 I Yes, exactly… well… have you, have you experienced any such event 
since you wrote this one about when you understood something… 
A I don’t think so… 
 I … that you can recall… 
A I don’t know, I don’t think so, not that I can remember at least, not for 
the time being… 
 I No… is there any other thing beside those that you already have told me 
about… where you think that you really understood something… 
A No, I don’t think so… at least not one that I can recall 
The probe for further accounts of instances of understanding was 
followed by a grasp after examples of sentences from Abraham’s 
repertoire that involve the verb “to understand” (förstå), but this 
didn’t yield much either. The same holds for the attempt to involve 
him in a discussion of similarities and differences between accounts 
and examples of meanings of the verb with respect to what and how 
aspects that followed after the grasp after significant sentences. The 
invitation to explain what is meant with understanding as a phe-
nomenon, which concluded the interview, didn’t yield much more 
either.  
It may be the case that the observed difficulty to learn more about how 
Abraham tended to understand, explain and further relate to 
understanding as a phenomenon when called upon to do so in the 
subsequent interview, had more to do with my failure to establish 
good working relations with him than with his lack of consciousness 
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of understanding as a phenomenon. However, additional reading of 
Abraham’s written contributions to the investigation in the light of 
what has been said about what has appeared to be characteristic of 
reception understanding has been found to give more support to this 
explanation. This is also a fruitful interpretation. Because if the meagre 
results of the interview with Abraham in the discussed respect actually 
is a result of a relative lack of consciousness of understanding as 
phenomenon, this further supports the idea that a relative lack of 
awareness of understanding as a phenomenon is a defining 
characteristic reception understanding of understanding as a 
phenomenon.  
In the part of the interview protocol from the interview with Abraham 
that represents the attempt to follow up on the written accounts, it 
seems, moreover, also as if reception understanding of understanding 
as a phenomenon could quite easily be transformed into acquisition 
understanding. However, as long as reception understanding 
dominates over acquisition understanding, the discourse seems to 
often stop short. The reception understander’s assertion is that to have 
understood means to have come to know what is.  
The following extract from the part of the interview protocol from the 
interview with Abraham that represents the attempt to follow up on 
his last written account can illustrate this point: 
 I Okay… we could perhaps talk (there is a sound as from the siren of an 
ambulance in the background) here comes the ambulance… We could 
perhaps talk about that occasion when you discovered that your spider 
was gone? You said that you were on your way home from school. And 
when you came home you met your mother… and then she said: What 
have you done with your spider? Can you tell me a little more about 
what you thought then? 
A I thought it had got out of the cage or something, so I went up and 
checked, and then there was nothing there in then… so it was my brother 
that had taken it. He had returned it to who we got it from… 
 I You had got it from someone? 
A Yes, we had got it from someone that he knew. 
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 I A pal, but… if you try to… your mother said, thus, like this to you: What 
have you done with your spider… and then you wrote like this: I said: 
What spider? Your spider, she said … and then you asked your mother: 
Has it disappeared… 
A Then she said: Don’t play innocent now. You have taken it with you to 
school…  
 I She thought that you had taken it? 
A She did not know about it either… 
 I And what did you do then? 
A I went up and looked in the room. It was not there. 
 I And then you thought that it had escaped… out of the cage… had it done 
that before? 
A No… 
 I And then when you came up you saw, you understood that it had not 
escaped then. 
A Yes, later on when my brother said it.  
 I So it was when your brother came home that… 
A Yes. 
 I Did you ask him then? 
A Yes. 
 I Was that the first thing that you asked him then? 
A Yes. Where have you, if he had taken it somewhere… 
 I And then he said? 
A I have returned it to my friend, because he thought it was boring… 
 I Indeed… so he told you that then? 
A Hmm. 
 I Well… so before your brother came home you thought that it was he 
who had taken it… 
A Yes. 
 I So you had already… 
A No, first I thought that it had disappeared. And then I thought: Think if 
he has returned it. And then I asked him. 
 I So you had already understood it before he came home? 
A No, I thought that just before I started to ask… 
 I You thought that then? 
A Yes. 
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 I And then when he came home, then you no longer believed that because 
then you knew when you… 
A … mmm… 
 I ... once had asked him. 
A Yes. 
Consciousness of understanding as a phenomenon that is dominated 
by reception understanding can, thus, involve the possibility to assert 
that what one has understood must mean that one has achieved 
definite knowledge of something that is the case, without for that sake 
including the possibility to assert that one has had a significant share 
in the achievement of this knowledge. The knowledge has simply been 
given and received. Notwithstanding that everything indicates that the 
understander has a fair share in the understanding that is achieved, it 
appears, thus, that one is not conscious of this in reception 
understanding. 
ACQUISITION UNDERSTANDING 
Bo’s written contribution to the investigation is: 
When I understood equations 
I sat in the maths room and Steve tried to explain how to do equations. What 
he said sounded as letters and numbers completely mixed up. We got a maths 
homework in equations, but since I didn’t understand anything, I could not do 
any. When I came home I sat down and looked through the homework. It 
looked completely incomprehensible. I asked my brother, but he could not 
explain that well. Then I remembered that my cousin was coming for a visit on 
Saturday and he is very good at explaining. He came on Saturday and we sat 
down. We sat for two hours and eventually I understood. After that we sat 
down to eat because we were very hungry. (Bo 9:1w) 
This account has earlier been categorised as a clear example of un-
derstanding as an achievement of desired knowledge through suc-
cessful completion of deliberate learning activity. In this case there 
were several attempts made to achieve the desired knowledge, but it 
was first in the obviously successful co-operation with the cousin that 
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the desired knowledge was achieved, namely the ability to do the 
equations Bo had been given to do as homework.  
The interview with Bo began with an attempt to follow up on the 
written account. The follow up was followed by a probe for additional 
experiences of understanding and accounts of experiences of 
understanding: 
 I Can’t you try to recall an additional situation in which you have un-
derstood? 
B … no it was very difficult this to recall something… well, in itself, when 
I practice karate.... so then I had been in Spain for a week… and when I 
came back… I didn’t get anything of what he was up to then… there was 
lots of different movements then. Then he demonstrated them and it took 
several weeks before I understood them really well, so that I could 
perform them properly…  
 I You said that you were in Spain a couple of weeks and that you didn’t 
understand a thing of what he did… what was it that you so to say, was it 
your instructor, trainer… 
B Yes, it was my instructor that demonstrated then… 
 I He demonstrated a couple of things then… 
B And then the group that had been doing that those weeks that I had been 
gone, so I knew nothing about it, so I didn’t understand anything… 
 I But the others could do what he demonstrated? 
B Yes... 
 I You could, thus, not do that… and then you did not understand how one 
should do… well… but then, the you worked on that for a couple of 
weeks… 
B So at last it went at least fairly well… 
 I Then you could do it? 
B Yes. 
 I So… what was the problem, why did you not understand when you came 
home? What was it that made you not understand? What difference was 
there between you and the others? 
B It looked strange and they had the chance to practice… 
The presentation of the account above was followed by a probe for 
experienced similarities and differences between the two accounts. 
This gave following data: 
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 I OK, do you think that there is… if we now are to take the two examples 
that you have brought forward… are there any differences… was it the 
same thing or was there any difference… in this example with maths, 
with equations and the other example, if one was to compare them… 
B Yes, there is quite a lot of a difference… maths it was, you see, to think 
with your head and this was, you see, both, both and, it was thus both to 
think with your head and to do it bodily with… 
 I Do the movement too… 
B Yes… 
 I But the maths it was more to think with your head… 
B Yes… 
 I But this was more a motor skill, it was about learning to move oneself, to 
do this and that… that is purely bodily then… but it was also about, as 
you said… 
B Yes, you had to think too... 
 I You needed also to think about how you should do it, but maths it was 
thus only with the head… so there was a difference then… In every day 
language one still says that one can, can you [do] equations? Yes, I can 
solve equations, I can figure them out. In the same manner one can also 
say can you do judo?… Well, I cannot do everything but I can do quite a 
few throws… or something like that… but notwithstanding there is still a 
difference between these… the one is… 
B Mainly bodily and the other is… 
 I There one must think how one should do… well… that is the difference 
between these examples, as you see it… in maths it is about to grasping 
how one shall do… 
Bo thinks to start with that the two examples were quite different, but 
as the conversation proceeded he became more an more open to the 
obvious similarities between the two with respect to the meaning for 
understanding expressed by them. The attempt to discuss experienced 
differences and similarities between the two examples was followed 
by an attempt at a conversation about what is meant with 
understanding. This began as follows: 
 I Well… if we say that you had a pal that didn’t knew Swedish so well 
then your pal asked you this: What is it to understand? What would you 
say then… 
B So that one can perform the thing so that one grasps a thing… 
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 I So that one can perform a thing, so that one grasps a thing… what do 
you mean with a thing; your friend says then… 
B ... 
 I A movement is that what you mean? 
B Yes, exactly just anything if one takes Swedish then if one says ad-
jectives or things like that, so that one then understands… the different… 
well… things there… 
 I In Swedish then? 
B Yes, lots of tenses and things like that there… 
 I Mmm… so that is to understand then? But that is not really the same as 
to do then, as for instance to do a throw in judo then… so one can thus 
learn to do… 
B Yes, but one can say that to understand that is like that you know the 
thing so well that you can teach it or something like that… so that you 
become proficient in it… 
 I So to understand something, that is then… if you have understood 
something then you can also teach, according to you… 
B Yes… 
It also seems here as if Bo proximally and for the most part sticks to 
acquisition understanding of understanding as an achievement of 
desired knowledge through successful completion of a deliberate 
learning activity. The knowledge is something that is brought about 
through one’s own activity. That is, one becomes an agent of 
knowledge. This means that if the if the implicit criteria for under-
standing in the previous understanding of understanding was cer-
tainty, one can say that “now” it is knowing or proficiency. However, 
further, with the discovery of oneself as an agent in understanding, it 
also seems likely that one thereby not only becomes able to relate to 
oneself and others as producers and as users of knowledge but that 
one can probably also learn to assess and grade one’s own and others 
performances. This is something that is also believed to be an 
important ingredient in understanding of understanding as a 
realisation of something.  
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REALISATION UNDERSTANDING 
The significance of Realising understanding will explored further by a 
consideration of two different participants contributions to the study. 
The first of these two participants is Constance. The other is Douglas. 
Each of them has been chosen to represent participants who 
throughout their contribution appears to have understood un-
derstanding in the discussed sense.  
If one compares these two participants’ contributions with one another 
with respect to what types and conceptions they have been found to 
express, one can, however, find that these differ from each other in 
several respects. One of the more conspicuous differences is that 
whereas Constance’s contributions involve manifestations of factual 
understanding Douglas’ doesn’t, and whereas Douglas’ contributions 
involves a manifestation of systemic understanding Constance’s 
contributions don’t.  
The two contributions differ, thus, with respect to the pattern of types 
and conceptions of understanding that they show up. Assuming that 
the noticed difference indicate that the understanding of 
understanding that Constance has developed is less advanced than the 
understanding that Douglas has developed, the previous’ contribution 
can be considered as a manifestation of early and the later’s can be 
considered as a manifestation of a later form of advanced realising 
understanding.  
EARLY REALISATION UNDERSTANDING 
Exploring the significance of less as compared to more advanced 
consciousness of understanding as a realisation of something can 
begin by calling attention to Constance’s first written account: 
It all began when I was four years old. I had had a cold over a longer period of 
time and had as a result got ear ache. Mom grew worried and took me to the 
hospital, to let me be examined. I was a little worried to begin with, but since 
the doctor was kind and nice I calmed down. 
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The physician looked at me and examined my ears with a lamp. Then he 
prescribed penicillin and after that mom and I were allowed to leave, happy 
over that the visit was over. 
The days came and went and I ate my penicillin, and I recovered. After a 
month or so we had to go back to the physician for a new visit. The doctor 
examined me and said then that I was completely healthy and that I could 
leave. 
Some years later, four more exactly, the whole class was to visit the nurse to 
examine their hearing.  
When I was informed about this I became absolutely horrified. I cried several 
weeks prior to the visit to the nurse and said that I did not want to go there. 
Mom and dad were very worried, but they could not figure out why I was so 
frightened to visit the nurse. 
No matter what, I had to go there anyway, and then there was nothing more to 
it, mom thought. But my fear to visit the nurse and have my hearing examined 
was not over. 
In subsequent years my class had to go on another hearing examination, and 
the same scene took place this time as well. I cried and screamed and tried 
with all thinkable means not to have to go. But naturally I was not allowed 
miss that examination either. And it continued like this for quite a while. Mom 
and dad could not understand what was wrong with me. But then one day, I 
think I was about ten or so, when I sat in my room and read, all of a sudden the 
door opened and an angry mother looked in: 
“Constance! You never hear what I say. I have called after you for fifteen 
minutes now, why do you not answer me?”. “Mother, I did not hear that you 
called on me. I have impaired hearing you know”, I said. Then mom 
understood why I had been so worried over all hearing controls. I had believed 
that I had poor hearing. Mom was absolutely in despair and asked me to sit 
down by her side. The she started to explain: 
“Constance, you know, all the times I have said that you don’t hear what I say, 
I don’t mean that your hearing is impaired. The penicillin you got when you 
were four years old had nothing with what the ears do. Your hearing is 
perfectly OK. Do you understand?” 
Then I understood that I did not have impaired hearing, and that there was no 
reason for me to worry over visiting the physician, and that the call back I had 
done to the physician’s had nothing to do with my hearing, but was about my 
cold.  
I felt tremendously relieved over getting rid of my fear and after a while I 
could even laugh over the whole thing. When I was eleven my class was about 
to make another visit to the nurse’s to have their hearing examined. But this 
time, I didn’t scream or cry. I had understood that I did not have impaired 
hearing and did not have to worry. (Constance 30:1w) 
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This account represents, like quite a few others, more than one type 
and conception of understanding as a realisation of something. As it 
has been interpreted here, it represents though first of all factual 
understanding of what really is the case.  
The subsequent interview with Constance began with a follow up on 
the course of events that was related in the written account. In the 
reading of this the passage of the interview transcript, it has been 
noted that she thereby among other things meant that the object of 
fear, which initially was fear of the prospect of being “taken in” at the 
hospital, transformed as she grew more experienced. It has also 
emerged that she has thereby retold the story as experience of 
referential understanding of how something appears for someone else.  
After the follow up, there was a probe for recollection of additional 
experiences of understanding. Constance could then not recall and 
recount any more experiences of understanding, but instead of this she 
began to develop an interesting reflection over what it is like when 
understanding takes place. In connection hereto, she said among other 
things the following: 
C Yes, but it is only like when Dad explains a maths task for me and we sit 
there and calculate and I don’t understand anything and he goes through 
it, but finally a light dawns on me then, and then I can sit there and solve 
just about the same kind of tasks over and over again and think that it is 
funny, but prior to that I perhaps, well… don’t want to calculate at all, 
just yell at dad… 
 I But then… what kind of difference is there between you then, when you 
are angry and irritated towards your Dad then and then afterwards, what 
difference is there… yes, what difference is it… 
C When I can’t do anything or don’t understand then I just sit there and let 
him explain. I’m like that, I don’t really listen to what he says… but 
then, it might not work directly but… if it perhaps is a complicated task I 
perhaps understand a little then, that thing there and this thing here and 
then I understand what he says then… yes, but then after that I, you 
know, think that it is fun to calculate… 
In this passage Constance describes a situation where she is doing 
some home work in mathematics, but finds difficulties with a par-
ticular task. She asks her father for help. He explains. She does not 
understand and this frustrates her. She cries out her frustration, but 
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her father continues to explain. All of a sudden what he says begins to 
make sense to her. She catches on and this leads to more under-
standing. New understanding motivates her to make a new effort. She 
solves the tasks she found difficulties with feels a joy over the 
achievement which spurs her to continue.  
The is a description of understanding as a process which indicates a 
certain consciousness of understanding as a relative and relational 
phenomena. This dawning consciousness is also visible in the fol-
lowing passage:  
C I feel that when I understand it, it’s as if it just comes, I can sit there and 
calculate the same kind of tasks and I don’t understand anything and 
then all of a sudden it just… it just opens as it were you know. Just 
comes at once like that… 
 I You are able to solve tasks… 
C Yes mechanically, in such a way that one does not think about what one 
does and then all of a sudden “Oh I see… that is why I do this and that”, 
like that… 
 I Oh I see, so you mean… there is a difference between calculating 
something mechanically and understanding?  
C Mmm. 
 I Is there a difference between that? 
C Yes, I think there is…  
 I What is it then? 
C Well, if you calculate mechanically you don’t need to understand the 
tasks because then it is perhaps only a formulae that one writes down 
then… that and that and that… 
 I One just learns to do it.  
C Yes, exactly. You don’t need to understand in order to master a formula. 
 I No, no, but one can also understand a formula? 
C Yes. 
 I You can solve a task through using a formula… by merely calculating 
mechanically and one can also learn to understand it then? 
C Yes. 
 I I see… ah… to calculate mechanically and… yes what is then the dif-
ference between two persons: A and person B. They have the same task 
to solve. Person A does it mechanically. Person B understands it. What is 
the difference between them? 
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C In the first place if one calculates mechanically then… it runs by itself, 
but if one is to develop the task then it is more difficult for that person to 
understand it isn’t it… 
 I What do you mean “develop the task”? 
C Well, it becomes perhaps. Let’s say we have a formula. And the first 
task, then it is like the formula, but then there can be texts that you are to 
put… add something to the formula, that there is no example about how 
you should do it then, but you have to think then too. If he does not 
understand the very formula. Why you do it. Then he can not easily 
continue with something more difficult… 
In addition to a certain consciousness of the relativity of under-
standing, this passage also indicates a certain consciousness of the 
dialectical aspect of understanding. In the previously quoted passage, 
Constance spoke about understanding in order to solve a particular 
type of task. In the passage above, she speaks about solving a task in 
order to better understand, which could easily be considered as the 
antithesis to understand in order to solve. The realisation of this seems 
(like the consciousness of the relativity of understanding) not yet fully 
worked out.  
After the probe for additional experiences of understanding, followed 
an additional attempt in this direction, but this didn’t yield anything 
new. The second probe was followed by a probe for sentences from 
Constance vocabulary that involve the key verb. In this she amongst 
other things gave an example that involved the expression “I 
understand you” (“Jag förstår dig”) and another that involved 
“understand something” (“förstår sig på en sak”) in the sense of 
“being well versed in”. In the follow up on these examples, the first 
was developed into an expression of a referential and the second into 
systemic understanding.  
The follow up also involved a probe whether Constance felt that the 
different senses had anything in common. The probe and the response 
to it developed as follows: 
 I Okay… if one now were to… do you think that there is any common 
denominator for these different senses, so to say any core… 
C For understanding? 
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 I Yes… is there such a thing or isn’t there a thing like that? If there is 
what is it then? If there isn’t why isn’t there any? 
C There ought to be one… 
 I What could it be then? 
C … I don’t know any word or so here but if you understand something 
then it is just as if there is a light that dawns. It doesn’t mater what it is 
that one understands or does, but it is always a… one understands… 
 I A light dawns… that is then something that appears to be common for 
the various examples then? 
C Mmm... 
 I Could you say some thing more about that “a light dawns”… could you 
explicate the meaning of that… what does it mean… ? 
C One understands… 
 I Could you if possible say something about what you mean when you say 
that? 
C …it is then as if one perhaps almost walks in a dream world… No 
perhaps not like that… but a minor, mist, like that then, and when one 
understands then it becomes naturally at once much clearer…  
 I … but, I see… there is a haze, a kind of mist... haze..., something is 
unclear and all of a sudden it becomes clear and distinct then? As if 
when it is dark and somebody turns on a light… is that something 
common to… what is that one sees then? 
C When one understands? 
 I Yes, for if one employs this simile then that “a light dawns” that there is 
a “mist” first so one can see clearly… what is it then that one sees that 
one earlier could not see or that one could not see clearly… is that 
something common to or is that contingent? 
C But I think, it is common if you understand some thing, if you under-
stands a thing or a person or how one should do something… it becomes 
much clearer at once. One understands then why one does things like 
this… 
 I Hmm… it becomes much clearer… what is it that… clears up? 
C Well, when one is occupied with some complicated machine or what 
ever it is, then one understands perhaps not why it works or why 
something sits just as it does and so on, then one just understands later… 
I don’t know how. 
 I If you should try to develop this example… a machine? 
C A complicated… yes, one does not understand why… that sits there and 
that there… lots of wheels and… 
 I Why that part is located there and that there… 
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C Yes… its just an apparatus you know. A machine, but if one looks more 
carefully and follows all these then one perhaps understand that later on 
then… 
 I and what is it one does then? 
C ... one… yes one understands how it works… I don’t know… 
 I How it is connected, parts are interrelated… 
C Yes… how the very machine works and like that then… 
 I Yes, exactly… how come it can work… well it works because that part 
fills that function and then that does so that like this and that… it is 
exactly this that they are placed in relation to one another in this manner 
then… if one changes one part then it [the machine as a whole] doesn’t 
work… is that like what you mean? 
C Yes.  
 I But first when one meets the machine “It’s just a machine”… 
C Yes.  
 I But then… 
C Yea, if one studies it, well one can even take it apart and look, if there is 
anyone that does that… 
 I Okay, the common thing then that you have said… that should thus be 
that one conceives it as a happening like this you know… on this side 
one does not understand but all of a sudden one transcends a boarder and 
then one understands and when one does that then that which has been 
hazy or unclear, it becomes all of a sudden clear… Can you give an 
example of that… 
C Hhhh... 
 I Something that you yourself have experienced or that somebody else has 
experienced? 
C … but it can you see… it is basically the same with a machine and a 
mathematical task and things like that… it is you see this that one as if… 
hazy then one in principle does exactly what others tell you to… 
mechanically and then when one understands then one can take one’s 
own initiative and… understands why one does so… 
 I … and here one merely does something because some one has told you 
to, one does not understand why one should and that is what you mean 
with doing it mechanically… but then one can also do something in 
another way… 
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C Yes, because if one understands it then one actually does it by free 
choice… yes… Yea if we say that I do maths again, and I don’t un-
derstand anything. Then if I for instance have this much to do for 
homework. Then I only you know do that much. But if I understand 
then, for one thing I do think it’s more fun, and then I want to continue… 
then I perhaps do some additional tasks … 
In this passage, Constance returns to the experience of understanding 
as an enlightenment of something, but this is just about all she can say 
about what can be said to be involved in understanding. She had also 
difficulties to provide synonyms for “to understand”: 
 I Do you think that there are any other words that are close relatives to the 
word understand… that one also can use? 
C Comprehend.  
 I Comprehend, that one can also use… are there any other? 
C … yea… I will probably not find any… comprehend… No I don’t… 
Constance has been identified as a participant that consistently seems 
to have understood understanding as a realisation of something 
through experience and interpretation. But since the ways in which 
she related to understanding in this sense appeared to be characterised 
by a relative lack of distance to the phenomenon as such, the 
understanding of understanding that came into expression has also 
been interpreted as an early form.  
The understanding of understanding she has developed has however 
obviously made it possible for her to relate to understanding of 
understanding as a realisation of something through experiences and 
interpretation, without for that sake being able to give an explicit 
explanation of it as such yet. This is a mode of understanding of 
understanding as a realisation of something through experience and 
interpretation that can be appreciated further through a comparison of 
with realisation understanding of understanding as a phenomenon 
that has been found to be more advanced.  
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LATER REALISATION UNDERSTANDING 
Douglas’ contribution to the investigation is considered as an ex-
pression for realisation understanding of understanding as a phe-
nomenon that is more advanced than the one presented by Constance. 
The initial identification of Douglas’ understanding was made in 
relation to his written contribution. This is given on page 158. 
Previously, this account was included as an expression of under-
standing of understanding as a realisation of something through ex-
perience and interpretation that appeared to suggest that the object for 
understanding is systemic understanding of why something is the case. 
This account will now together with the rest of Douglas’ contribution 
to the study, be considered as an expression of a relatively advanced 
form of realisation understanding of understanding as a phenomenon.  
Beginning with the written account, it is in this respect interesting to 
note that Douglas divides the story about this particular experience of 
understanding into two parts; “the experience” (of the concrete 
existence of apparently quite organised prostitution at a particular 
spot in South America) on the one hand and “the understanding” (of 
the special problems of the continent that were felt to explain the 
existence as well as the character of the experienced practice) on the 
other. Judging from the wording of the narrative, it seems obvious that 
Douglas means that “the understanding” of the relations and 
mechanisms that were felt to explain the experienced practice were not 
constituted through one single flash of insight, but rather through a 
series of insights into the special problems of the continent as 
mediated through media. These were brought together into a 
relatively coherent systemic explanation of the particular form of 
social practice in terms of underlying mechanisms and power rela-
tions.  
In connection hereto, it also is interesting to note that the story not 
only indicates understanding of why prostitution exists and manifests 
itself and continues as it does, but also that this understanding 
developed over time for the understander as he brought the things he 
learnt about the particular problems of the continent to bear on what 
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he had experienced when he and his work mates visited a brothel. It 
also suggests the presence of an active consciousness that there may be 
more to understand about the being of that than he has been able to 
understood so far, and that other persons that have studied the 
particular practice more than he has have probably developed a better 
understanding of it than he has.  
This implies that he recognises that the understanding he has de-
veloped is not absolute, but rather relative and developmental. these 
are the most distinguishing and effective characteristics of the more 
advanced realisation understanding of understanding.  
The follow up interview with Douglas began with an attempt to learn 
more about the experience of understanding reported in the written 
account. In connection hereto, he was first asked to say some more 
about how talks about the brothel and the prostitutes went when he 
was on his way to South America. As a response to this, he said 
amongst other things the following:  
D Yea, one chatted you know then about what you should do, in port … 
and like that you know… 
 I Hmm… 
D … and I had you see until then lived in rather protected… 
 I … existence? 
D … world, you know… where nothing like that was a part of it… 
 I Certainly not, can you then tell me something about what your mates 
said would happen when you arrived in South America, yea… can you 
say something about… how the chatter ran… 
D Yea, it was that you know that you were to be initiated in a sexual life 
then… that you hadn’t been part of before, you know… 
 I … it was like, if the old lads should take care of the young boy and… 
D … yes… 
 I … and make sure that he had to go through some sort of rites… 
D Yea… it was a lot like that… 
 I … and then you would… 
D Yes, but when I think it over, I don’t mean that these guys were 
completely ignorant about what it was… 
 I Certainly not… 
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D … but they had I guess more or less resigned… they were very well 
informed about why it was like it was… in South America, you know… 
but they had, they were double-sided… They had one, the vulgar side, 
then and then they had also a very intellectual conception of how… 
 I … how the problems… 
D … about the problems there, but they reasoned like that it was something 
they could do nothing about. So, toot and drive on, you know… 
In searching for indications of defining characteristics of advanced 
realisation understanding of understanding as phenomenon in the 
reading of this extract, it is interesting to notice how Douglas com-
pares the crew members understanding of the relations both with his 
at that time relatively ignorant understanding and with his at the later 
time relatively insightful one, and that he does not want to give the 
impression that he thinks that his former colleagues were ignorant 
about the relations he came to understand. On the contrary, he seems 
to mean that he thinks they were both experienced and informed, even 
though he thinks that the understanding he came to develop later can 
be said to have transcended their understanding, as it was at the time 
when they brought him into contact with prostitution.  
The line of reasoning that forms the basis for this judgement could be 
put as follows: 
Whereas I (Douglas) at that time had merely experienced the way that 
prostitution manifested itself there and then, they had not only 
experienced it there, but also at other places at other times before that. In 
addition, they had without doubt also learnt a great deal about the 
particular problems of the continent and thereby also developed an 
intellectual understanding of the problem; the reason why the practice 
manifested itself as it did there. For some reason they had, however, 
apparently not integrated these two different forms of 
experience/understanding into the unitary systematic kind of 
understanding that I came to develop later, and which can be said to 
have meant a transcendence of their understandings, in that it integrated 
the two hitherto relatively separate experiences or understandings into 
one unitary coherent, comprehensive one.  
The implied course of development of understanding has been:  
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1. learning about the practice and the place where it takes place from 
others that first of all have gained first hand knowledge of the practice 
through personal experience;  
2. experiencing the practice;  
3. learning about the problems of the society where the practice takes 
place and in the knowledge that is gained from this finding new 
questions to ask and new answers to these; and:  
4. integration of this new learning with previous experience and the 
formation afterwards of a comprehensive and systemic understanding 
of the particular form of practice as an integrated and functional part 
of a more encompassing web of interrelated forms of practices, deeds, 
movements and transactions among persons and groups of persons at 
a particular place, time, society and period in individual and general 
history.  
In addition, it is also interesting to notice how Douglas, as the in-
terview proceeded, revealed more and more about what he under-
stands with the relations in South America in general and about 
prostitution as it manifests itself there in particular than he had 
mentioned in the written account.  
The obvious ease with which Douglas could develop his narrative has, 
thus, come to stand in sharp contrast to the obvious difficulties with 
the considerably less experienced participants spoke about their 
experiences. It is also interesting to notice that Douglas, especially in 
the interview, time after time came to say things that indicated that he 
meant that the experiences one makes in understanding presupposes 
previous experience, but that the important thing in them lies perhaps 
not so much in what is confirmed as in what is negated in them. 
Because is it not, he seems to ask, first of all this partial annihilation of 
previous experience that gives the necessary new material for the 
constitution of the understanding that comes next? Is it not so, he 
seems to say, that the partial annihilation of previous experience is at 
the same time also the partial coming into being of the potential new 
understanding?  
This is at least the sense in which I have interpreted his talk about 
things like: 1) “with my background the experience was a minor 
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shock”, “I had, you know, not experienced anything like that, I did not 
know that girls could be like that, you see… because I had only met 
the one side then… Yea, ‘homely-girls’ you know, the ‘family-girls’ as 
we called them at the sea, you see… So little by little one came to 
accept it as it was, and one became like the others then on the ship, one 
had the same, one had the same discourses, you know… ‘Yea, now we 
are going up into the mountains to check out the whores…’ you see, in 
that manner then, and one did not reflect over why it was as it was… 
but it was just like that… It was so and…”, 2) “10-12 years later, I 
gained insight into the special problems of the continent through TV-
programs and books and got answers to some questions I had never 
asked”, 3) “Yes, I ended up in the same seat as many of my generation 
did, we received the world through the TV-apparatus. Now, I had 
been out for sometime before, so many things that were seen on ‘the 
telly’‚… and so on, that was no news so to say, but I began to 
disentangle the interconnections, so to say of experts then, through 
‘the tube’ and that resulted in several ‘aha-experiences’… It was 
different documentary programmes… that discussed different 
countries and continents and in that way one began to understand you 
know… if, and it was even so that one sometimes thought that ‘No, 
there you were wrong old man’, one had thus ones own conception at 
the base, that one had never ventilated you know… ”. 
In the reading of these utterances, Douglas from time to time seems to 
say things that indicate that he meant that the activities and ex-
periences need not necessarily led in the long run to a continuous 
development of gradually better understanding, but on the contrary 
can very well also led to a generative extinction. It is at least to this end 
that the following passage from the written account has been read:  
Against my background, the experience became a minor shock, but little by 
little one got used to such states without wondering over them… 
A similar idea has also come into expression in the previously quoted 
passage, wherein Douglas relates to the dual understanding of the 
older crew members. They had obviously also learnt to know 
prostitution from first hand personal experience in their youth and 
with the help of more experienced others. They had, under the in-
fluence of the same or other more experienced others probably also 
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begun to develop systemic understanding of the practice in more 
political terms, but they had for some reason or another obviously not 
gone further in this. Douglas’ explanation of why they had not done so 
appears first of all to be that they simply could not. Because as long as 
they continued to “check in the whores”, intellectual understanding 
could not develop further, for there was simply nothing that could 
propel such development. On the contrary, all that they expected to 
experience, were supposed to experience, and therefore, in a sense, 
could and did experience while they were there, spoke rather very 
well for the continuation of the sustentation of their participation in 
the practice and thereby also “vulgar understanding” that they, 
according to Douglas, also maintained.  
The idea that participation in practice and the experiences one make 
there can lead to “unhealthy” understandings continuing to flourish, 
also came into expression in another passage of the interview. The 
sentence that follows right after the above quoted sentence in the 
written account runs as follows: 
Maybe the experience also affected my view of women though, I until then 
had only met “little angles”. 
What Douglas says here seems to be in response to something he said 
earlier, that after a while he got so used to being there that he felt it 
was natural. That is, that the milieu by then was so familiar to him that 
it seemed as if there was nothing more for him to experience than he 
already had or could imagine he could. This meant that though 
continued visits to the brothel stopped to effecting the understanding 
of the practice that he used to sustain. In the reading of this passage, it 
seems as if Douglas here too means something like the experience one 
makes in one’s encounters with a particular practice do not necessarily 
have a negational, but on the contrary can very well have a 
confirmational effect on previous understandings, no matter how 
twisted such understanding may appear in retrospect or from another 
perspective. In addition to this, it also seems as if he not only meant 
this, but also that what determines whether experience mainly will 
have a negational or confirmational effect on previous understanding 
has something to do with prior experience, the expectations that have 
been projected on the basis of these and the manner wherein what one 
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encounters is inscribed and lends itself to be understood as it is 
encountered anew.  
It is clear that Douglas not only means that understanding is relative to 
the present, past and future understanding of oneself and/or of others, 
but also to a thinking dialogue with oneself and/or others. This 
relational aspect of understanding may lead one to think that he 
thereby has also talked himself into a relativism (Bernstein, 1983). But 
there is no real support for this. On the contrary, he rather argues that 
the understanding that he has come to sustain can be considered as 
better than – at least some other understanding – for example, 
understanding that fails to take the historical conditions for the 
phenomenon into consideration.  
After the attempt to follow up on the written account followed a probe 
for additional accounts of experiences of instances of understanding. 
In this Douglas presented one additional account that has been 
interpreted as an account of referential understanding of how a situation 
appeared for someone else. This account was found to stand close to what 
has been called systemic understanding. It also appeared to present 
close resemblance with the kind of understandings and explanations 
that researchers in political science might develop.  
In the part of the interview that was intended as an attempt to en-
courage Douglas to give some example of sentences that involve the 
verb ”to understand” a conversation developed and the previously 
discussed tendency of the interviewee to present understanding as 
relational phenomena shone through once again. Douglas also 
developed an additional account of what has been interpreted as an 
instance of referential understanding of what an expression means. This 
was interpreted as a kin to the kinds of understandings and 
explanations that human scientists might seek to develop.  
The discussed third part of the interview came to involve an objection 
from the interviewee concerning whether the interviewer had “hung 
up” the interview about the meaning and nature of understanding a 
little to much on the very word “to understand” (förstå), and if it 
might not be wiser to move more into a joint exploration of 
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understanding. This passage has also been interpreted as an additional 
expression of active awareness of the relationality of understanding. In 
this particular context, it has come to mean an obvious openness 
towards understanding as a term which can mean different things to 
different persons depending on their previous experience, their 
language habits and the situations they find themselves in.  
In the fourth part of the interview, Douglas was encourage to work out 
an explicit definition of what is meant with understanding. The 
passage of the transcript that represents this part of the interview in-
volves among other things a rather long explication of the meaning, 
nature and constitutive elements in understanding. 
Here Douglas is understood once again to emphasise a relationality of 
understanding that perhaps can also be called the dialogicality of 
understanding or even the historicity of understanding. In the reading 
of the discussed passage it even appears as if Douglas tends to divide 
the reference to this term into the history of the understander and the 
history of the understood as two developmental lines that are 
somehow brought together in understanding. It can also be of some 
interest to note the distinction that is made between the common 
understanding or meaning of a particular being, the being of that 
being, and the being of the being as it has lent or may lend itself to be 
understood in subsequent encounters. 
In the above, Douglas first compares understanding with the com-
pletion of a jigsaw puzzle that one has not seen a model of and that 
nevertheless appears to take shape according to some sort of rule 
system or within a particular world view. The understanding means 
that a lot of hitherto relatively isolated experiences are brought to-
gether and organised into a pattern. Douglas also compares under-
standing to a triple-jump jump that involves the big leap first and the 
supporting steps afterwards. He also makes a comparison to nuclear 
fission and a subsequent chain reaction. Understanding is also 
presented as a course of events that not only involves a transformation 
of previous understanding into new understanding, but also 
appropriation of the truth that can be gathered from the under-
standing. This is said to be a less dramatic transformation than when 
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leaps that are experienced as the most decisive moments in 
understanding are involved.  
In sum, it seems as if what distinguishes less from more advanced 
realisation understanding of understanding as a phenomenon, is that 
the latter involves an intellectual freedom over above that of the 
former. This makes it possible to not only recognise and “compose 
stories” about experiences of the event of relatively new compre-
hension, but also to make the structure of understanding explicit. This 
makes it possible to recognise and explicate the historical relational 
structure of understanding and makes self initiated deliberate 
development of more systematic understanding possible. 
SUMMARY AND ELABORATION OF THE 
RESULTS OF TURN TWO 
In this chapter, the collected contribution of four particular partici-
pants were analysed, whose contributions exemplify consistent: 
1) reception, 2) acquisition, 3) early; respectively, 4) later realisation 
understanding. The purpose of the interpretation of these data was to 
explore the significance of understanding understanding in these 
ways.  
Reception understanding appeared first and foremost to be marked by 
the understander’s lack of reflection over his/her own role in un-
derstanding. Acquisition understanding appeared to be characterised by 
an active awareness that the object of understanding is achieved 
through successful completion of deliberate learning activity. And it 
also emerged that the understander tends to be well aware that the 
achieved knowing or proficiency is more and less relative to advanced 
knowing/proficiency. Realisation understanding, finally, appeared as an 
understanding of understanding as a phenomenon that involves a 
relative awareness of the understander’s contribution to the 
constitution of the object of understanding, but that understanding as 
a rule involves partial negation and confirmation of previous 
experience of the understood as significant ingredient in coming to 
understand. It also emerged that one becomes more and more 
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conscious of what is involved in understanding as one becomes more 
an more experienced in the ways of being of understanding and that it 
is this that above all makes it possible for oneself to participate in, 
initiate and perform learning activity that involves the development of 
more advanced theoretical understandings.  
In the sketch for a theory of the development of understandings of 
understanding that is to be proposed here, understanding is seen as a 
word, concept and phenomenon that one learns to understand like one 
learns to understand any other word, concept and phenomenon. It is 
something one learns to understand through one’s participation in 
various forms of activities that involves oneself in linguistic 
communication with others about things like what is meant with 
particular words, what particular words refer to, how particular being 
is. This also concerns the similarities and differences between various 
ways of understanding particular words, concepts, phenomena, etc. 
that involve the word understanding and related words as vehicles for 
meaningful sense making about these and related objects in these and 
related activities.  
The learning to understand understanding as a word, concept and 
phenomenon can be assumed to begin with one’s participation in 
linguistic communication with others that involve the word and re-
lated words in meaningful ways about particular things in particular 
activity contexts. It is a learning that begins much earlier than where 
the youngest and least experienced participants that participated in the 
discussed study were met. It is also a learning that is believed to give 
rise to the understanding of understanding that has been discussed as 
reception understanding of understanding as a phenomenon.  
After the above follows the learning to understand understanding as a 
word, concept and phenomenon that can take place as one is drawn 
into and participates in linguistic communication with more 
experienced and knowledgeable others about differences in one’s own 
and/or other persons’ ability to perform particular activities as these 
are presented in various forms of pedagogical practices. It is a learning 
to understand understanding that can give rise to what has been called 
achievement understanding of understanding, namely the understanding 
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of understanding as a relatively successful completion of deliberate 
goal oriented learning activity or chains of such activities aimed at an 
acquisition of particular; and by the learner in advance; relatively 
clearly foreseen.  
This understanding of understanding as a phenomenon seems to arise 
later than the previous one. In it the learner seems to be an agent 
rather than an object.1 This understanding of understanding appears 
to develop alongside the previous understanding. But whereas the 
former form mainly seems to receive its support from one’s 
experiences of understanding and one’s participation in conversations 
about understanding as reception, the later form appears to receive its 
support from one’s experiences of learning in more explicit 
pedagogical practices or practices that present elements of pedagogy 
as they are at least in part carried out for the explicit purpose of 
developing particular knowledge and performances etc. 
The development of realisation understanding of understanding as a 
phenomenon appears to begin its development earlier in individual 
history than where one usually begins higher education. It appears 
also as a phase in the development of understanding as a phenomenon 
that seems to follow after reception understanding has reached a certain 
maturity and after the first development of acquisition understanding 
has begun. The genesis of realisation understanding seems, thus, to 
require both reception understanding and acquisition understanding.  
One can perhaps even assume that the first realisation understanding 
emerges much more as a transformation of reception understanding 
under the influence of acquisition understanding than as an entirely new 
form of consciousness of understanding as a phenomenon rooted in 
one’s activities. In so far as this is the case, one can perhaps also 
assume that the first development of realisation understanding is much 
                                          
1 It can be of some interest to point out that whereas the concordance, which was gathered 
from novels that a given publishing house published in 1981–1982, was found to involve 
usage of understood (förstod) that indicated Reception, it was not found to involve any 
indications of Acquisition (cf. Appendix 3).  
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more propelled by the experiences one makes in participation and 
performance of activities that involve communication about 
similarities and differences between various forms of performances of 
particular activities for the purpose of developing an ability to perform 
these, than it is by experiences made in participation in activities that 
involve communication about similarities and differences between 
various forms of understanding and explanation of particular being 
for the purpose of developing better understandings of such being.  
In between these two types of activities are other activities that arise as 
answers to the perceived meaning differences of more experienced 
others and between their and our usage of particular words, 
expressions, ways of obviously understanding, etc. This involves 
communication about what one is to understand with particular 
words, expressions, etc. as objects for the purpose of replacing wrong 
with right or erroneous with correct, or false with true understanding 
of such subjects for understanding. Notwithstanding how important 
these in-between activities can be for the first development of 
realisation understanding, as represented by the accounts that have been 
read as expressions of absolute forms of factual, relational and perhaps 
also early forms of systematic realisation understanding, it is difficult 
to believe that these can have more than a preparatory function for the 
development of more advanced forms of realisation understanding of 
understanding as a phenomenon.  
The hypothesis concerning the development of realisation under-
standing that is presented here is, thus, that it is foregone by the de-
velopment of reception understanding and acquisition understanding 
that appear to spring forth from activities that involve oneself in 
communication with others about what is meant with particular 
words, etc. on the one hand and obvious similarities and differences 
between various performances of particular activities on the other. It 
seems also as if the development of realisation understanding in itself 
appears to spring forth much more from one’s participation in and 
performance of activities that involve relatively systematic 
communication about similarities and differences between particular 
systematic understandings of particular being for the explicit purpose 
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of developing better understanding of such being than from one’s 
participation in and performance of activities that have involved or 
can involve conversation about what is meant with particular words, 
etc.  
In so far as it is the case that the development of realisation is more 
propelled by the experiences one makes in activities that involve 
systematic discussion of systemic understanding, than by the expe-
riences one makes in activities that involve discussions of what is 
meant with particular words, it can also mean that whereas one’s 
participation in and performance of such activities can give rise to 
realisation understanding and can respond to the first development of 
that understanding, they can hardly be expected to have the power to 
develop such understanding into its more mature forms. The ripe form 
of realisation understanding only seems possible to reach the support 
of the development of realisation understanding of understanding as a 
phenomenon that comes from the participation in and performance of 
activities wherein the development of more advanced systemic 
understanding is a value or virtue in its own right. 
  
PART IV 
DISCUSSION 

  
Chapter 9 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
And say not now… : “I do not understand.” 
Or please say so, but not in the way you do 
when you turn away. Because what we un-
derstand has already been incorporated in our 
consciousness…. Future begins only at the 
boarders of the unknown. It is first there it is 
possible to go further than before. (Tunström, 
1986, p. 211; my translation)  
The two foregoing chapters have presented the results of the study. 
In this, the ninth and last chapter, the significance of these results 
will be discussed. The discussion will begin with a consideration of 
the significance of the study in relation to previous research. After 
this follows an attempt to draw out some implications for further 
research. The chapter is closed with an attempt to draw out some 
possible implications of the study for education praxis. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The study has, as was explained in Chapter 1, concerned under-
standings of understanding as experiential prerequisites for devel-
opmental learning with a general aim to come to a clearer awareness 
of the ways participants in formal education tend to understand 
understanding as a phenomenon. Understanding was explained as 
what takes place whenever one comprehends or realises something.  
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A review of previous studies in education on understandings of 
learning and understanding has been given (Chapter 2). (This review 
focused works by Burns et al., 1991; Entwistle & Entwistle, 1992; 
Marton et al., 1993; Marton, Watkins, et al., 1997, Pramling, 1983; 
Säljö, 1979). From this review it became clear that participants in 
various forms of education tend to understand learning in different 
ways (Marton et al., 1993; Marton et al., 1997, Pramling, 1983; Säljö, 
1979). These range from understanding it as an activity that concerns 
the acquisition of facts, definitions, methods, etc. toward a more 
relational understanding (Marton et al., 1993; Marton, Watkins, et al., 
1997; Pramling, 1983; Säljö, 1979).  
In addition to the above review, a review of studies of understand-
ings of understanding was also given (Burns et al., 1991; Entwistle & 
Entwistle, 1992). This review revealed a similar pattern. But it also 
indicated that people that tend to understand learning as an activity 
that aims at the development of understanding of the subject for 
learning, also try to achieve this as a rule and tend to be more 
successful in their learning activities than others (Burns et al., 1991; 
Entwistle & Entwistle, 1992; Marton et al., 1993; Marton, Watkins et 
al., 1997).  
In the subsequent reflection over the theoretical prerequisites for 
these studies, it emerged that they all tend to presuppose that de-
velopment is either something that just happens or that it is an in-
tellectual accomplishment that persons accomplish in education 
through their own effort as autonomous individuals. This is obvi-
ously an ahistorical individualistic and even mentalistic under-
standing of the prerequisites for understanding and was compared 
within the thesis with the historical understanding of the develop-
ment of thinking and speaking as represented by for instance 
Vygotskij (1930/1978; 1934/1987), Leont’ev (1959/1977) and Lurija 
(1978).  
The above reviews were extended in Chapter 3 by a review of un-
derstanding of understanding in the philosophy of interpretation. On 
the basis of this review it appeared that the previous research not 
only seems grounded on under-developed understandings of the 
social, cultural and historical aspects of understanding even at the 
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individual interpretative level (Heidegger, 1927/1990; Gadamer, 
1960/1993; Palmer, 1969). This led me to develop a critique of the 
understanding of understanding privileged in these studies. This is 
the notion of understanding as a subjective accomplishment of 
objective and coherent knowledge. This critique was founded on 
examinations of Schleiermacher’s and Dilthey’s understanding of 
interpretation on the one hand (Palmer, 1969) and Heidegger’s 
(1927/1990) and Gadamer’s (1960/1993) on the other.  
In this comparison, it appeared that a development of a more ex-
plicitly theoretical understanding could probably profit much from 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey’s work (Palmer, 1969), since they can be 
seen as providing much more elaborate understandings of un-
derstanding at the individual level. However, in the long run this 
was considered less than prudent and the idea developed instead 
was that it would probably be much better to abandon this aim in 
favour of a development of understanding of understanding in re-
lation to Heidegger (1927/1990) and Gadamer (1960/1993), who not 
only appear to have transcended the ideas of the two earlier 
philosophers of interpretation in that they have taken a clear step 
beyond objectivism and relativism (Bernstein, 1983), but also appear 
to be more consistent with the historical understanding previously 
mentioned (Vygotskij, 1930/1978, 1934/1987, Leont’ev, 1959/1977; 
Lurija, 1978). 
The research situation was re-described in Chapter 4 in line with this 
idea and the other considerations brought out in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3, and the research situation was in a sense rehatched as one 
that set out to develop a more philosophically and socio-historically 
informed approach to the study and the development of 
understandings of understanding than had been apparent in the 
previous studies. Substantively, this purpose can also be described as 
an attempt to better understand the ways wherein studying persons’ 
in various forms of education tend to understand understanding as a 
phenomenon and to comprehend how different understandings of 
understanding can develop. This is also how this purpose was 
expressed in Chapter 4. However, a further substantive interest was 
for the requirements of learning activities that involve a 
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development of more advanced systematic understanding of things 
(object and events) in the world, including the act or event of 
understanding itself. This intention was added to the others and 
described as one of forging the available data and interpretations of 
data into a first account of the developmental requirements of 
understanding of understanding in personal developmental history. 
The study has, as was explained in Chapter 5 and as is clear from the 
above, evolved as a continuation and extension of existing ed-
ucational research on study activity and understandings of learning 
and understanding. Much of this research has in Sweden evolved 
from Marton and Svensson (1970). And there has been a quite 
substantial amount. My work also fits in with this research tradition. 
But in so far as it has also profited from the phenomenological 
studies in the psychology of learning that Giorgi (1975, 1985) has 
conducted, the historical understanding of the development of 
thinking and speaking etc. that has been developed in Vygotskij 
(1930/1978, 1934/1987), and the philosophical understanding of 
understanding that has been developed in Heidegger (1927/1990) 
and Gadamer (1960/1993), it has also meant a more historical and 
human scientific hermeneutic approach than has otherwise been 
apparent.  
The study has, as was also explained in Chapter 6, been worked out 
through a set and series of gradually more informed and en-
compassing attempts to study understandings of understanding on 
the basis of interpretations of linguistic accounts for experiences of 
having come to understand something. There have been many 
participants involved in the study. This was outlined in Chapter 6, as 
developed from a stratified sample of seven groups of participants in 
four different forms of educational practice in an average urban 
community in the western part of Sweden. The sample was drawn 
and investigated first in the middle of the 1980’s, where the 
constitution of data took place through two activities.  
The first of these activities was an invitation to a group of partici-
pants to write down an account of an occasion when they experi-
enced they had understood something. In the second, a sub-sample 
was drawn from this group. This was made from pools of the twelve, 
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fifteen, and eighteen year old school pupils and the adult students in 
the original sample, whose contributions were considered 
representative for an identical conception on the one hand and for 
the general contributions of the members of the groups as wholes. 
These persons were invited to interviews. The interviews were tape 
recorded and the transcripts which where made from them and the 
first written accounts provided data which were then subject to two 
interpretative turns. The turns have been accounted for in Chapter 6. 
The presentation of the results is given in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 of 
the thesis. According to these results, the participants were first of all 
found to have understood understanding in three qualitatively 
different ways. Firstly understanding appeared either as an act or 
event of receiving knowledge, secondly as an act of acquiring 
something like a skill and thirdly as an activity or act of coming to 
realise  something. In addition, when understood as an act of 
realising something (third form), the object for understanding was 
either presented as something of a factual, a relational or a systemic 
character. 
The categorisation of the participants’ accounts revealed that there 
was an apparent shift from understanding as receiving to under-
standing as achieving and understanding as realising something 
according to the age and educational experience of the participants. 
At least to the extent that there seemed to be some possible 
correlation. In addition, in relation to the third category (realising), 
there was also a shift from factual towards relational and then finally 
systemic understanding, which also seemed to depend to some 
degree on the age and the level of formal education of the 
participants expressing them. Although not possible to prove sta-
tistically, this notion of shift does have some coherence with the 
general theoretical ideas which have developed on the basis of the 
thesis work. 
Four of the participants who were interviewed, were found to rep-
resent sharp and coherent reception, acquisition, and realisation 
understanding. And their contributions were for this reason focused 
heavily in the analysis (Chapter 8). This revealed a number of things, 
but most particularly for the aims of the present study, that the later 
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forms of understanding presented an intellectual freedom as 
compared to the previous ones (reception and acquisition) and that it 
is really first in advanced realisation understanding that one has 
risen to a consciousness of understanding that makes the 
performance of a developmental learning activity possible.  
The account of the significance of the different understandings of 
understanding was finally also forged into a developmental theory 
of the development of understanding of understanding toward the 
end of Chapter 8. According to this theory, the understanding of 
understanding is a function of one’s development as a participant in 
different institutionalised discourses on the basis of one’s pos-
sibilities to understand the character of understanding as a phe-
nomenon as it tends to be sustained in these practices.  
The design and the sampling procedures in the investigation is, to 
say the least, relatively limited. A longitudinal design, “random” 
sampling procedures, a larger sample and a more encompassing data 
from each of the participants would have been preferable for several 
reasons, if the intention had been to test a specific theory from the 
outset. This was not the intention however. Rather my aims were 
more exploratory and compensatory with regard to the omissions of 
previous descriptive research. And towards these ends some of the 
limitations of the design and sampling procedures, have to a certain 
extent been compensated for. This has been specifically through the 
gradual elaboration of the investigation method. Further, the scope 
of the study has also been broadened by the inclusion of data from 
other sources. This does not abate the fact that the prerequisites for 
the generalisability of the results of the study is limited. But it 
provides a foundation from which the plausibility of the findings can 
nevertheless be assessed. 
Despite its limitations, the study has contributed with at least a 
somewhat better understanding of what understanding tends to be 
understood as among participants in various forms of educational 
practice. In comparison with the previous studies of understandings 
of learning and understanding, the present study has provided an 
account of what understanding as a phenomenon tends to be 
understood as, and this account is also felt to be more general and 
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specific than those that have been provided in, for instance, Burns et 
al. (1991) and Entwistle and Entwistle (1992).  
A second advance made from the present study is in the light of the 
comparison between the results on understandings of understanding 
among the participants in the study as read out of their accounts of 
experiences of understanding, and the results on understandings of 
understanding in novels that is presented in Appendix 3. In this 
comparison, the understanding of understanding as an achievement 
of coherence, which has also been accounted for in Burns et al. (1991) 
and Entwistle and Entwistle (1992), has come more and more to 
appear as an understanding of understanding that is sustained in 
and springs forth from the experiences of understanding that one 
tends to make in one’s participation in educational practice if and 
when such understanding is also really made to matter. Something 
which happens all too rarely in education, and particularly in many 
forms of higher education according to Beach (1995, 1997).  
In addition to this, the present study has also provided an account of 
two other understandings of understanding than are accounted for 
in Burns et al. (1991). One is a more advanced form than the forms 
they give. One is a less advanced. They are understanding as a 
reception on the one hand and advanced understanding of understanding 
as a realisation on the other. The account of the earlier of these 
assumed forms of understanding is somewhat reminiscent of 
Pramling’s (1993) account of learning as becoming able to understand. 
The later understanding of understanding reminds more of Säljö’s 
(1979) account of learning as the abstraction of meaning and learning as 
an interpretative process aimed at the understanding of reality. 
Support for the advanced form of understanding presented in the 
account is supported also, if indirectly, even by other researchers. 
This includes even those whose works have been reviewed in 
Chapter 2. Such support is given for instance by Marton et al. (1993) 
in their account of learning as understanding, learning as seeing 
something in a different way, and learning as changing as a person, in 
Marton, Watkins, et al. (1997) account of learning as understanding 
meaning and learning as understanding phenomenon, and in Entwistle 
and Entwistle’s (1992) account of creating own structures for topics, 
 Concluding remarks  206 
adjusting structures from strategic reading to meet exam requirements and 
developing an individual conception of the discipline from wide reading. 
What is significant here, is that all these categories are found 
amongst university students and are amongst the more advanced 
forms of understanding shown by them. This corroborates my thesis 
about the genesis (indirectly) and late development of advanced rela-
tional understanding. 
The present study has provided a fairly penetrating account of what 
different understandings of understanding can mean for one’s 
possibilities to engage in learning activity that involves a 
development of a more advanced understanding of the being of 
particular being as an objective in its own right. Through the 
hermeneutic and historical interpretation of this development, it has 
also however provided a first sketch for a theory of the development 
of understandings of understanding. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This enquiry has without a doubt a lot of things in common with the 
previous studies concerning study activity and conceptions of 
learning and understanding among studying persons. One thing is 
that, like those studies, it is based on the assumption that the most 
profound and innermost feature of learning is meaningfulness 
(Rogers, 1969) and that meaningful study activity involves making 
sense as a significant element (see also Beach, 1995, 1996; 
Alexandersson & Beach, 1997). Another common feature is that it is 
based on the assumption that one’s ability to make sense of what one 
listens to, reads, wonders over and writes about as one studies, is not 
only dependent on the relation between one’s own being and the 
object of study, but also on the being of one’s own being also 
becoming an object for understanding. A third common feature with 
those studies, is that the present study has been based on the 
assumption that the ability to study develops as one grows more 
experienced with the meaning of understanding, of which it has also 
presented certain evidence. A fourth feature it shares with the 
previous studies, is that it has not only meant an interpretation of 
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different ways of understanding, but also an indication that some 
ways of understanding can be considered more advanced than 
others, and that the development of understanding appears to have a 
certain direction.  
According to Chapter 8, the development of understanding of un-
derstanding proceeds from a form of consciousness of understanding 
as reception of knowledge about a given object and towards a form 
of consciousness as realisation via a form of consciousness as an 
acquisition of desired knowledge or skill through successful 
completion of deliberate learning activity. It has also been suggested 
it is in the third form that one begins to become truly aware of the 
relationality of understanding, i.e. that all understanding is relative. 
In so far as the presented sketch for a theory of the development of 
understanding in general and understanding of understanding in 
particular can be accepted as sound, it can with reference to future 
research mean that there is a need to reconsider the so called “active 
view of learning”. This is because against the background of the 
results of the study, it seems as if one has put too much emphasis on 
the activity of the experienced for understanding, experiencing and 
interpreting, at the expense of the activity of the existent, self-
presenting, understood, interpreted, objectivity that reveals itself in 
the subjectivity’s linguistic encounters. It seems also as if previous 
research has overseen the linguisticality and factuality of all 
understanding and has not succeeded in explaining the character of 
historically operative consciousness to the degree that it becomes 
possible to grasp that conceptions are not so much fix and firm 
meanings that persons and groups of persons are supposed have, as 
they are persons and groups of persons ways of making sense of 
things on the basis of their self-understanding of the things.  
Conceptions are projections of meaning made on the basis previous 
experience and current understanding and one makes these 
projections almost as projections of the self and according to one’s 
possibilities for being in the world in concrete activity. That is, one 
does so neither with a blank openness nor with a fixed frame of 
reference, but rather with a particular openness for a particular 
purpose towards a particular end. Thus one encounters, meets and 
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understands the world always according to one’s possibilities for 
being in the world in purposeful activity towards a particular 
purpose. This is the essential core of activity theory, but it also 
essentially the character of a linguistic relation to the world as well.  
This means that one can even see understanding as a hinder (in the 
relational conception) as well as a strength. Indeed perhaps we can 
even say that it is one’s projection of oneself towards one’s 
possibilities for being toward the being that one is encountering, that 
hinders oneself from understanding the being in accordance with its 
own possibilities for being in the world. For what an encountered 
being presents itself to consciousness, appears (at least according to 
the thesis) not so much as something entirely different from oneself 
as something that one has a relation to and as something that one 
assumes is possible to understand.  
One can perhaps say that it is first and foremost previously un-
foreseen aspects of being that one’s previous experience had not 
taken under consideration, that makes new understanding possible 
at all. This is also a view which is expressed by Gadamer 
(1960/1993), and which places all previous experience as a limitation 
for, as well as a partial foundation of new understanding. This is 
because whilst an experiential event creates a meaning difference 
which makes new understanding possible (in that the experience of 
meaning differences calls for a reinterpretation of whatever is under 
consideration), in the event that previous experience might 
encourage one to stop searching for a language which belongs to the 
actual situation under immediate consideration, and which has the 
power to co-ordinate new and previous experience into more 
inclusive and precise understanding than before, past experience is 
counter productive to new understanding as well as supportive of it. 
In this sense, it is the hitherto unforeseen being and the finitude of 
one’s relationship to its existence, and more precisely the way that 
one projects oneself towards it and the manner wherein one en-
counters it in concrete activity, that makes new experience possible. 
As experience of limitations of previous experience, new experience 
calls for new and more inclusive and precise understanding. 
Responding to this, one seeks to find way to a better understanding 
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and as one does this one projects oneself according to one’s 
possibilities as they present themselves in light of the new 
experience. In this event, it may happen that one finds a way to relate 
to the being under consideration that corresponds to both new and 
previous experience, and that mediates between these experiences in 
such a way that it works out a merging of horizons between self-
understanding and self-presentation. It is when this happens that 
one experiences that one understands.  
In order to know more precisely, however, what it is that one has 
understood (which often seems to be more than one thing), it seems 
also as if one first has to make an explicit linguistic interpretation of 
what one has experienced before, before one can become consciously 
aware of the significance of the emerging new experience. 
Understanding precedes conceptualisation (Lonnergan, 1956). If this 
is the case, it means that it is really first in explicit linguistic 
interpretation that one becomes aware of what one actually has 
understood. This because making one’s self-understanding explicit 
in such interpretation also means a new act of projecting oneself 
understandingly according to one’s possibilities, which implies a 
formation of a new experiential horizon. In short, one’s self-
understanding seems in principle impossible to fully objectify.  
If self-understanding and self-presentation not only make projections 
of oneself according to one’s possibilities possible, they are also a 
part of what makes all changes of self-understanding and self-
presentation possible. For it is only in projecting oneself according to 
one’s possibilities that one can encounter a being other than oneself. 
And it is also only in encountering something other than oneself, that 
one gains experience and the need to understand differently. This is 
fruitful if an when one can search and eventually also find a 
language that belongs to the situation and that can co-ordinate new 
and previous experience of the being under consideration and one’s 
possibilities for being in the world relative that being and in specific 
forms of concrete activity.  
Understanding is, thus, proximally and for the most part neither a 
purely subjective nor a purely objective achievement, but always a 
concrete emergence of new truth that comes to stand over above old. 
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It is in other words a factual disclosure of being. It is something that 
typically appears to take place in, concern and in part modify a 
particular part or aspect of the world: namely the meaningful 
linguistic relation between oneself and one’s counterpart in 
understanding.  
One can perhaps also say that understanding essentially appears to 
be productive transformation of ones abilities to relate to a particular 
being in concrete activity. If interpreted in this sense however, it is 
both something that occurs in, concerns, and changes, particular 
possibilities to relate to things and activities. In the light of this 
interpretation, one can in turn make a distinction between 
understanding in three different and related senses. These are: 
1) historically operative consciousness, 2) productive transformation 
of such consciousness, and 3) possibilities to understand and further 
relate to a particular object in a particular kind of activity that in part 
may be implied by a particular form of consciousness of a particular 
being under consideration.  
However, If one makes this distinction and also tries to say 
something about the difference between previous research on 
conceptions, understandings, alternative frameworks , etc., and the 
research that is represented by this thesis, one can say that previ-
ously the character of historically operative consciousness and the 
character of understanding as an event were not taken into con-
sideration, whereas in the present study there has been an attempt to 
take heed of these things. Further whilst this means that previous 
research has had to settle for only describing conceptions and 
relations between conceptions (Säljö, 1994, 1997), in the present 
research there has also been an attempt to understand them.  
A main implication of the present study for future psychological and 
pedagogical research on conceptions, understandings, alternative 
frameworks, etc. then, is that it may be worthwhile when studying 
things like concepts, not only to try to articulate in what sense one 
tries to understand themselves, but also to study them in a sense that 
makes it possible to better understand and interpret their broader 
frame of reference as well. Another implication is that, as a rule, it is 
better to listen to what others have to say about a particular object 
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and then try to incorporate the positive aspects of their discussion in 
one’s own, rather than merely trying to show wherein they are 
wrong. A third implication is that it is probably better to construe 
conceptions as projections of a particular view of something and an 
ability to take par in particular language games, rather than 
identifying conceptions with historical consciousness or frozen forms 
of thought. Because understanding is, as has been suggested here and 
elsewhere, not the same thing as explicit linguistic interpretation. It is 
rather both a prerequisite for and a result of existential awareness, a 
sense of self and explicit linguistic interpretations.  
A forth implication of the investigation, is that it is better to study 
conceptions and understanding as attempts to make sense of 
something as it appears to be included as in particular language 
game. This is meant “instead of” merely viewing them as relatively 
independent meanings, not only of way that the objects under 
consideration are introduced by the researchers, but also of the ways 
wherein particular participants or various types of participants tend 
to understand these objects under consideration in different 
situations. This leads to a fifth implication. This is that it is probably 
better to view and study consciousness as historically operative 
consciousness rather than to merely view and study it as a relative 
static meaning structure (i.e. historical consciousness). And that it is 
probably better to view and study learning as the process whereby 
persons elaborate and guide inadequate or partially adequate 
meaningful presentations or actions in relation to Subject-Other-
World relations, toward adequacy, by discovering, acquiring or 
sustaining the new dimensions offered by the Subject-Other-World 
network and its horizon (Giorgi, 1992). This in contrast to merely 
viewing and studying learning in terms of transitions between 
qualitatively different conceptions of the same object. The reason 
why the new suggestion is better than the old idea is that it is first in 
the concrete enquiry of being that one can hope to gain experience 
and find the necessary language to provide an explanation of why 
there is learning and why understanding develops as it develops 
does.  
In order to develop understanding of understanding, it thus seems 
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important that one does not only settle for general structural de-
scriptions of learning as the development of specific understandings 
of a particular object, but rather that we also stretch our knowledge 
frameworks to include also existential aspects. These include 
expressions about concepts in terms of what the categories of 
circumspective concern they express, represent in terms of lived 
experience, pre-understanding, negation of previous experience, 
understanding interpretation and explicit linguistic interpretation. 
This is also an implication of Säljö’s (1994, 1997) critique of much of 
the “phenomenographic” research of the eighties. In order to 
develop a better understanding of learning in this sense, it is also 
probably necessary to better understand the general and specific 
character of the circumstances in which human beings learn, and the 
similarities and differences between learning various things in 
various situations, for various purposes and towards various ends. It 
is also important though, that one better understands the ways in 
which learners and more experienced and involved others are 
involved in various forms of learning activity, as well as the ways in 
which the character of particular types of self-understanding learners 
and teachers are influenced. It is important to know what 
combinations of such things can say for possibilities to learn 
particular things from particular associations.  
However, even the above is not enough alone. Because in order to 
develop one’s understanding of understanding in the indicated di-
rection, it is also important that one better understands the impor-
tance that self-understanding of the significance of that which is the 
subject for studies may say, for possibilities to develop particular 
types of understanding of particular types of objects. Motivation 
covers part of this terrain. If one finds it worthwhile to develop 
understanding of understanding in the proposed direction, it seems, 
to put it short, important that one doesn’t settle with what has been 
achieved so far, but rather pushes forward beyond toward a truly 
psychological and pedagogical understanding of learning as a 
human phenomenon.  
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IMPLICATIONS FOR PEDAGOGICAL PRAXIS 
Reflecting on what consequences the results and the discussion of the 
results of the present study can have for pedagogical practice, it 
seems as if what has first and foremost been said here (and 
elsewhere) about understanding as best conceived of as historically 
operative consciousness and as self-understanding, practical ability 
and so on, has something to say to teachers and students. Beginning 
with the second, it seems important to once again point out that 
understanding as a rule not only means that one moves towards a 
meaning, but also that one thereby also becomes a person that 
understands or knows “that something” – if not better so at least – 
differently from how one tended to understand or know it before. 
This indicates that one changes as a person through the experience 
(Marton et al., 1993), and that one as a studying person, exactly as an 
educating person, is not so much an autonomous individual as a 
socio-cultural being (Ozmon & Craver, 1995, Chapter 10). 
The study has in my view very strong implications for teaching. This 
is because it implies that if teaching is considered as a form of 
activity that involves development of understanding of particular 
phenomena in the sphere of experience and the sphere of activity in 
the world, there can also be a good reason to ask what counts as 
understanding in such spheres and who or what determines this. As 
a rule teachers seem to do so in the classroom, the activities of which 
generally involve directed acts of questions and answers, which are 
worked out especially for the purpose of providing opportunities for 
the studying person to demonstrate whether or not he or she has 
achieved the desired form of understanding. in this sense one could 
perhaps also say that it is what counts as understanding in language 
games “steered” by the teacher, that also determines what counts as 
understanding in the classroom. But of course, the teacher is also 
steered by other language games both outside and inside “the 
present”. 
If what counts as understanding in these language games is to be as 
fruitful as possible it seems important that one as a teacher asks the 
right questions and is familiar with the many different senses in 
which something, for instance, the equivalent sign, may be un-
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derstood (Nickerson, 1985). Unless one does and succeeds in taking 
this into consideration in a fruitful way in the composition of the 
language games, the students could very well pass an exam for 
instance without having understood in the desired sense (Beach, 
1997).  
To have passed these examinations could then be read synonymous 
with having achieved the desired form of understanding, and that 
would be perfectly OK if there were such things as forms of 
understandings that were relatively fixed and firm and that could be 
described. And that we could use descriptions of such things to 
identify equivalents beyond the answers that particular students 
have given. But what would have become of understanding then? 
Would understanding thereby not have become like that which 
Gadamer (1960/1989) called “historical consciousness” as opposed 
to “consciousness in which history is ever at work”? Would 
understanding as a result of this movement then not have been 
ripped out of its living context, reformed according to the image of a 
dominant cognitive system? This is a dogmatic dependency 
relationship (Beach, 1997, 1999). 
If one compares with what has been said earlier in this discussion 
about the ways in which the participants have understood under-
standing, it seems as if what one is encountering here is something 
similar to what has been called understanding as achievement of 
knowledge of or skill in something through successful completion of 
deliberate goal oriented learning activity. But understanding that 
proceeds from the assumption that to understand something is to be 
able to carry out particular operations is to determine that 
understanding is no longer seen as historically operative 
consciousness, but rather as “a historical consciousness”: i.e. a fixed 
and finished system of beliefs and possible actions that stands over 
against us like an object that has qualities that can be catalogued.  
There is still some truth in this way of interpreting understanding, 
but understanding it  lies in the practical side becoming recognised. 
This is also something that there has been an attempt to take into 
consideration in the thesis, by it pointing to and discussing 
Rosenberg (1981) on the one hand and to Gadamer (1960/1993) on 
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the other concerning what is contingent in a given situation. Taking 
one’s point of departure in a notion of understanding like that of 
“historical consciousness”, opposes or ruins our possibilities to 
understand and above all carry out education as the combination of 
teaching and learning for the purpose of developing more advanced 
systematic understanding. It “freezes” knowledge. This is also what 
normally happens in education perhaps. 
What I’m setting out to assert here, is that models of understanding 
as factual acquisition are absolutely counter-productive with 
reference to the “high-modern”, reflexive aims of education, and 
should be abandoned in favour of conceptions of understanding as a 
particular self-consciousness at a particular moment in time. Such 
may be objectified, but need not be. Moreover, if interpreted in this 
sense, what has been called conceptions in psychological and 
pedagogical research so far, is not to be identified with un-
derstanding as such, to be “developmental”, because this should 
only be used to refer to how someone has grasped something in a 
particular situation, for a particular purpose and toward a particular 
end. When understanding is used to refer to frozen forms of thought 
it becomes counterproductive to the development of the most valued 
notions of understanding in high-modernity. 
Understanding is a far more encompassing and elusive phenomenon 
than a conception. It is the totality of historically and experientially 
given and changing possible ways to discern and further relate to an 
object in concrete activity that are within a particular persons reach 
at a particular moment. It is the experience and the possible ways to 
discern and relate to the particular object in question that are implied 
by a living meaning relation. It is the historical personal ground 
whereupon one can project oneself according to ones possibilities 
relative to particular being in the world. It is an experience of being 
which can be voiced. And it is an orientation.  
Understanding is then also the meaningfulness or the meaning 
relation of being in the world. It is also the medium wherein the 
being of the being that is available can present itself as something 
that appears to present this or that character, or as something that 
can be understood as something, or as something that one can 
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understand differently now from how one may previously have 
understood it. It is, thus, in short, the lived experience of being and 
the possibilities to discern and relate to this and similar or types of 
being. This “relativity” is what makes understanding generalisable. 
And without this “relativity” it is not. 
Understanding is, thus, not the same as the being of the particular 
being that has become an object for understanding, but it is a living 
personal historical meaning-relation to it which is made according to 
one’s possibilities relative to the being implied by one’s 
understanding of the same. It is, in other words, a prerequisite for 
and a result of understanding in the sense of an experiential course 
of events that involves negations of experience, projections of oneself 
according to one’s possibilities, understanding interpretation and 
explicit linguistic interpretation. These are the “semantics” of 
understanding and an expression of their semiotic relations. And 
these have been given relief with/in the present study. 
This gives us the following as a new point of departure on/in 
“education for the advancement of understanding” and for teaching 
toward meaningful, relational learning. That is, that understanding is 
an ongoing functional relation with particular being in the world that 
may take on new meaning as it enters into new relations with the 
“one’s self” which stands both with and against. It is a personal 
historical experiential linguistic factual relation with a proportional 
being of a particular object in the world. As such it is not only 
different from all other personal historically operative experiential 
linguistic factual possible relationships with that being, but also 
similar to all such relationships to the extent that the person’s that 
are responsible for them have shared in the same world, have lived 
under similar conditions, have participated in similar activities, have 
had similar experiences, have learnt the same language, and have 
worked out the same relationship relative to being.  
This gives us the, in my view, primary significance of the results of 
the study of the development of understanding of understanding as 
a phenomenon for relevant pedagogical practice. The findings not 
only throw light over what one in various ages and with varying 
lengths of formal education tends to understand with understanding 
 Concluding remarks  217 
as a phenomenon and how one’s understanding of that phenomenon 
tends to develop as one grows more experienced in what it means to 
understand. They also suggest that understanding as a phenomenon 
can be described as an experiential sequence of events in which 
historically operative consciousness of particular being as being that 
presents this or that but not the other character is transformed into 
another and often also more advanced, inclusive and exclusive form 
of consciousness of that something. This takes place through a 
particular type of event that essentially seems to consist in projecting 
oneself according to one’s possibilities relative to the thing in 
question and involves firstly experiencing that “this thing” is not as 
one expected it to be, secondly looking for and finding another way 
of understanding it that corresponds to how it has presented itself, 
and then thirdly, integrating understanding interpretation with 
previous meaning into a more or less explicit linguistic meaning that 
comes to stand in a way that is felt to transcend a previous grasp in 
one sense or another.  
This is an understanding of understanding as a phenomenon that 
suggests that understanding is not just a world event but also a word 
event, because the important thing with understanding is not only 
that it takes place in the world, but also that it can modify and be 
expressed in an essentially linguistic relationship to the world as a 
whole. This is the ability of a particular understander to relate to an 
object and its being, as a being that presents such and such a 
character, and also to be able to express this in discourse. This is an 
understanding of understanding that appears to present the 
possibility to understand teaching as a historical form of 
communication that involves the development of more advanced 
forms of consciousness of the things under consideration as a 
significant objective and is a consciousness of understanding, 
teaching and learning as historical forms of activity rather than as 
subjective or objective processes. 
This is of vital importance. Because what it says is that what is 
important for understanding, is a consciousness that one as an un-
derstander transcends in understanding. This is perhaps first and 
foremost not so much previous understanding of particular being as 
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it is what one has been so far oneself in relation to the understood. 
This links one to others in the web of the living, ever changing 
functional meaning relations, that make up one’s share in the world 
with oneself, other persons, and things, and that is also where one 
proximally and for the most part exists with the other persons, 
beings and things that one encounters in the physical and socio-
cultural environment. Hence: 
The weight of the things we encounter in understanding plays itself out in a 
linguistic event, a play of words playing around and about what is meant. 
Language games exists where we, as learners – and when do we cease to be 
that? – rise to… understanding of the world.…  
Thus there is undoubtedly no understanding that is free of all prejudices, 
however much the will of our knowledge must be directed toward escaping 
their thrall. (Gadamer, 1960/1993, p. 490). 
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Appendix 1 
 
SENSES OF “FÖRSTÅ” 
“1)… märka, erfara…; lära känna…; 2) … få veta, få reda på. få höra, 
erfara…få besked l. vetskap om ngt;… 3) komma underfund med; 
komma till insikt om, inse (ngt l. att ngt är l. vad som är… av ngt 
komma till insikt om ngt, draga den slutsatsen avngt (att osv)… 4) 
(med förståndet) genomtränga, fatta den värkliga innebörden l. det 
väsentliga l. det inre sammanhanget i (ngt), inse (hur ngt är möjligt l. 
varför ngt förhåller sig på ett visst sätt o.d.) äv. inse det naturliga l. 
berättigade i (ngt); begripa… 6) (med förståndet) uppfatta (ett gm tal l. 
skrift l. tecken l. på annat sätt gjort meddelande), så att man med 
orden l. tecken osv. förbinder en viss betydelse l. mening, begripa… 
fatta; 7) (i sht i skriftspr.) (upp)fatta l. tyda (ngt) på visst sätt, taga l. 
uppfatta (ngt) i en viss betydelse, (för sig själv) inlägga en viss mening 
l. betydelse i (ngt); tolka… 8) mena, avse, åsyfta; inlägga en viss 
mening l. betydelse i (ngt)…” (Svenska Akademin, 1928, F3256–3262).  

  
Appendix 2 
 
ADDITIONAL TABLES 
Table 1. The participant informants in terms of subgroup, status as 
participant, and gender 
 
  Sex  
Subgrou
p 
Status M F Sum 
A written 5 8 13 
 interviews 4 4 8 
B written 6 5 11 
 interviews 4 4 8 
C written 4 14 18 
 interviews 1 7 8 
D written 5 20 25 
 interviews 5 5 10 
 Total 34 67 101 
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Table 2. Distribution of the twelve year old participants’ accounts over 
categories 
 
Understanding as… 
 I. recep-
tion 
II. acqui-
sition 
III. realisation 
 
   
a. factual 
1–2 
b. relation. 
1–3 
c. systemic 
1–3 
Adam 1: 3* 2, 4  1:b3  
Ann 2: 2  1:a1, 2:a1, 3:a2   
A 3: 1, 2, 3     
Agatha 4: 2  1:a1   
Abraham 5: 1, 2, 3, 4;     
A6:   1:a1, 2:a2   
A 7:  2  1:b3  
A 8: 1, 2 3    
Andy 9: 1 4 2:a1, 3:a2   
A10: 1     
Anthony 11: 1, 4, 6 3 3:a1   
A12: - - 1:a1   
A13:   2a:1, 4a:1   
A14: 1     
A15: 1     
A16: 1     
A17: - - -   
A18: 1     
A20: - - 1:a1   
Alexandra 22: 1, 2,3     
Amy 24: 1, 2, 3     
* Italicised letters and numbers indicate orally presented accounts. 
 Appendix 2 237 
 
Table 3. Distribution of the fifteen year old participants’ accounts over 
categories 
 
Understanding as… 
 1. recep-
tion 
2. acqui-
sition 
3. realisation 
 
   
a. factual 
1–2 
b. relation. 
1–3 
c. systemic 
1–3 
B1:   1:a1   
B2:   1:a2   
Bill 3:  1    
B4: 1     
B5:  1    
Barbara 6:    1:b1,3; 2:b3  
Burt 7:      
Beatrice 8:  1  1:b1  
Bo 9:  1    
Betty 10:   1:a1 2:b3  
B11: - - - - - 
B12:  1    
B13:  1    
B14:   1a:1   
B15: 1     
B16:   1a:1   
Bobby 17:     1:c2? 
Blanche 18:    1:b1  
B19 - - - - - 
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Table 4. Distribution of the eighteen year old participants’ accounts over categories 
 
Understanding as… 
 I. recep-
tion 
II. acqui-
sition 
III. realisation 
 
   
a. factual 
1–2 
b. relation. 
1–3 
c. systemic 
1–3 
C1:     1:c2 
Camilla 2:  1   1:c3 
Charles 3:   1:a1   
C4:    1:b1  
C5:  1    
Caren 6:   3:a1 1:b1 2:c1 
C7:  1    
C8:   1:a1   
C9:   1:a1 1:b1  
Christina 10:   3:a1  1:c2 
C12:    1:b2  
C14:    1:b2?  
C16:      
C18:      
C20:    1:b1  
Caroline 22:   1a:1   
C24:   1:a2   
C26:     1:c1 
Charlotte 28:  3 1:a2, 2:a1 4:b2; 1:b3  
Constance 30:   1:a2 1:b2  
Christel 32:   2:a1 2:b1 1:c2 
C34:   1a:1   
C36:   1:a2   
C38:      
C40:   1:a2   
C42:     1:c2 
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Table 5. Distribution of the adult participants’ accounts over categories 
 
Understanding as… 
 1. recep-
tion 
2. acqui-
sition 
3. realisation 
 
   
a. factual 
1–2 
b. relation. 
1–3 
c. systemic 
1–3 
Dan 1:   1:a1 1:b2;2:b3  
Daisy 2:   1:a1 1:b2; 2b3  
Douglas 3:    2:b2; 3b:3 1:c3 
Diana 4:    1:b2, 2:b2  
Davis 5:   1:a1   
D6:    1:b2  
Dick 7:     1:c3, 2:c3 
D8:    1:b1  
D9.    1:b2  
D10:   1:a2   
D11:   1:a1   
D12:   1:a1   
D13:      
D14:   1:a1   
Donald 15:   1:a1; 1:a2 3:b3 2:c1 
D16:      
D17:      
D18:  1 1:a2   
D20 1  1:a2   
D22:   1:a2   
D24:      
D26:    1:b1;1:2  
D28:    1:b1  
Dora 30:  1, 2 1:a1 3;b3  
D32:   1:a1, 1a:2   
D34:   1:a1   
D36:      
D38:      
D40 2  1:a1   
D42      
D44   1:a2   
Doris 46:   1:a1 1:b2  
Dorothy 48:    1:b1 1:c3 
D50   1:a1   
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Table 6. Distribution of interviewed participants’ accounts over categories 
 
Understanding as… 
 1. recep-
tion 
2. acqui-
sition 
3. realisation 
 
   
a. factual 
1–2 
b. relation. 
1–3 
c. systemic 
1–3 
Adam 1: 3 2, 4  1:b3  
Ann 2: 2  1:a1, 2:a1, 3:a2   
Agatha 4: 2  1:a1   
Abraham 5: 1, 2, 3, 4;     
Andy 9: 1 4 2:a1, 3:a2   
Anthony 11: 1, 4, 6 3 3:a1   
Alexandra 22: 1, 2,3     
Amy 24: 1, 2, 3     
Bill 3:  1    
Barbara 6:    1:b1,3; 2:b3  
Burt 7:      
Beatrice 8:  1  1:b1  
Bo 9:  1    
Betty 10:   1:a1 2:b3  
Bobby 17:     1:c2? 
Blanche 18:    1:b1  
Camilla 2:  1   1:c3 
Charles 3:   1:a1   
Caren 6:   3:a1 1:b1 2:c1 
Christina 10:   3:a1  1:c2 
Caroline 22:   1:a1   
Charlotte 28:  3 1:a2, 2:a1 4:b2; 1:b3  
Constance 30:   1:a2 1:b2  
Christel 32:   2:a1 2:b1 1:c2 
Dan 1:   1:a1 1:b2; 2:b3  
Daisy 2:   1:a1 1:b2; 2:b2  
Douglas 3:    2:b2; 3:b3 1:c3 
Diana 4:    1:b2, 2:b2  
Davis 5:   1:a1   
Dick 7:     1:c3; 2:c3 
Donald 15:   1:a1, 1:a2 3:b3 2:c1 
Dora 30:  1, 2 1:a1 3:b3  
Doris 46:   1:a1 1:b2  
Dorothy 48:    1:b1 1:c3 
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UNDERSTANDING IN NOVELS 
The account of the various assumed forms of and conceptions of 
understanding will here form a background for a presentation of the 
forms of understanding and conceptions that have been conceived in 
the analysis of the concordance materials. This means that if the 
presentation of the discussed forms of consciousness and conceptions 
of understanding presented emanate from an attempt to work out 
what until further notice can be considered as a delineation of what 
have appeared as the ways in which the participants appear to have 
understood understanding, the present section can present the result 
in relation to an attempt to identify and exemplify these forms and 
conceptions of understanding from an analysis of the meaning of the 
usage of the verb to understand in its past tense.  
The data consists of the previously mentioned extract from the 
concordance. This extract involved about 40 registrations of the key 
verb (förstod) in its immediate context, which as a rule means 4–10 
words before and after the key word. The registrations were picked 
out on the basis of the same criteria as those that guided the 
preliminary analysis of the written account of experiences of having 
arrived at understanding of particular being. 
The purpose of this analysis was simply to find instances of the 
previously discerned forms of understanding of understanding and to 
if possible also discern other ways of understanding understanding as 
a phenomenon. 
The relevant parts of the concordance were read and categorised 
according to the previously established categories of description.  
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UNDERSTANDINGS OF UNDERSTANDING 
Considering how the Swedish equivalent to the English verb to 
understand (förstå) is used in its past tense (förstod) in the mentioned 
database, it seems as if understanding as a phenomenon appears to be 
understood either as a reception of knowledge of something through simple 
perception or as a realisation of something through experience and 
interpretation. In the first case understanding is understood as an event 
that involves a knowledge recipient in an act of simple perception. In 
the second case, on the other hand, it seems to be understood as an 
event that involves a realisation about a particular being through an 
experience in relation to the character of something that can be 
understood and apprehended as something that presents the character 
of what one thereby experiences.  
UNDERSTANDING AS  A RECEPTION 
The following extract has in relation to this been understood as usage 
of the verb that implies understanding in the first of the two senses:  
in… yellow and when she managed to take that which had been sewn in, she 
understood that it was a coin but of a sort that she nev…  
The above has been understood as usage of the verb that implies an 
understanding of understanding as a reception of knowledge of something 
through observation. The same has also appeared to be valid for the 
following extract: 
… I began to discern details. It was the old. I understood that before I saw his 
face. It was pale…  
Hereto too, understanding seems to be understood as a reception of 
knowledge of something through simple perception and as an event that 
involves oneself as a person that receives knowledge of something that 
is experienced to be the case through this something presenting itself 
through simple perception. It is a usage of the verb that suggests that 
understanding as a phenomenon means that one experiences a 
particular object or being as an object of a particular kind or as a 
particular individual through it presenting itself as that for oneself 
from a position and through a perspective that makes it possible for it 
 Appendix 3 243 
 
to present itself in this way. This implies an understanding of 
understanding as phenomenon that ascribes the understander a 
passive roll and the understander’s counterpart an active role.  
UNDERSTANDING AS A REALISATION 
In the understanding of understanding as phenomenon that is 
assumed to be implied in the second type of usage of the verb, the 
relationship between the understander and the understood appears to 
be more dialectical. This could perhaps be exemplified by a 
consideration of the following extract: 
At first he did not understand what it meant. But then he understood. The tiger 
made an attack against the boards in front of the basement… 
As may have followed from the reading of this quotation, the usage of 
understanding implies in this case an understanding of understanding 
that suggests that understanding implies a productive shift of 
awareness. It presents someone in a situation where he or she 
obviously hears a sound, finds that he or she doesn’t understand what 
it is the sound of, tries to understand what it is a sound of and 
understands that it is the sound of “[t]he tiger making an attack 
against the boards in front of the basement”. It implies that 
understanding involves both experience and interpretation, which has 
appeared as a defining characteristic of the form of consciousness of 
understanding as a phenomenon that has been called Understanding as 
a realisation of something through experience and interpretation. This 
understanding of understanding as a phenomenon could perhaps also 
be said to have been expressed through the following usage of the 
verb: 
… in her own despair she became all of a sudden conscious of his, and 
understood to a certain extent how humiliating it must have felt… 
Beside these two there were about thirty-five other extracts that also 
were found to express understanding in the discussed sense.  
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CONCEPTIONS OF REALISATION 
The usage of the verb understand in the discussed senses have in turn 
been found to express the following conceptions of understanding:  
Understanding as a realisation of: 
1) that something is the case 
2) the existential meaning; 
3) how something appears for someone else; 
4) what is meant with something. 
The various conceptions of Understanding as a realisation of something 
through experience and interpretation, which were recognised in the 
concordance material, will be exemplified below in the mentioned 
order. 
1. That something is the case 
The conception of Understanding as a realisation of something through 
experience and thinking means that the understander understands that 
something is the case. It can be exemplified with the following extract 
from the concordance materials: 
When they began to miss him at his workplace everyone understood that he 
had drowned.  
In this particular usage of the verb, it is “that he had drowned” that is 
said to have become the object for understanding, and which was  
realised through some sort of additional experience and thinking to 
that which somehow had led to that one had learnt that he seemed to 
have or could have drown. 
2. What really is the case 
The conception means that the understander is conceived and 
explained to understand what really is the case as opposed to what 
appeared to be the case. This is only represented by two cases. 
The first of these runs as follows: 
… ed and laughed from the harbour side but shut up when they understood 
that they by mistake had entered into a house of mourning.  
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This suggests an event where a group of people realise that what 
appeared to be a place where they could merry themselves was not 
what it appeared to be, but rather the opposite, namely a house of 
mourning. The extract does not tell us how this understanding was 
arrived at, but it suggests at least that it was something that could 
have been reached through something in style with: looking for a place 
where one could enjoy oneself, finding a place that looked as if it could 
be such a place, entering it as if it was, but once in the building, 
finding that it was the opposite, namely a place where people had 
gathered to mourn.  
The second extract sounds as follows: 
… To begin with I believed that the film was in favour of drugs but understood 
later that it delivered critique in part against society… 
This extract suggests also a course of event s where what is really the 
case is understood, but only after what appeared to be the case was 
proven to be different to how it had been expected to be.  
3. The existential meaning 
The conception of understanding as a realisation of the existential meaning 
through experience and thinking means that the understander is felt to 
understand the existential as opposed to, for instance, the linguistic 
meaning. This could be exemplified with the following extract from 
the concordance: 
… to drive the whole distance without stopping over night. That night I 
understood what the notion “fall asleep when driving” means… 
This extract suggests a situation where a person who has heard and 
understood but not experienced the expression “fall asleep when 
driving” comes to understand what it means to have the assumed 
experience. This expresses a conception of understanding as a 
realisation of the existential meaning of “falling asleep when driving” 
through first hand experience and recognition of the phenomenon in 
question. 
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4. How something appears for someone 
The conception of understanding as a realisation of something through 
experience and thinking means that the understander is felt to 
understand how something, for instance a particular object, situation, 
sense, etc., is lived by another person. This could be exemplified with 
the following extracts from the concordance: 
… that tenderness came over me and I felt I understood how she experienced 
it, how she mourned over that she could not… 
… in her own despair she became all of a sudden aware of his, understood to 
some extent how humiliating it must have felt. 
Each of these two extracts imply a situation where a person is said to 
have experienced that he or she realised how another person lived or 
lives a particular situation. They suggest also that this realisation takes 
place through the understander somehow finding him/herself in a 
mode in which through an imaginative transposition, another person’s 
position can be divined in order to experience how the other lived, 
lives or has lived his or her situation. These extracts imply that the 
emotional dimensions of one’s belongingness to the world have 
something to say in understanding. However, there are also some 
extracts that have been found to express this conception that do not 
imply any emotionality in understanding how the particular object, 
situation, sense, etc. appears for others.  
5. What is meant with  something 
The conception means that the understander is felt to understand what 
is meant or said by, for instance, a particular word, utterance, gesture, 
etc. This could be exemplified with the following extract from the 
concordance: 
Uglik made a jerk with his head and she understood immediately what he 
meant. She took the frying pan with… 
In this particular case, the usage of the key word has been taken to 
express understanding as an apprehension of what a counterpart 
obviously meant to communicate with a particular gesture. It is a 
usage that presupposes a dialogical relationship between a person that 
says something with a gesture and another person who by experience 
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and interpretation of what is meant with the gesture apprehends what 
is intended. This assumed conception suggests that understanding 
means an apprehension of what is meant with something and could be 
exemplified with the following extract: 
I know that. A long gaze. I understood what it meant. I looked down. 
The use of the key verb suggests a dialogical relationship between two 
persons. One that obviously thinks something about a particular object 
and expresses this thought in a gesture for another person, who by 
experience and interpretation apprehends what the first obviously 
thinks about the particular object and communicates in return about it.  
In addition to these two examples, which have both been taken here to 
presuppose understanding as a realisation of something through 
experience and interpretation by comprehending understanding as a 
realisation of what is meant with something through apprehending, 
there are also examples that suggest a slightly different situation. One 
such example is the following: 
… man friends of my wife…” They spoke German, but I understood most of 
what was said. They had obviously not seen… 
In this particular use, understanding is also understood as a realisation 
what is meant with a particular (series of) expression(s), but with the 
difference that it suggests a much more complicated relation than a 
dialogical one. It differs also with respect to what is said to have been 
understood. This appears not as much in terms of what was meant 
with what was said with what was uttered as it does what the 
understander could make out of what was said with respect to the 
interpretations of the speakers’ experience(s) of the object(s) for their 
speech.  
A more sophisticated analysis might perhaps say that the example is 
an example of another sense of understanding that the first two. 
However, in this case they have all been taken as expressions for the 
same conception of understanding as what is meant with a particular 
expression and that one arrives at this through experience and 
interpretation of what it appears a counterpart means with what they 
gesticulate, utter, etc.  
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SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS CONCERNING 
UNDERSTANDING IN NOVELS  
In sum, the analysis of forms of consciousness and conceptions of 
understanding as a phenomenon in the concordance have revealed 
that understanding for the most part appears as a realisation of 
something through experience and interpretation or as a reception of 
knowledge of something through observation. It has also shown hat 
there are no indications that understanding has been understood as an 
achievement of desired knowledge or skill through the successful 
completion of goal-oriented learning activity.  
The analysis has also revealed that understanding of understanding as 
a realisation of something through experience and understanding has 
been found to manifest itself in terms of a realisation: 
1. that something is the case; 
2. of what really is the case; 
3. of the existential meaning ; 
4. of how something appears for someone else; and: 
5. of what is meant with something; through some sort of experience and 
interpretation. 
It has thereby, however, also revealed that the actual part of the 
concordance only represents four of the altogether eight different 
manifestations of understanding as a realisation of new truth about a 
particular way of being in the world through experience and 
interpretation which emerged from the interpretation of the written 
accounts of instances of understanding and the additional examples 
that were added in the interviews. The conceptions: f) how something 
works; g) inherent regularity or structure; and: h) why something is; 
seems, in other words, not to be represented in the concordance, 
whereby it seems reasonable ask if this is not due to the concordance 
being based on a particular kind of written material where such 
conceptions are seldom expressed. 
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DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE LATER AND THE 
EARLIER INTERPRETATION 
The reflection over the variation between the different episodes that 
the participants recounted gave at one stage of the analysis the 
thought that the events described were about: 
Acquiring a desired skill 
Getting to know something 
Realising something (Helmstad & Marton, 1992, p. 4) 
This preliminary result was considered similar to that arrived at by 
Pramling (1983). In her study of children’s conceptions of learning, she 
found that the participant stories about things that they meant the had 
learnt were about: 
Learning to do 
Learning to know 
Learning to understand (Pramling, 1983, p. 92) 
Moreover, whilst the first category was by far the most frequent and 
the third extremely rare in Pramling’s study, things appeared to be the 
other way around with the material that forms the basis for the present 
study. It also seemed as if some of the accounts which makes up the 
data fail to carry the meaning that eventually became associated with 
“understanding”, namely those which were of the first two categories 
and which were about Acquiring a desired skill and Getting to know 
something. This made for a hypothesis in which it appeared as if the 
observation presupposed an implicit notion of understanding, where 
the line of reasoning was that the intuitively felt meaning that can be 
assumed common to all episodes, can be intuitively accepted as being 
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examples of accounts of understanding proper. If the common ground 
against which the different meanings of understanding appear could 
be made explicit we would have a possibility to answer this charge. 
This is meant, to answer the question “What is the invariant meaning 
or essence of understanding?” as an empirical approach to a 
fundamentally philosophical problem.  
In accordance with previously established praxis, the attempt to work 
out an answer to this question meant searching for a way of 
discriminating between all instances that belong to the third category 
(i.e. understanding “proper”) and those which do not, it was assumed 
that all understanding is learning, but that not all learning involves 
understanding. This was something that was also felt follow from 
Pramling’s (1983) and to support a hypothesis concerning the results 
of her study.  
In the discussion of Marton et al., (1993), it was noticed that this article 
represented an attempt to spell out what could be considered to be 
“the essence of learning” as “becoming more capable through 
experience”. In the stage of the analysis where the accounts were 
found to be about Acquiring a skill; Getting to know something; and 
Realising something; it emerged that the assumed essence of learning 
obviously applied well to both Acquiring a skill  and Getting to know 
something. This is because in the analysis of the accounts that had been 
found to represent this, it occurred that these accounts implied that 
“understanding” meant that one felt one became more capable in one 
sense or another and that one typically meant one did so through 
accidental action, observation, information, practice and/or questions 
and answers. These “accounts” rest in contrast with, for instance, those 
of biological maturation, or productive thinking.  
An attempt to apply what was said to be characteristic about “the 
essence of learning” to “the essence of understanding” was also made, 
but it seemed as if the later was more specific. Assuming that this was 
a valid interpretation, it appeared to follow that the essence of 
understanding had to be qualified further to differentiate it from the 
meaning of learning. In connection hereto, it seemed obvious that 
understanding implies a particular meaning of “becoming capable” 
and/or a particular meaning of “through experience” in the 
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description of learning as “becoming more capable through 
experience”.  
Trying to spell out what then appeared to be common for all the 
accounts of instances that had been classified as belonging to the third 
type, i.e. Understanding as realising something rather than as acquiring a 
skill or getting to know, it was said that in each case some change of the 
understander’s conscious awareness of something is described or 
implied. Furthermore, it was also said that it seemed also as if this 
change was experienced to be of a particular kind,  with a subjective as 
well as an objective aspect which was conceived and explained as a 
course of events in which appearance and reality, subject and object 
become visible, and first separated and then united again.  
More precisely, the accounts that had appeared to set loose 
Understanding as realising something seemed to indicate that one as a 
person usually lives in a taken-for-granted attitude where one assumes 
that one’s knowledge or one’s consciousness of things simply reflects 
what these things are like, and that others are aware of the same things 
in the same senses as oneself. One is in what the phenomenologists call 
the natural attitude unaware that what is, is in part relative to ones 
experience and that a certain thing that one is aware of as something 
that presents this or that character may appear differently to others in 
the circumstances given and also to oneself in other circumstances.  
In some cases, however, an experience that one is unable to perceive 
how something really is, breaks down the normal unity between 
perception and reality. One experiences that one does not understand 
until one once again – if possible – experiences that one does. 
Understanding means, then, a lived experience of realising how 
something is. The natural attitude is restored. Struggling with a 
problem and all of a sudden realising how it can be solved is an 
example of understanding in this sense. In other cases, it appeared that 
understanding means that what is the case and perceived reality are 
split in retrospect as one becomes aware of the obvious fact that what 
one took for granted to be the case about something was in fact ones’ 
interpretation of it; one was wrong or one had not experienced what 
one is aware of now. This relationship was in connection hereto 
explained as one that essentially appears to consist of becoming aware 
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of this due to an insight into what the actual aspects of reality really 
look like. Moreover, it was suggested that it is exactly this “insight” 
which makes what one experienced as reality. At the same time, the 
insight means that one experiences that one becomes aware of how 
things are.  
This type of account of understanding as realising something was, in 
other words, found to suggest that understanding sometimes means 
that one leaves the natural attitude in retrospect so to speak. These 
accounts were also interpreted to suggest that in the same moment as 
one moves out of the natural attitude one also moves into it again, 
albeit not exactly the same natural attitude as before, but one that 
represents a partly different outlook over that which it concerns. This 
means that they were found to suggest, that one from now on either 
tends to understand that which one had not understood before with 
that which has become object for understanding or that one tends to 
understand that which one has understood before in another and in 
some sense more advanced meaning.  
In relation to the discussed interpretation of the general structure of 
the meaning of the accounts that at that stage of the analysis had been 
interpreted to understand understanding as a realisation of something, 
was also to advance a preliminary conclusion that understanding 
could be interpreted as something in style with a simultaneous 
suspension and confirmation of the natural attitude. That is, that it was 
an experiential course of events that among other things involved 
partial negation of previous experiences and the emergence of a new 
experiential truth as something which came to stand over and above 
the older version. One example of a narrative that was found to imply 
this assumed form of understanding was one that was related to 
learning to ride a bike. This was described as follows: 
After the child has had some practice on the bicycle with someone – who 
usually has already developed the skill – running after holding it, all of a 
sudden the child feels a change in his or her relation to the bike and shortly 
thereafter discovers that the more experienced or capable other is not holding 
the bike. It is at this instant that the child realises “I can ride the bike!”; the 
meaning of what has been experienced. This realisation implies of course that 
the state of being able to ride the bike was there before the child became aware 
of it. There had thus been a perception which differed from reality. 
Understanding means experientially seen, thus, that one realises what the case 
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really is. Perception and reality are no longer separated. (Helmstad & Marton, 
1992, p. 6) 
Another narrative that also was taken as an example of this form of 
understanding relates to what happened on a Christmas Eve when 
Santa Claus visited the family. This was described as follows: 
The child gets suspicious about the identity of Santa and by pulling his beard 
he comes to understand that Santa Claus is actually father or grandfather or 
some family friend. At the very instant of understanding, Santa Claus is in 
retrospect split into an appearance (Santa) and a reality (father). At the same 
time, what is perceived (father) and what is real (father) collapse again; what 
appeared as Santa was in fact father. (ibid.) 
Understanding was then, thus, understood as a collapse of reality and 
perception of reality into reality after that they have either been 
separated prior to the understanding taking place or have been 
separated in retrospect in the very act of understanding. A kind of 
event that results in that what previously was not understood becomes 
understood, or that what previously was understood in one sense now 
comes to be understood in an even more profound one. A new truth 
which stands over above the old has emerged for the understander.  
In order to further demonstrate the obvious difference between this 
sense of understanding, which was worked out through the 
interpretation of the discussed accounts, and the meaning for 
understanding that the other accounts appeared to suggest, one 
deviant case of each was considered. These two examples are 
presented below: 
Acquiring a skill 
It began at my grandmother’s. I was sitting eating when my mum and dad 
came in. They shouted for me to come. I went over to them and saw that they 
had bought a bicycle! It was a red girl’s model, the old type. Dad ran and 
pushed while I tried to cycle. After a while it went really well (at least I 
thought so then). I rode it all evening. There was a really long hill and I 
whizzed down it. I was really sad when we had to go home (A 7:2) 
Getting to know something 
When I understood… 
I was in the fifth grade (the second year of junior school) and we had just 
started to study English. The last chapter in the book had the heading “Safety 
first”. I translated it into “saftfest” [Swedish equivalent of “lemonade party”]. I 
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was at the age when that was a reasonable thing for a chapter to be called, and 
I didn’t really think about it. I didn’t think of checking in the dictionary to see 
if I was right. The day came when we got that chapter for homework. When I 
looked at the book’s vocabulary list I was a bit disappointed. My translation of 
“Safety first” was completely wrong. But I thought my translation was much 
nicer, at least for a fifth grader. (D 20:1) 
The first of the two examples was obviously not an account of an 
instance of understanding as it has been characterised above. One 
reason for this that was pointed out, was that it obviously does not 
involve a description of a subjective aspect. Another was that it 
obviously does not involve any explicit distinction between reality and 
perception of reality either. In consequence, it was not found to imply 
any collapse of the two either. Because, the account suggests just that 
the boy simply learns to ride the bike, without suddenly 
understanding that he actually can ride it (as in the case mentioned 
earlier). 
The second example was somewhat more difficult to distinguish. The 
narrative yields that the girl at the first encounter with the expression 
“Safety first” thought that it meant “saftfest” (Swedish for “lemonade 
party”), but that she at the second encounter with the expression learnt 
what was the correct Swedish equivalent from the dictionary. The 
reason why this account was found more difficult to differentiate from 
the accounts that were found to lend themselves to be understood as 
expressions of understanding as realising something, was explained to 
be that it may appear to suggest that understanding involves a 
retrospective split of reality into perception and reality and the 
collapse of the two into a new reality. However, whereas other 
accounts suggest that understanding involves a transformation of one 
way of understanding something into another in terms of a power of 
an experiential logic of relations or an evident logic of a system or 
structure; the narrative about gaining knowledge of the correct 
translation of ”Safety first” does not involve any explicit outlining of 
this element.  
The main difference between the accounts about understanding as 
realising something and those about receiving knowledge of 
something was, thus, found to be that while the former appeared to 
involve more or less explicit indications that understanding involves 
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experience of evident truth, the later appeared to lack this element, as 
the girl is simply informed about the correct Swedish equivalent of the 
expression and it is accepted due to the authority of the dictionary, not 
because it is experienced as being the true meaning of the expression. 
Finding out the correct meaning of a word or an expression may imply 
genuine understanding. For instance by finding a missing piece, the 
lines may make sense and all of a sudden form a coherent and 
transparent whole in which the different parts are logically related to 
each other. Nothing of this sort is, however, expressed in the second 
kind of account. Consequently, it was not considered as an account of 
understanding as realising something, but rather as an account of 
learning something in a particular sense, namely as getting to know 
something.  
At this stage of the analysis, there were three types of accounts in the 
material, two that were about learning and one that was about 
understanding in the discussed sense. In a subsequent phase of the 
analysis, it became obvious, however, that also the first two types of 
accounts could be considered as accounts about understanding too, 
where the meaning for understanding could be said to lack the 
essential element of the meaning for understanding that had been read 
out of the accounts of the third kind.  
It was also found that the accounts about Getting to know something, on 
a closer inspection appeared to consist of two different kinds with 
respect to how the object for understanding is meant to have become 
so. In the first type, something that one all of a sudden just noticed by 
accident or as something that someone else all of a sudden just said. In 
the second type, understanding is something one arrived at through 
feeling a need to know it, taking an action to know it and eventually 
also obtaining knowledge of it.  
The first type of the accounts of Getting to know something can be 
illustrated with the following example: 
When I understood 
When I understood that Buster, my hermit crab, was dead. Buster had been ill 
for a week or so. He had crawled out of the shell several times. We, my mother 
and me, went away for the  weekend to Varberg. We came back on the 
Sunday. Buster was dead, because he had not moved one bit and… it smelled 
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bad. I cried for several hours, it felt at least like I did. Then we buried him… 
Now we don’t live there any longer. It happened in Kungsbacka. (Andy 9:1w) 
The second type can be illustrated with the following example:  
When I understood the word precipitation 
It all started January 15 when we came to the geography lesson.  
Gunnar Petrell came and presented himself. 
Then he began to talk about what we would work with and among other things 
he said that we would talk much about “precipitation” in Sweden and in the 
Nordic countries.  
I could not follow, I did not understand the word “precipitation” but I didn’t 
dare to ask what was meant with it. 
All the time, he talked about it and I could not grasp the word, at the middle of 
the term we did some group work and I was together with two others, they also 
talked about “precipitation” and it was then that I decided to ask what was 
meant by it.  
They explained the word very well, but the term was almost over. 
When I understood the word, I understood also the fear that I’ve had for the 
teacher. (Dora 30:1w) 
In the first case the object for understanding is something that the 
person just observes, finds, etc., in the second it is something that the 
person feels a need to know, takes actions to learn to know and 
thereby also manages to achieve knowledge of. The first account 
suggests that the person is a rather passive recipient, the second 
suggests that the person is a rather active agent. This is an observation 
that also has support in Pramling’s (1983) investigation, which 
presents a similar variation with respect to how the participants 
appear to have understood and explained how learning comes about 
(ibid., p. 105 ff.).  
Against the background of these observations, one could perhaps also 
expect to find a similar variation with the accounts that were found to 
be about acquiring a skill, but the analysis has not given any support for 
this. If it had done so, there would be accounts about acquiring a skill 
that would suggest that the skill was acquired by accidental action and 
accounts that would suggest that the skill was acquired by successful 
completion of deliberate goal-oriented action. The analysis has, 
however, resulted in discernment of accounts suggesting that the 
object for understanding is reached through successful completion of 
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meaningful learning activity. The following account may serve as an 
example of this: 
When I understood the technique… 
To begin with I should perhaps explain what I mean with “the technique”. I 
play the electric organ and I have done that for about 7 years. When I moved 
to town 2 years ago, I began to compete in playing the electric-organ. I have 
competed in the town championship for two years and it is about one of my 
tunes for competition that I’m about to write. I had laid hands on a Japanese 
tune. It was a very difficult tune and I liked it although I did not always know 
the technique. The competition was to take place the first of April. 
By the end of February, I had still not found the way through the tune. On the 
top of everything, I became ill and could not take my organ lessons. My 
teachers even thought that I should play another tune. But I was determined to 
manage the tune on my own! 
Said and done. Since I was ill, I had whole days for practice. And one day I 
managed the technique. There was no limit to how proud I was over having 
managed the tune and the technique by myself. My teacher was very pleased 
and I myself grew in confidence. When I later also won the town 
championship I was overwhelmed. I had won with a tune that I was not 
supposed to have played. (Beatrice 8: 1w) 
This example suggest that understanding is an achievement of 
knowledge. In comparison with the accounts that had been taken as 
examples of Getting to know something, but that at this stage of the 
analysis had begun to emerge as accounts that express another 
meaning, it appeared reasonable to assume that the examples could be 
explained to present just about the same meaning for understanding. 
Moreover, in a subsequent attempt to spell out the general meaning 
for understanding not only of those accounts that could be said to be 
about understanding, but also for those that had been taken as 
examples of Acquiring a skill and those that had been taken as 
examples of Getting to know something it occurred that this could be 
accounted for in terms of three different forms of consciousness of 
understanding as phenomenon.  
A form of consciousness was then defined as a personal experiential 
ground on the basis of which a person or a group of persons can relate 
to a particular kind of being as something that presents this or that 
character rather than another character. It is a theoretical construct 
invented to better understand why a person during a particular 
passage of time tends to and can relate to a particular being in some 
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sense or senses, but not in another sense or other senses or why that 
being at that moment in that person’s experiential history can present 
itself in some sense or senses for that person, but not in others. It is a 
result of an attempt at a hermeneutic phenomenological 
reinterpretation of a conception as “a certain delimitation of a 
phenomenon from the context or background, and of its component 
parts and the relations between them” (Marton et al., 1993, p. 278; 
Svensson, 1984a), towards interpreting it as relating to a particular 
being as a being that presents this or that character, that presupposes 
more fundamental and more encompassing experience of that being 
than what is contained in that particular way of relating and that can 
also be understood as the personal ground for relating to it in this way.  
A form of consciousness of something as a phenomenon can, thus, be 
understood as the experiential background against which a person can 
relate to a particular being as something that present this or that 
character rather than as something that presents another character. It is 
a construct whose meaning can be explained further in comparison 
with what Dilthey [1958] called Erlebnis: “a lived experience 
encompassing unity of parts of life bound together through a common 
meaning for the course of life” (Palmer, 1969, p. 107).1  
Erlebnis can be illustrated with the experience of loneliness. Which is, 
for instance, not so much what one encounters when one finds oneself 
lonely as it is what loneliness has come to mean for oneself as a result 
one’s encounters with instances of various types of loneliness, at 
different times, situations, and places. This may even include other 
narratives about loneliness (and of course most importantly) one’s 
dominant meta-narratives of loneliness as carved in one’s major/main 
official discourses. Experience presents, in other words, the character 
of a contraction of meaning; an operative consciousness that reaches 
out and encompasses both recollections of the past and anticipation of 
the future in the total context of meaning that could be said to make 
up the life world (Palmer, 1969). This is a conception of experience that 
steers away from the otherwise so tempting tendency to make visual 
                                          
1 Gesammelte Schriften, VII, p. 194. 
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perception into a paradigm for understanding of consciousness. It is a 
conception that has been developed further in Heidegger (1927/1990) 
and in Gadamer (1960/1993). The meaning of the conception is that 
consciousness is not so much a question of having grasped a particular 
object in a particular sense as it is a question of orienting oneself 
towards “being in the present”.  
 
